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ABSTRACT
PROFESSIONAL VEILED WOMEN: THE EVERYDAY LIFE STRATEGIES 
OF PROFESSIONAL ISLAMIC WOMEN IN 1990S BURSA
Nese Öztimur
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
S upervisor/ ^ jİDilek Cindoğlu 
December 1999
The majoi' aim of this thesis is to examine the multiple bases on which professional, 
married, veiled Islamic women organize their everyday lives, and understand how do they 
legitimize their everyday activities with using different discourses. The professional veiled 
women reproduce and reformulate their gender roles and relations with regards to material 
necessities of everyday life and also with regards to the necessities of Islamic discourse. The 
professionally working veiled women legitimize or reconcile their everyday life experiences on 
the one hand with respect to their Islamic values, and on the other hand with their working 
woman status. The relationship between the social structure, Islamic discourse and individual 
agency is constructed by using different strategies, to cope with the necessities of everyday 
life. These strategies show differences according to the material well being of the Islamic 
women. The social class is an important factor for the transformation of Islamic discourse into 
a living social practice.
Key words: social agency, professional women, Islamic women, legitimization, womanhood 
experience, public sphere, public participation.
ÖZET
TESETTÜRLÜMESLEK SAHİBİ KADINLAR: 1990'LAR BURSA ’SINDA 
TESErrÜRI. Ü KADINLARIN YAŞAM STRA TEJİLERİ
Neşe Öztimur
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Danışman;/* * ^ i l e k  Cindoğlu 
Aralık 1999
Bu tezde profesyonel meslek sahibi, evli ve tessettürlü kadınların gündelik yaşamlarını 
nasıl ve hangi kanallardan giderek organize ettiklerinin, ve yaşam deneyimlerini nasıl 
meşrulaştırdıklarının izleri sürülmeye çalışıldı. Profesyonel meslek sahibi tesettürlü kadınlar, 
cinsiyet rollerini ve ilişkilerini bir yandan Islami söylemin gerekirlilikleri diğer yandan ise 
gündelik yaşamın maddi gerekirlilikleri çerçevesinde üretmekte, yeniden üretmekte ve 
dönüştürmektedirler. Fakat, bir inanç ve aynı zamanda bir anlam sistemi olarak İslamiyet, verili 
toplumsal yapı içinde gündelik yaşam pratiğine aktarılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, profesyonel 
meslek sahibi tesettürlü kadınlar gündelik yaşam pratiklerini, cinsiyet rollerini ve cinsiyet 
ilişkilerini kurarken ve meşrulaştırıken bir yandan îslami söylemden hareket etmekte, diğer 
yandan ise, profesyonel meslek sahibi, çalışan kadın olma durumundan hareket etmektedirler. 
Toplumsal yapı, îslami görüş ve toplumsal eyleyen olma arasındaki ilişki gündelik yaşamın 
gerekirlikleri çerçevesinde oluşturulan stratejiler dolayımında kurulmaktadır. Fakat, bu 
stratejilerin oluşturulma biçimleri, ve îslami söylemin yaşam pratiği haline dönüştürülme biçimi 
kadınların toplumsal sınıfına bağlı olarak önemli farklılıklar göstermektedir. Bu tür farklılıklar 
ise îslami söylemin gündelik yaşam pratiğine aktarımının tek bir biçimde olmadığının, 
kadınların toplumsal konumları ile îslami söylemin gündelik eylemin meşrulaştırımında 
kullanılması arasında bir ilişki olduğunun ortaya konulması açısından önemlidir.
Anahtar kelimeler; meşrulaştırma, kadınlık deneyimi, kamusal alan, kamusal katılım, toplumsal 
eylem.
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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen the emergence of radical social and political 
upheaval all around the world. These social and political movements have been 
associated with issues of ‘identity’ rather than economic grievance. They are 
associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values, and meanings that relate to the 
sentiment of belonging to a distinct social group (Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield, 
1994). Leading the most politicized movements of recent decades have been the 
religious based groups. In other words, religions throughout the world are entering 
the public sphere and the arena of political contest. Casanova explained this process 
as follows:
“Religions throughout the world are entering the public sphere and the 
arena of political contestation not only to defend their traditional turf, 
as they have done in the past, but also to participate in the very 
struggles to define and set the modern boundaries between the private 
and public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality 
and morality, between individual and society, between family, civil 
society, and state, between nations, states, civilizations, and the world 
system” (1994: 6).
Casanova has labeled this process as ‘the deprivatization of religion’ in the modern 
world. By this he means a process in which religious traditions throughout the world 
are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role that the theories of modernism 
and secularism have reserved for them. This means that, in today’s context, social 
movements have arisen which are either religious in nature or are challenging in the 
name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state
and the market economy(Casanova, 1994: 5). In particular, Islamism' has criticized 
the existence of societal, cultural, economic and politic orders, and has proposed new 
ones that are rooted in original Islamic rules. This radicalism, or criticism has become 
appealing to people who were latecomers to the metropolitan areas, those who were 
members of the upwardly mobile social groups, those who had aspirations to this 
social climb in Turkey^ and in other Middle Eastern countries.
The women of these upwardly mobile groups were the main representatives of 
Islamism in the public sphere through their Islamic dress, the ‘tesettiir.^ These women 
in veils have been among the most radical and active wom en’s groups of the last two 
decades in Turkey. Their radicalism and activity has not only risen from their Islamic 
standpoint, but has also grown in the form a movement against the hegemonic state 
rules concerning styles of participation in the public sphere. Also, the veiled women 
are the most important Islamic actors with respect to bringing private sphere relations 
and values into the public sphere. The current veiling movement has transmitted 
images of educated, urban, and militant Muslim women to the public realm, and has
' Within the scope of this thesis the terms Islamism, Islamic movement, or radical Islamism 
are used to refer to the Islamic movements as a collective action in which Islam is taken into 
account as a world view or life guidance. The radical Islam refers in its essence the return to 
the origins of Islam. On the other hand it criticizes Western model of society and relationship 
styles. Therefore it is impossible to evaluate Islamism without considering its relation with 
‘modernity’. See,( Kara, 1994), and (Tiirköne, 1991)
■ For a detailed analysis of these issue see (Göle, 1997; 1996 and 1998), and (Heper,1997).
’ In the scope of the thesis I will use the term ‘veil’ to refer to the ‘tesettür’ of Turkish form. 
‘Tesettür’ means in Turkish context the Islamic dressing form that consists of colored large 
headscarf and long,large, and colored overcoat.
ensured that their political activity gets major headlines. However, they have stood 
against modes of dress and body representation that fit with the principles of the 
establishment within the Turkish s ta te .T h e s e  so-called ‘establishment principles’ 
were the force behind the rupture between the modern Turkey and the Ottoman 
Muslim past. More importantly, the public sphere, which had been under the direction 
of the state, came to be tightly monitored by modernizing elite who tried to expunge 
all religious tendencies and practices in order to institute their vision of the modern 
way of life.·*’ As a result, the approaches that do not fit with this ‘modern outlook’ 
have not been tolerated in public places. In the veiled women’s case, for the 
modernists and Kemalists, it is not only problematic that they are ‘veiled’ as an 
assertion of ‘Islam’, rather their demand for greater participation in public affairs, 
including education, economic activities, and cultural activities, is the origin of most 
of the criticism against them. While seeking active participation and more of a 
presence in public circles, in the private sphere the veiled women espouse the Islamic 
world view.
The Westernization in the name of modernization was accepted as the main principle of the 
Turkish republic. So, the women were considered as the bases of this republic. Their body 
representation style, dressing forms, and covering hair style were taken into account as the 
main signifiers of being Westernized. However, Kandiyoti (1991; 191) has argued that this 
identification of women as bearers of cultural and national identity will have a negative effect 
on their emergence as full-fledged citizens. Also other writers in this book have denoted the 
similar state policies on women’s representative role. They have indicated that, in the post 
colonial context, while many nationalist movements and nationalist projects equated the 
emancipation of women with modernity, some successor states have been appeared to reverse 
reforms when the previous secularist projects appear to break down.
In a sense, contemporary Islam in Turkey, in particular the ‘veiling’ of women is, 
more a product of modernization than of the return to tradition. The significant and 
most effective Islamist players in Turkey are trained in secular institutions, and the 
majority are engineers, social scientists, intellectuals and journalists. They are the 
products of the urbanization process and modern education. The ‘veiling’ of women 
at these institutions is the most prominent and obvious symbol of this movement, and 
these women are the newest actors in contemporary Islamism. They are women with 
modern aspirations for employment and education (Göle 1996; Ilyasoglu 1994).
However, veiling is a reminder of the traditional concept of gender identity and 
segregation of the sexes. But, since this practice is, in its essence, an indicator of 
public participation, it also represents a break from tradition and the will to participate 
in the public sphere. This means that, on the one hand, through veiling the Islamic 
movement presents women as symbols of modesty and morality. At the same time, 
their participation and politicization engenders the formation of a public and collective 
female identity that distances itself from definitions of separate gender roles in the 
domestic realm.
In this context, in addition to interest in why women are wearing veils or what their 
motivation may be, a separate question arises; How do Islamic women, particularly 
professional ones experience their ‘womanhood’ in relation to the reconcilement of 
these two identities?
'^ See (Göle, 1998) and (Keyman, 1997).
Because, as social agents veiled women are not only under the pressure o f Islam. 
Other factors affect their social situation as well. Their positions or acquired status 
within modern capitalist society have led to new roles and identities, but, because of 
their devout Islamist stance and their different way of dressing, they are not 
considered ‘modern women’.*’ In other words, they don’t fit with the theories of 
modernization that have forced researchers to endorse simple linear accounts of 
development which that have little or no foundation in history and geography. There 
are also other perspectives in the study of the veiling of women, including theories on 
social agency, and self-reflexivity. In recent decades, universalistic and evolutionary 
assumptions of modernization have been criticized by theorists who have questioned 
the ‘agency’. They have taken the alternative viewpoint of specific, context-bound 
interpretations of modernity and self It is very clear that modernization did not follow 
a linear, universal causal sequence. The so-called parameters of modernization, 
education, urbanization, economic development and democracy did not simply follow 
one alter the other. Instead, modernization took shape in irregular fashion, according 
to specific interactions between the local cultural structure and the universal concept 
of modernity (Göle, 1998: 43). This new approach has led researchers to examine the 
relationship between the local and global, the local in its context, and the existing
*’ 1 think that this category of ‘modern woman’ is very elusive one. What are the parameters of 
being a modern one? If rationality, being an educated, working outside the home, having an 
ascribed status are taken into account as the parameters of being a modern, it may not be 
possible to consider veiled women as a non modern. But being a modern one means being 
a ‘secular’ one; elimination of the effect of religion on daily life, it is also difficult to find a 
modern person. See (Swatos, 1994)
mixed models.’
The same criticism of the epistemological and methodological presumptions about 
modernity has also been raised by feminist researchers and theorists. These critics 
have emphasized the neglect of women’s life experiences and women’s life spaces that
Q
exist in theories of modernization and classical social theories. They have asserted 
that the social and political theories ignore the role of women in the constitution of 
society and history. Feminist social theorists have criticized the view of women as 
passive objects and ahistorical entities. In this sense, these theorists have contributed 
to the sociology of knowledge by asserting women’s role as knowledge producers, 
knowledge reproducers, and knowledge transmitters. This has led to growth for
’ Anthony Giddens’s studies has underlined this kind of approach. He has developed the term 
of self-reflexivity as a major parameter of modernity. The term reflexivity denotes the 
relationship between macro and micro elements; between society and individual. See, 
(Giddens, 1981 ; and 1991). Moreover the more important contribution about the social agency 
comes from Alaine Touraine (1988). He has proposed a new kind of sociological perspective 
which gives special attention to social actor’s activities, and to their way of constituting 
sociality. He criticized classical sociological outlook and then proposed a new perspective as 
follows: “ Those who tend to see in all aspects of social life the unrelenting presence of 
domination are reminded by this conception that dominated actors can also participate in a 
culture and therefore fight against the social domination to which this culture is subject. Those 
who see in social relations nothing but the diversified application of general norms and values 
are shown that between forms of organization and cultural orientations there stand 
distinguishable relations of domination in all collective practices. Those who continue to 
explain social facts by their position in a historical evolution find here the opposite idea: 
societies are less and less ‘in’ history; they produce themselves their historical existence by 
their economic, political, and cultural capacity to act upon themselves and to produce their 
future and even their memory.” (1988:155)
women as a whole, not as a homogenous group but a heterogeneous one with respect 
to ethnic, religious, and social position.’
As well, feminist studies on Middle Eastern societies and Muslim women have 
criticized universal assumptions made regarding women’s experiences with 
subordination or exploitation. They have put forth the view that women are social 
actors, that they have social pov/er, and that women can choose to accommodate or 
resist the existing male dominance sy stem s.T ak in g  this view, professional working 
veiled women cannot be judged solely upon their Islamic standpoint" and their veils.
For a parameters of distinct feminist methodology see (Nielsen 1990). and, (Harding, 1987).
Especially Patricia Hill Collins (1990) has noted that white and black woman experience 
different forms of subordination, because they are in different places at the societal hierarchy. 
The values attributed to the white and black woman are different from each other. So, their 
internalization of this values shows differences. In order to get the freedom, the black women 
have to processed different strategies.
The best examples of this approach are Keddie and Baron(1991), and Kandiyoti (1988).
" The term ‘standpoint’ is mostly used by feminists. It is meant by this concept that women’s 
material experience has provided a powerful basis for change. Feminist standpoint basically 
involves a dual consciousness. According to Nancy j. Hirschmann (1996) “ women are aware 
of the dominant ideology of patriarchy because it constructs our lives: Women are the literal 
embodiment and instruments of this ideology as caretakers and nurturers, as mothers and 
wives, ... Yet, at the same time, the material experience this ideology constructs for women 
provides the basis for seeing a disjunction between ideology and that experience. Even as 
women internalize cultural norms that the activities of childcare and domestic work are 
unimportant, women experience them as very important...This dual consciousness that women 
experience as an oppressed group forms the basis for political change.”( 1996:66) I will 
borrow, the term ‘standpoint’ for referring the professionally working veiled women’s Islamic 
situation: It is a kind of standpoint in which women have a conscious devoutness to Islam of 
classical text, on the other hand they are participating public life and gaining new public roles.
Considering these women as passive conveyors of Islamic discourse ignores their 
social experience as active social beings.
‘W omanhood’ is produced, reproduced, and transformed in the process of 
relations between men, modernity, tradition, religion, and women themselves. In 
general, women build their social agency in relation to their gender identities, and in 
the context of gender relations. Gender identity is an ongoing emotional creation and 
interpretation of cultural meanings and self-other experience (Chodorow, 1995: 541).
Thus, it is very significant to analyze the mechanisms, dynamics and strategies 
by which distinct Islamic ‘womanhood’ is formed and reproduced. This allows the 
understanding of not only the veiling issue, but also their social practices. The main 
motivating factors behind these social practices are the Islamic worldview and the 
modern social status the women have achieved through university education. In this 
context, ‘Islam’ does not represent a theological world view, but a specific belief 
system that proposes a specifically organized way of life. This means that Islam is 
more than the religious belief: It guides the structure of social life in Islamic 
societies. In other words, Islam affects every minute of daily life, and of social and 
political organization.
However, Islam as a religion and as a meaning system is not transformed in the
This situation is very dynamic one in which traditional woman models are criticized and a new 
one is being proposed. In this sense, because of the involvement of the consciousness and the 
possibility of change the term ‘Islamic standpoint’ is suitable for referring veiled 
professionally working, and married woman.
living practice within its own context. Rather, the Islamic people try to carry out their 
so-called “Islamic way of life” within the given social structure. The major actors of 
contemporary Islamism have modern education, careers, and consumption patterns. It 
means that they have other identities that fosters from their other roles and statuses, 
as well as an Islamic one. Because, social identity is not something that is permanent, 
but is always under construction with respect to social actor’s different standpoints 
and relationships.
From this point of view, in this thesis, I will an.swer the following questions: 
how do veiled professional married women experience their womanhood? How and 
through which mechanisms do they reproduce or challenge the existing male 
dominant patriarchal and heterosexual presumptions? What does their working 
experience mean to them? How does their professional working status affect their 
domestic relationships? What kinds of relationships do they form in public circles. I 
will analyze how professional working veiled women legitimize or reconcile their 
everyday life experiences with respect to their Islamic values on the one hand, and 
their working woman status on the other. How the relationship between the social 
structure in modern Turkey, Islamic point of view and individual agency is 
constructed?
In order to explore these issues, I interviewed 12 veiled professional married 
women in Bursa, and the information received formed the data base for this thesis. 
The interpretations on these women’s life experiences may only be valid for this 
group. Also, it should be stated that the lives of Islamic women differ greatly based on
material well-being. Also, Bursa, as a metropolitan and economically developed city, 
may have influenced the overall group portrait. The city’s history as a religious 
center, and especially the existence of many ‘tarikat’ organizations, may affect the 
collective experience of religion there. Living in an environment that swings between 
modernity and tradition, Bursa’s inhabitants are strongly influenced by the experience 
of religion.
In the first chapter, I will analyze the existence of Islamic movements, their 
assertions, and the role of women in these movements within the context of the 
Turkish modernization experience. The aim of this chapter is to explore the 
uniqueness of the participation of veiled women in the public sphere, and their role in 
challenging of the homogeneous character of this realm. Here I also investigate the 
relationship between the gender and political debates in Turkey. In contrast to the 
West, where the public sphere was first formed by the bourgeoisie and excluded 
women, in Turkish modernism women have been the symbols of the civilizational 
shift and included in the formation of the public sphere. I will discuss this point of 
view in terms of the challenge that veiled women present in this dominant form of 
public visibility of women. How do veiled professional working women contribute to 
restructuring the public sphere in a more democratic and heterogeneous way?
The methodology of this thesis is summarized in the second chapter. The 
advantages of using qualitative methods to study interpretative issues are discussed, 
as are topics of why 1 chose this topic to study, how I conducted the research, who 
were the subjects of this research, and why they were my focus.
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In the third chapter, I interpret the relationship between the Islamic standpoint 
and how veiled women see themselves. It seems that the Islamic standpoint and the 
specific ‘Allah’ and ‘believer’ relationship has led to a distinct form of ‘self 
definition. This chapter emphasizes the interviews conducted with professional 
working women. However, I believe it would be of interest to see another thesis 
focused specifically on the self and superego relationship in Islamic women in general.
In the fourth chapter, I analyze the relationship between the specific ‘womanhood’ 
of Islamic women and their preference to wear the veil. According to them, they wear 
veils in honor of their faith. But to view this practice solely as a requirement of faith 
gives an incomplete picture. The veiled women’s social practice, their specific form of 
gender identity, and specific gender relations must be analyzed in order to understand 
the usage of the veil in the sociological sense. In this point of view, the veiled 
women’s ‘femininity’ is taken into account, including consideration of the 
heterosexual male sex drive discourse and the Islamic stance on the issue of sexuality.
Concerning this unique femininity of veiled women, I concentrate on the working 
experience of professional women. I speculate about how veiled women justify their 
working position and why, how the different subject positions influence their means of 
justifying and legitimizing their position, and how their Islamic point of view affects 
their ways of justifying their life and work styles.
Next, I concentrate on the mechanisms these women use to regulate domestic
II
responsibilities, how their professional working situation affects their marital 
relationships, how status as both an Islamic and a professional woman is interwoven 
in the way they handle domestic relationships and housework.? These issues are dealt 
with in the sixth chapter.
Chapter seven looks at the veiled Islamic women’s experience with participation in 
the public sphere, and the rules and limits that govern this activity. I discuss how they 
take part and what mechanisms they use to do so, what ‘participation’ means to them, 
and what the rules of participation entail. These questions are addressed in light of 
these women’s distinct way of participation to public sphere and their contribution to 
restructuring the public sphere in Turkey.
Finally, this study may only reflect a group portrait of the interviewed professional, 
married, veiled Islamic women in a particular time in history; 1990s Bursa. I will try 
to explore the ways and strategies that as being contemporary Islamists, professional, 
married, and veiled women, with their different subject positions, employ for 
substantiating what they do with their lives. I will not only deal with the Islamic 
textual knowledge on women. But I will concentrate on the ways and strategies that 
this textual knowledge is transformed into a living social practice by these women.
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CHAPTER I
ISLAMISM, PUBLIC SPHERE AND WOMEN IN TURKEY
The need for immediate democratization in Turkey is the only issue upon which 
all the social and institutional parties agree. But each party perceives democracy 
differently and uses it as a way to promote its own legitimacy. Thus, democracy 
bears different meanings for different groups. The place where all these opposing 
thoughts come together, and where they are negotiated, is the so-called ‘public 
sphere’ '. This is defined as a space where different elements of society bring forth 
opinions and knowledge, and struggle for hegemony with groups that promote other 
ideas and opinions"
’The concept of public sphere in this context refers to space in which different social groups 
become face to face, to formulate, adopt or change the general social norms and collective 
political decisions. Here I mix the definitions of Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘public space’ 
and Jürgen Habermas’s idea of ‘public sphere’. Arendt defined the activity of action that 
realized at the public sphere. She has emphasized the significance of public conversation. 
Similarly Habermas has gave special attention to the discussion and dialogue among the 
different social groups. The concept of participation has a significant place in this 
formulation. Here, participation is not seen as an activity only possible in a narrowly defined 
political realm but as an activity that can be realized in the social and cultural spheres as 
well. I recognize the importance of this type of participation in terms of its potential to 
empower the social and political subjects. In the Turkish case, the real democratic 
relationships between the different social groups can only be constructed within practical 
discourses. For a detailed arguments on public sphere see, (Calhoun, 1992; Meehan, 1995; 
Landes, 1998).
"For a detailed analysis of the struggle for ‘hegemony’ see (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). In 
this book, Laclau and Mouffe proposed a reformulation of the socialist project with 
providing a new imaginary to the ‘left’. According to them this imaginary of the new left
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Islamic movements, which became more prominent at the end of the 1980s and 
whose influences endure, and the veiled women who take action within these 
movements, are the most prominent participants in this sphere. They are in a struggle 
confronting the other discourses and are in the process of forming their own distinct 
public spheres.
In recent years, Islamist parties have been building their own sources of 
knowledge, promoting their views, and increasing their publicity through 
newspapers, magazines, local radio and TV channels that are known an elements of 
the Islamist media.^ As a result, the Islamist movement- though not homogeneous in
conceived by them as constituted by an ensemble of subject positions. So social agent 
consists of the articulation of different subject positions. They have tried to draw the 
consequences of such a theoretical approach for a project of radical democracy. They argued 
for the need to establish a chain of equivalence among different democratic struggles so as to 
create an equivalent articulation between the demands of women, blacks, workers. This 
approach can be used to analyze the demands of different social or political groups in 
Turkish society. The subordinated groups can formulate overlapping strategies to 
empowerment. Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theoretical outlook has construed the path for this 
struggle.
■’Habermas has emphasized the significance of media facilities for the existence of bourgeois 
public sphere in the European context. Although, it is impossible to adopt the Habermasian 
theoretical outlook to analyze the Turkish context, because of the different historical 
experiences of social groups, we can use his findings to make inroads to understand the 
phenomenon. Habermas situates the bourgeois public sphere as a forum that emerged during 
the 17th and 18th Centuries, where middle class men would criticize the cultural and 
political practices of Western European absolutist regimes. This forum provided a theatre in 
modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. Such 
talk served an important double function. First of all, it provided a ‘public’ arena where 
‘private’ citizens could be dialogically critical of the state. Second it also provided a space
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itself- presents itself as a new and alternative form of public entity. In this process, it 
has come face to face with the ‘Kemalist’ tradition, which is dominant and 
hegemonic in defining the limits of public sphere, and the movement is being 
highlighted by this confrontation.
In this context, the rationale behind the structure of the Islamist movement in 
Turkey is peculiar. Its peculiarity stems from the way Islamists defend against 
society’s predominant social and political views. Analyses of this peculiar 
‘discourse’ of Islamism is related to the oppression that took place when the 
Republic was founded. Islamism, which was exiled to the private sphere and which 
Kemalist-Republican history tried to erase from public discussion, made its 
comeback in the post-1980 period. It rose a new with a novel ‘life politics strategy’'^ ,
which could be distinct from and critical of dominant economic relations. In other words, for 
Habermas the bourgeois public sphere came into being as an emancipatory site of 
enlightened critical distance from the dominant political regimes and economic forces 
governing modern Western European Society. For a detailed analysis of his point of views, 
see (Calhoun, 1992).
‘'The concept ‘life politics’ is used by Anthony Giddens to refer to self actualization 
processes in the post traditional contexts, where globalising influences intrude deeply into 
the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of self realization influence 
global strategies. Although this conceptualization is relevant to the Western ,especially 
European context, some characteristics of the Islamic movements in Turkey give 
possibilities to use this concept. According to Giddens, life politics presumes emancipation 
from the fixities of tradition and from conditions of hierarchical domination. Life politics is a 
politics of lifestyle. Therefore, it develops ethics concerning the issue ‘how should we live?’. 
For an in-depth analysis see (Giddens, 1995) Following this kind of evaluation, we can assert 
that Islamic discourses in the post 1980 period, respond to the question of how should we 
live, with the answer of Islamic way and also this choice shape their self identities and their 
public presentation, involving preferences on the ways in which they enter into social 
relations and participate into public life. More specifically, Islamism at the post 1980 period
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and began to work toward carving out a distinct place in the public and political
arenas.
In fact, Islamic views and preferences which had long been banned from the 
public sphere, did not fit into Turkey’s private sphere either. The movement became 
organized, creating an alternative to the dominant associations in the private sphere 
and the usual economic ties. Having acquired new power and definition, the Islamist 
movement reappeared when the conditions were right, and found itself in a 
hegemonic struggle. Islamists established schools, mosques, foundations, solidarity 
organizations, Islamic communities, economic enterprises. They went to the 
forefront in the communication sector in an effort to fill the vacuum in civil society. 
Eventually, they gained representation as a political party."“’
In the literature, authors have taken different stands to explain why the Islamic 
front has achieved such an important position in the economic and political arenas. 
Those with a strongly sociological point of view claim that the Islamic identity has 
resulted from a combination of social transformation, identity crisis, and alienation.^
problematized the Westernized life style . It criticized the equation of the civilization and 
westernization. As an alternative it advanced the Islamization of the life world and 
lifestyles. This process has been experienced by social agents consciously. This consciously 
and rationally chosen of Islamic life style is its characteristics that makes it ‘political’. For an 
elaboration of Giddens’ ‘life politics’ term in the analysis of a kind of Islamic community in 
Turkish case, see (Saktanber, 1994).
For the civil society and Islamic movement’s relationship see, (Mardin, 1994; Göle, 1994; 
Sarybay, 1994)
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The best examples of this point of view are in Serif M ardin’s work. He aimed to 
make sense of religious revivalism by stressing the importance of ‘identity’ as a 
concept, and by showing what Islam meant to its believers. In his work, he attempts 
to explain the relationships between religion and social transformation in the terms of 
Said-i Nursi, the founder of the ‘Nurculuk’ worldview. Mardin (1989) asserts that the 
tendency to abide by this sect and doctrine encourages a certain type of social 
participation and, to some extent, politicizes the public, or the followers of this 
movement. According to Mardin, the transformation of the epistemological 
background of meeting both moral needs and modernization has spawned 
uneasiness, and has created a cultural vacuum in some parts of the public. ‘Nurculuk’ 
allows these people to comment on religious messages the way they understand it 
(Mardin, 1989).
“During the three decades from 1930 to 1960, social mobilization , 
the penetration of the market nexus into the rural areas and 
beginnings of political participation accelerated this tendency in 
Turkey. It could thus be predicted that to the existing material 
demands of the believers of rural areas would be added a demand 
for a picture of the world, for a cosmology (an ideology) more 
sophisticated than the one they had used in the past. This is one of 
the meanings of Said’s emphasis on the proofs of Islam.... Said 
Nursi may be considered to be an ideologue into whose preaching 
an infra structural change, the ‘mobilization of the periphery’, 
breathed new life. He was meeting a demand arising out of this 
mobilization”(Mardin, 1989:222).
” There are many studies in the literature that explains the dynamics of Islamic revivalism or 
the impacts of political Islam in the Middle Eastern Countries. For instance see (Esposito, 
1997;Piscatori, 1983). On the other hand, for the Turkish case see (Toprak, 1981). 
Moreover, the sociological outlook for an elaboration of the Islamic revivalism asserted the 
significance of the socio-economic factors and migration process at the existence of Islamic 
identity and appeal of Islamic politics. For instance see, (Vergin,1985;Sanbay 1985).
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In brief, M ardin’s vision of religious revival as a result of the
modernization process, and as a different way of connecting with this process,
inspired volumes of research.^ More importantly, as Mardin (1989) has indicated,
Islam plays a very important role in reproducing societies through the common use
of its special language shared by the members of the society. Mardin has called this
specific language the ‘Islamic idiom’. He has stated, the appealing Islamic figure,
Said-i Nursi, to the masses is fostered from his specific idiom that bounds religion
and modernity in a particular way. An identical society is produced each generation
*
through Islamic discourse and idioms, while these guide individuals in regulating 
their conduct and relationships with others. However, these idioms are not stable. 
They are open to change and through individual’s social actions and their 
interactions with each other in the context of material conditions. So, these ‘idioms’ 
which are the guides of every day life, are at the same time, points where resistance 
and challenging strategies are born, and where social change is realized.
Nur Vergin also drew on the society’s transformation process in trying to explain 
the dynamics behind increased participation in the ‘Nakt)ibendi’ sect in 
Ereöli(Vergin, 1985). Again, according to her, increase in attendance to religious sect 
was directly in relation to the social change and transformation process.
Other theoretical approaches do not reject the sociological point of view, but try 
to analyze the growth of the Islamic movement within the framework of its
’ In the literature on Turkey there are two leading studies which consider the dynamics of the 
formation of the Islamic identity as a dimension of modernity with giving attention on
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relationship with politics. In this point of view, which has been developed mostly by 
political scientists, the place and impact of religion within the political system are 
treated with respect to state-society relations.*  In these studies, the foundation o f the 
Republic and the Kemalist tradition is presented as problematic, and the rise of the 
Islamic movement is considered to have grown out of these tensions and difficulties, 
the irregular process by which Turkey became modernized, and the concept of 
‘secularism’ form the basis of these theories. The best example of this is found in the 
words of Fuat Keyman:
“The process of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey involved 
the initiative to put the necessary political, economic and 
ideological prerequisites into force by the Kemalist elite in order to 
reach a certain level of civilization (Western). In other words, the 
wish to become more civilized symbolizes a drive to establish a 
modern nation that was built on a triangle o f nation-state, 
industrialization and modern-secular identity”(Keyman, 1997:87).
According to Keyman (1997), the revival and rise of Islamic identity in 
civilian and political contexts have been driven by hegemonic crises of Kemalism. 
The basic character of this Islamic movement, which is a product of this crisis, is not 
different from the structure from which it was born. “Islamic modernization is acting 
in such a way that it is not an alternative to the Kemalist tradition, but reproduces it 
in a different type of discourse’’(Keyman, 1997:87). In his discussions, Keyman 
debates what the conditions of democratic restructuring should be in a pluralistic 
Turkey. He emphasizes the need to change relationships between the individuals, 
society, politics and the state, which are created and take on certain contrasts (secular
woman issue. See (Gôle,1996;Ÿlyaso91u,1994).
*The significant examples of this approach are as follows: (Heper, 1981; Keyman, 1995,1997 
and 1998).
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modernism/Islamic traditionalism etc...) as a prerequisite o f democratic openness 
(Keyman, 1997).
Both the sociological and political approaches are important in terms of 
their contributions to the examination of our understanding of religious, social, and 
state relations in Turkey. On the other hand, in probing religion-based identity 
formation processes or social movements, one should also try to understand their 
social roots, what they mean for the individuals involved, and what the effects of 
these religious themes are in terms of everyday experiences. One should also note the 
relationship of these movements to the changing politics of the state and the 
dominant ideology. This is the only way to understand important opportunities in 
Turkey that are the products of the openness of radical democracy and the public 
sphere.
In recent years, one key to these opportunities has been the women in 
desettiir’, the veiled women. These individuals subjected to a patriarchal controls 
because of the fact that they are women. They are subject to the pressures of a 
modern/secular ideology because of the fact that they are veiled. They are making 
these two spheres of pressure visible in their fight to take action and participate in the 
public sphere. In other words, on the one hand they are challenging the dominant 
female model of the public sphere, and on the other they are settling internal 
accounts with the patriarchal dominant Islamic worldview, which views their 
purpose in the public sphere as a duty of representation. The questioning and 
resistance launched by the veiled women against these two different discourses put 
pressure to women as a whole. The veiled women have not only revealed the new
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laces of sexuality in Turkey, but may also play an important role in forming a new 
understanding of democracy through their coalitions with other resistance groups in 
society. However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze these issues in 
depth. Instead, the focus will be on what kind of femininity and womanhood veiled 
married women experience, how they perceive themselves, and the potential they see 
in terms of their participation in the public realm.
This section will show that the potential for veiled woman to play a key
*
role in opening up democracy depends not only on these women alone. This 
opportunity also depends on the way relationships between religion and the dominant 
ideology of the state are evolved, and on the course of the struggle launched by these 
women within the Islamic discourse. In other words, an attempt will be made to 
explain when, and with what arguments, Islamism, as a political point of view, was 
followed, what kind of tradition it has produced, how women are represented and 
how they represent themselves in the Islamic tradition. This way of seeing Turkish 
political life also leads to an understanding of the main themes in the history of the 
formation of the public sphere in Turkey.
/. 1 ISLAM ISM , TH E PU BLIC  SPH E RE A N D  W O M EN  IN  TU R K E Y
In the past 20 years, the women in veils, who regard themselves as being 
at the forefront of Islam, and who have tried to build their individual and social 
identities around Islamic references, have entered into a fight for a space in the
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public sphere‘·^ and to reap the benefits and opportunities of modernity‘s.10
While the headscarf is the traditional wear of rural and small-town 
women, ‘tesettür’ (the veil) is an urban concept that is separate from the headscarf." 
The tesettür is more than just another way to cover the head. There is a new meaning
‘Researchers who are interested in the mutual interaction process of the state- religion - 
society relations, take the ‘civil society’ or the ‘public sphere’ concepts as their means of 
investigation. We should mention that the term public, sphere originates in fact from the 
West, and the meaning of these two concepts found its content within the history of the 
West. In our analysis about Turkey we should take the Turkish context into consideration, 
and take the historical roots of Turkish social and political system as a source of current 
events.
'“The opportunities of modernity’ concept is used by Mardin. See, (Mardin, 1987; 1994).
" Usage of ‘head scarves’ symbolizes tradition rather than religion, it is widely used in the 
rural parts and small towns in Turkey. The women who work in the fields of the rural areas, 
usually wear ‘tülbent’ from which the hair is generally visible. In the small towns the usage 
of ‘tülbent’ stays limited indoors and colored scarves replace tülbent when women go out 
and a coat completes this outfit. The way of covering which is called tesettür is different 
from the head scarf. Although we cannot talk about a homogenous way of covering, we can 
say that the common denominator is the covering of the head in such a way that the hair is 
not seen. In the ‘tesettür/ veiling there is a necessity for women to cover their hair, their 
shoulders and shapes of their body. So the main characteristic of the Islamic sourced 
‘veiling’ is generally a headscarf completely covering the hair and falling upon the shoulders 
(distinct from the traditional use of a headscarf) and a sort of long gown that hides the 
woman’s body shape. Although this type of covering results from the adoption of the Islamic 
view, not having an homogeneity and that every Muslim country has the concept of the 
covering of women, the way it is done varies from country to country and this indicates an 
important point; Islam is experienced differently in every country and in every social 
structure. Since Islam possesses a single written document , and has the same content 
overall. However, in accordance with the historical and social background and structure of 
the countries, in which Islam is put into practice, different ‘Muslim’ practices are 
experienced.
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associated with the use of this covering in daily life. It lies in the call for veiled 
women to actively participate in the public sphere while wearing their veils, and 
these women’s quest to access the opportunities offered in the public sphere- 
education, work, and social and political participation. In other words, what is new is 
the emergence of Islamic identity, and tesettür (veil) is a part of this, as an urban 
concept (Saktanber,1995).
What is significant is not the practice of veiling, but the quest for 
participation in the public sphere through symbolic demonstration that violates the 
public sphere’s limits of legitimacy. It is worth noting that, beyond being a symbol 
that reveals and symbolizes their identity, the cover symbolizes the ‘difference’ 
between these women and those of other categories. The obvious question is why 
and compared to whom veiled women want to be different.
In order to be able to respond, we need to look at the modernization and 
W esternization of Turkey. Analyzing the position of Islam in this context also allows 
us to understand where women stand in Islamism today. The veiled women have two 
basic functions in the Islamic movement: they are its main identifiable element in the 
public sphere in terms of political clashes, and in the private sphere they function as 
the main actors in the effort to live in conformity with Islam.
If they are not satisfied with the roles that allotted them in the traditional 
division of labor in the private sphere, so what are the dynamics, and what 
contradictions do they face in their efforts to participate in social activities and 
assume professional roles in the public sphere?
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This chapter, will first endeavor to answer the main question above. The 
veiled women play a role as a symbolic representatives of political Islam '“ in the 
public sphere relative to its historical formation. While political Islam was launching 
the hegemonic fight of the Islamic pronouncement against the secular Republican 
discour.se, the veiled women initiated a symbolic upheaval with their protests at the 
universities. In other words, they have made public the existence of Islam in the 
public sphere, wearing their covers as expected of them within political Islam. 
Although their emergence in the public sphere might seem a natural part of this 
expectation, they have fought every possible battle to attend universities, find jobs, 
and benefit from alt other opportunities in modern society. Realizing these 
opportunities through concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and designating 
themselves as the oppressed party in their struggle, veiled women set in motion a 
new critical discourse on the power relationships and political structure that currently 
exists in Turkey. Central to this critical discourse is the most visible theme of 
discrimination between ‘us’ and ‘others’ discrimination. How can this distinction be 
understood?
Stuart Hall (1996) has asserted that “identity is a constructed entity that 
can realize its positive only through the negative point of view. The other must pass 
through the eye of the needle in order to construct itself(Hall, 1996:68). Similarly, 
Julia Kristeva, who has made important contributions to psychoanalysis, states that 
identities are always formed in terms of ‘the other’(Cornell and Thurschwell, 1987).
'"In this context ‘political Islam’ means, the using of Koran, hadiths (reports about the words 
and deeds of Muhammad and his companions) and other canonical religious texts to justify 
the daily activities or relations. See (Beinin and Stork, 1997)
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Kristeva states that the other is not an outer thing, but an inner thing. Thus, the other
is within ourselves, it is complementary to the process that creates us as the subject.
Kristeva believes that our identity, as a collective subject, and like our subjectivity,
has been formed by excluding what we substitute in place of the ‘other’, that which
we see as a threat to our integrity. Therefore while we try to find definitions for
ourselves among the collective identities, we are in fact reflecting a calculation we
are making within ourselves. Kristeva takes a critical approach to the ‘female’ model
as conceptualized in the patriarchal structure, and proposes that women should self-
«
build themselves. This is possible by creating a counter narrative. Kristeva’s counter 
narrative suggests that autonomy is deceptively peaceful, that it relies on the 
repression of a relational field of conflict, violence, confusion, and heterogeneity 
located within the subject. Moreover, ‘abjection’ plays a major role in her theorizing 
about the subject. Because, according to her, the differentiation and otherizations 
along the abjection process have a significant contributions to the production and the 
protection of identities. Because, “These differentiation include the distinctions of 
inside-outside, pure-impure, self-other, and other forms of dichotomized difference 
which produce identity’’(Di Stefano, 1996: 107). The domain of abjected is 
introduced in Kristeva’s approach to language, a social practice that presupposes two 
modalities of significance, the semiotic and symbolic. She defines the semiotic as a 
modality, but always aspiring to, negating, or exceeding meaning. The semiotic 
issues from the felt processes of the drives and may be traced to the archaic, 
preoedipal period of the body. The symbolic, on the other hand, is created as a result 
of cutting oneself off from the semiotic state. In this stage, the woman does not 
represent herself as the real her because, according to her, woman is not the subject 
of her language. Her language is not hers. She therefore speaks and represents herself
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in a language not her own, that is, through the categories of language of the other. 
She thinks of herself as thought of by the other. If the language women speak is not 
truly theirs, if it is a language and conceptual vocabulary of identity and being that is 
specifically masculinist, then our very categories of meaning become barriers to 
wom en’s self-definition. Our epistemology itself is a restraint because our ways of 
knowledge encode and derive from patriarchal constructions of women (Hirschmann, 
1996: 57).
In brief, although Kristeva’s analysis of the formation of identity focuses 
on the construction of male and female identities, her proposed framework can also 
be used to analyze the way the Islamist veiled women in Turkey form their identities, 
as they do so by constantly referring to others. The groups that they ‘otherize’ are, in 
some cases, ‘men’, but they are usually social groups that are not of them. 
Therefore, the invariability and inalterability of the ‘other’, as spoken of in the 
Islamic rationale is open to discussion.'^ More generally, according to Meyda 
Yegenoglu (1997: 107-60), it can be said that political Islam in Turkey has been 
working to create a discourse in which the hierarchical relationship between the West
'■’ Although the ‘other’ figure, used when Islam founds the identities of the women and 
which is mostly regarded as the women figure dressed in the Western type, Islamist women 
may formulate different ‘other’ groups in relation to their standing. For some of them, the 
‘others’ are the feminists and for others it is the ‘Kemalists’. The ‘etherisation’, done by the 
Islamist women, and also by the modern, civilized women by ousting one another, prevents a 
process of struggle against the patriarchal system for the liberalization of women in Turkey. 
And the positioning of women as the counter forces, leads to a diversion in women 
consciousness. The only reason laying behind this division should be searched in the 
modernization process. For a detailed analysis of the ‘others’ of the Islamic women see,( 
Alankus Kural,1997)
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and the East is reversed, to the benefit of the East. 14
The ‘others’ as referred to by Islamic women in the course of their 
identity-construction, can differ according to changes and turmoil in the Turkish 
political and social structure. Support for this view comes from Charles Taylor 
(1996: 282-88), who has stated that identities, whether individual or cultural, develop 
in relation to other identities, and therefore are of dialogical quality 
(Taylor, 1996:282-88). Identities are not a product of looking inward at oneself, or of 
introversion. They are formed as a result of interactions with other people and 
cultures, and they are constantly changing. In summary, we cannot discuss identity as 
being independently defined and developed with respect to others. Identities are 
always dependent on others, and they develop themselves as a result of interactions 
with others.
Based on these views, we can say that the ‘others’ represented in the 
Islamic discourse of the past twenty years are the hegemonic groups in the public 
sphere and the thoughts they represent. However, understanding what is meant by 
‘others’ to the Islamic woman comes from analyzing the modernization and 
westernization processes, and by examining Islamism, which is a product of these 
processes. In an effort to understand the dynamics of Islamism through the changes 
that have occurred in state/society relations, one needs to step back to the 
modernization process launched by Tanzimat.
'■‘For the work of Meyda Yegenoglu in which she treats how the ‘other’ is formed in the 
Orientals discourse by basing on cultural and sexual differences with a feminist point of 
view see,(Yegenoglu ,1997)
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1.2 M O D ERNIZATIO N, W E STE R N IZA TIO N  A N D  TH E  E M E R G E N C E  OF  
ISL A M ISM
In the period from the last century o f the Ottoman Empire to date, the 
concept of Islamism as a political point of view, was present. In order to 
understand the conditions that allowed this movement to emerge, and the 
characteristics of this way of thinking, we need to review certain political and social 
processes. First, within the framework of the principle of superiority of state over 
society, the social contradictions that have grown out of innovation, modernization, 
capitalism, and democratization have defined the discursive content of Islamism as 
an opposing movement. The process of social transformation, which paralleled the 
modernization policies ordered from the top by the state, was influential in the 
formation of this movement. Both processes paved the way to important changes in 
the social stratification system, and have caused major shifts in the way social life is 
organized in Turkey. Thus, the development and the course of change for Islamism 
in Turkey- though it has not been linear and is difficult to characterize in few Words­
can be considered in relation to modernization policies, processes o f social 
transformation, the existence of social categories, the rise of new values, and the to 
the upside down process by which daily life is organized.
1.2.1 R ISE  OF IS L A M ISM  A S  A  PO LITIC A L ID E O LO G Y
Although this particular analysis of Tslamism’ as a political ideology 
relates specifically to Turkey, we should point out that Islamism is also a popular 
movement in other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries. The M uslim world became
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colonized at the end of the 19th century as a result of Western expansionism. 
According to John Esposito (1987: 56), for the first time, Muslims had to defend 
themselves against the West (represented by Europe rather than the United States at 
the time),which had made advances in technology and was imposing its principles on 
other peoples.
The colonisation process, which gained momentum especially after the Industrial 
Revolution, had a negative impact on the Muslim world. The Muslims were defeated 
by the Christian West in the military, economic, and political fields throughout the 
19th century. They beeame very much dominated by the West. According to Oliver 
Roy (1992: 51), the impact of colonialism and imperialism caused the Muslim 
population to adopt a different system of foreign references. These new values, 
which were not the part of the Islamic system, led to an identity crisis in Muslim 
societies. Thus, Islamism was transformed into a course of resistance against the 
Western system, and against actual physical invasion of colonial and imperial 
references and against cultural invasion (Roy, 1992:51).
Briefly, this reaction to the supremacy of Western imperialism and the intrusion 
of this supremaey into a Muslim country’s socio-cultural structure, were two of the 
most important elements in the emergence of Islamism throughout the Middle East 
and the Muslim world. According to Roy, Islamism has three geographic and 
cultural foci: the Sunni-Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian sub-continent and Iran- 
Arab Shii area, and Turkey which is detached from the Arab world. Roy views 
political Islam, or Islamism, as a 20th century concept, and summarizes, that the
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Islamic sphere of influence includes all the modern activist groups and the discord 
between them. “These groups have focused their actions around the Egyptian 
Muslim brotherhood founded by Hasan El Benna (1906-49) and the Cemaat-i Islam 
Party founder Ebul Ala Mevludi (1903-78) in the Indian subcontinent”(Roy, 
1992:16).
There were many differences between the Islamism of the Muslim-Arab societies 
and that of the Ottoman Empire, and Miimtazer Tiirkone has outlined some of these. 
(Turkone, 1991: 38) In colonial Muslim-Arab societies, Muslim solidarity was 
identified with anti-imperialism, but in the Ottoman Empire Islamism had a positive 
meaning. According to Miimtazer Turkone (1991: 38) there, in its narrowest sense, 
Islamism implied the reorganization of Muslims and the creation of new institutions 
and ideals appropriate to the modern era.
What was the origin of this difference? Its basis was the ‘modernization’ process. 
Turkish modernization was not rooted in a colonial model, as was the case in other 
Muslim countries. Thus, Turkey did not partake in the mandatory modernization 
efforts launched by colonial powers. On the contrary, the modernization of Turkey 
was undertaken through the conscious decisions and will of state elite. In other 
words, the initiation of modernization from the inside, and from the top, fostered a 
different character in Turkey’s Islamic movement. The dawning of the movement 
came when the ‘other’ figure was revealed, in the form of the Islamists who objected 
to the steps taken by the pro-Western state elite. Authors who identified themselves 
as Islamists, ‘etherized’ the pro-Western statesmen Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha at the
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Ottoman Period. Later at the republican era, the state elites of the republic were 
‘etherized’. At the post-1950 period the precursors of materialist thought was 
etherized by the Islamists. And the precursors of secularism and the Kemalists in the 
post-1980s were otherized by the Islamist groups. Thus, the fact that Turkey’s 
social and political history, and its modernization experience, differs greatly from 
that of other Middle Eastern countries explains why the course of Islamism in Turkey 
has also been unique.
In the literature (Ttirkone, 1991; Kara, 1994), various specific periods are 
highlighted with regard to the emergence of Islamism in this country. Although the 
surfacing of Islam as a political ideology is believed to have started in the period of 
the Second Constitution Period, recent research has shown that this began in the 
Tanzimat period (Tiirkone, 1991). This leads us to the question when and how Islam 
became a mass ideology, and who caused this to happen? Tiirkone (1991:56) states 
that, between 1867 and 1873 in Istanbul, Islam was transformed into an ideology. 
This metamorphosis was the result of the concerns of certain Ottoman intellectuals 
about the Em pire’s defiance of the modern world. According to Tiirkdne, within 
Islamization the part of religion that relates to the outside world was overlooked, and 
emphasis was put on the worldly aspect of Islam. In other words, in ideological 
Islam, religion is considered a worldly affair. This means that, the principles of Islam 
in social and political life are put back on the agenda. With this approach, taking the 
will o f man and humans themselves as its basis, Islamism supports the return to 
world view of Koran and advocates a new Islamic understanding.
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The main difference between modern Islamism and traditional Islamism is that 
the concept today does not consider other religions as enemies of Islam, but sees 
modern ideologies -positivism, modernism- as its rivals, and tries to settle accounts 
with them. The new problems of Islamism did not exist in traditional Islam. In 
addition, since Islamism can now present itself through the mass media, and is 
widely disseminated this way, the two former modes of communication- one through 
the public and one through the ‘ulema’ (muslim theologians)- have become one 
streamlined word in Islamism.
But Islamism is a defense, a defensive act against the W est, and it is the 
intellectuals who are behind this movement. Türköne (1991) considers Islamism a 
product of intellectuals, and a system of thought that only influences intellectuals. 
However, we should pose another question at this point: Has Islamic thought affected 
the daily life of a ‘mümin’ (a special concept that refers to a devout believer of 
Islam) Has it changed the place of religion in the life of the ordinary believer?
1.2.2 TH E F IR S T  ERA OF ISLAM ISM : FR O M  T A N Z İM A T  TO TH E  
REPU BLIC :
‘Tanzimat’ began in 1839, and was one of the most important periods for the 
Ottoman Empire. It was a time of much innovation, and the state took many steps 
toward modernization. The state elite had two objectives when they launched this 
modernization process. First, they aimed for the level o f civilization that had been 
achieved in the West. Second, they wanted to instill solidarity - ‘Ottomanism’- that 
would keep the peoples of the Empire together. In this period, both civilization and 
progress were emphasized. It was also a kind of predatory phase in which Islamic
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tradition and thought came to the fore in cultural life, and in which Islamism became 
crystallized.
During this time, newspapers were used as vehicles for promoting new thoughts 
and ideas. According to Tiirkone (1991: 59), the Tanzimat period also witnessed the 
ri.se of a group of journalists who undertook to be the public’s voice against the 
governing class. The newspapers played a significant role in the birth of Islamism. 
Through the newspapers what was once private became generally known, and the 
dissemination of information, and the formation of public opinion, gained 
momentum.
Why did the use of newspapers and the emergence of Islamic thought through 
discussions in the newspapers occur in the second half o f the 19th century? The 
answer is that there was a strong reaction to new ideas at that time. The new practices 
and applications initiated by the state elite spurred the development of the Young 
Ottoman thought. The Young Ottomans’ criticism of those in power, and of their 
policies, was supported by the Islamic front, and this meeting of minds marked the 
start of the transition from traditional Islam to ideological Islamism.(Mardin, 1991). 
The transfer of this ideology to the public on a large scale occurred when Islam 
began to be viewed as a modern nation, that is, through Ittihad-i Islam (Islamic 
Union) discussions(Lewis, 1968).According to Islamic Union thought, religion is 
‘ideologized’, and is an important element of identity-building. Thus, Islam was 
brought to the masses as a vehicle for forming identity.
For a rich and in-depth elaboration of the existence of the different idea factions at the 
Ottoman Empire, see (Berkes, 1964), and (Lewis, 1968).
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According to the Young Ottomans, who can be considered the first proponents of 
Islamic thought, Islam went beyond giving oneself to God, beyond being a belief that 
provided continuity of religious community, or ‘cem aat’. When the masses 
participated in a broader communication process, Islam was no longer a resource 
consulted in order to understand their narrow surrounding, but had become a larger 
identity that helped them integrate with a larger world. Beyond religion, Islam took 
an ideological axis: It became the main leverage for mobilizing the masses via the 
intellectuals. Briefly, as religion became ideological, Islamism spread in all 
directions.
Islamists did not stress social modernization, but political modernization. They 
accepted notions such as progress, democracy, and independence, but tried to find 
appropriate counterparts to these notions within Islam (Tiirkone 1991; Kara, 1994). 
In analyzing the birth of Islam as a political ideology, Tiirkone considers the effect of 
mass media-newspapers- in the formation of this ideology. He(1991) suggests that 
growth of an ideology requires newspapers to formulate and verbalize it. Followers 
are also needed if an idea is to become ideology. Islamism, as a political , ideology, 
emerged in a period when these conditions existed at once (Turkone,1991:87).
Briefly, the emergence of Islamism occurred at a very important time. During this 
period, the Muslim world’s fall behind the West was not only compensated for 
through military reform. Islamism emerged, as sparked by the government elite’s 
adoption of a Western way of life, and by the experimentation of high-level figures
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in Turkey with new ways of living.
This brings up the following questions: Did the emergence of Islamization as a 
political ideology among intellectuals affect the daily lives of the Muslim masses? 
Did the place and effect of religion change in the daily lives of ordinary Muslims? If 
Islam is considered an opposition movement that stood against the secular policies of 
the state, but is in harmony with modern and Western political concepts and 
processes, can we say that this ‘ideologization’ led to the ‘disenchantment of the
religion? 16
To reiterate briefly, in order to analyze the rise of Islamism in Turkey, one must 
examine the modernization /Westernization process, the processes of social change, 
and the social structures that shifted during these transformations. Islamism in 
Turkey is significantly different from Islamism in Muslim-Arab societies. In Muslim 
countries that were affected by colonialism, the Islamist movement had a negative 
unifying function against imperialism. The call for the Jihad in the colonialized 
Muslim countries is a good example of this. Contrasting this, in Turkey’s case, the 
Islamist movement was born from a combination of problematic national and 
republican issues, i.e. modernization, westernization, secularism. From the 19th 
century on, modern Islamic thought has materialized as an effort, in the form of 
ideas, to respond to and comply with the problems and innovations brought on by 
form of competition with the West. In Turkey, Islamist thought can be considered a
'^The phrase of “disenchantment of the world” was mainly used by Max Weber to refer to 
the process of modernization and capitalization at the Western world, and the effects of the
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reactionary and defensive positive form of action which began at the end of 19th, and 
the start of the 20th century.
According to Türköne, Turkey has led Islamism as a political ideology since the 
last quarter of 19th century. However, here we see some conflicts in the literature. 
For example Ismail Kara has as.serted that “Although Islamism was supported by 
vSultan Abdiilhamit II at the end of 19th century, it only became a distinct movement 
after 1908”(Kara, 1994:56). Kara states that, compared to earlier periods, the more 
liberal political environment that came with the proclamation of the Second 
Constitution contributed to the development of Islam as a political faction. Islamism 
was expressed in newspapers and magazines, such as ‘Sirat-i M üstakim’, ‘Beyan-ül 
Flak’ and ‘Islam M ecmuası’. There was an increase in the circulation o f Islamic 
publications.
The major questions evolving in these publications were as follows; Why has the 
Islamist world gone back to the Islamist thought? How can we develop as Muslims? 
What can be done to unify the Muslims? Does Islam have the values that allowed the 
West to develop -freedom, equality, civilization, and freedom of thought. What are 
the unchanging and constant traits of Islam? What can be learned from the W est? 
These were the kinds of questions being asked with regard to Islamic thought in this 
period. Kara has stated that:
“Islamic growth in the Ottoman Empire should be viewed as a 
continuation of Ottomanism, as a development and salvation 
ideology, and it is appropriate to regard it the way it was prior to 
the nationalist and Turkist currents. However, we should not ignore 
the fact that although Islamic thought is similar in some ways to
Protestant ethic on this processes. See, (Weber ,1976).
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other modes of thought in terms of identifying and solving 
problems, there are definite traits that separate Islamism from the 
other streams”(Kara, 1994: 56).
It is important to stress the idea of returning to basic Islamic principles so that 
Muslim societies could revisit their era of glory and power. However, in doing so, 
the movement also thought it important to take some lessons from the West in 
economics and technology. The key issues were the supremacy and advancement of 
the West. Based on Muslim acceptance of this success, an effort was made to blend 
Islamic and Western values. In the end, this is the best way to define Islamist thought 
at the end of the 19th Century. As Kara has described it, “Islamism is a synthesis- 
oriented movement which sees the harmonious existence o f Islamic values with
Western values possible”(Kara, 1994: 48).
Several questions spring from this definition: To what extent was the Islamist 
thought that emerged at the end of Ottoman rule visible at the political-social level at 
that time? How did the Islamists participate in political life? To what extent were 
women influential in the development of the Islamic thought?
There is no reference in the literature to any woman having significant impact on 
the emergence of the Islamic movement. However, while women do not appear to 
have actually participated in this movement, they are discussed at great length in 
reference to it. We have already stated that the appearance o f Islamism as a political 
ideology coincides with the beginning of the modernization process. The subject of 
women occupied much discussion on modernization; sexuality, family relations, and
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sexual identity. For the modernist intellectuals, the rise of the status of women was 
seen as an important basis for the development of society. They thought that 
improving the position of women would inevitably mean offering better service to 
men, and to patriarchal society as a whole. More importantly, women endeavored to 
embrace the concept of ‘social motherhood’ which involved more than being a good 
wife and mother, and this process also allowed them to move from the private into 
the public spheres. However, this also caused women to begin questioning their 
traditional domestic roles.
In the post-Tanzimat period, many intellectuals wrote about the significance of 
women and the importance of the development of the status of women in the 
Ottoman society. Some o f the leading writers were Sinasi, Namık Kemal, Semseddin 
Sami, and Ahmet Mithat Efendi (See, Kandiyoti, 1988a). These authors saw the 
position of women as a sign of the tradition and backwardness of Ottoman society, 
and they stressed the importance of improving the status of women. Authors who 
were regarded as the representatives of the Islamist movement also wrote about the 
situation for women of that period. Although they did not deem women worthy of 
values we regard as ‘modern’ today, these authors criticized polygamy and female 
slavery. In fact, both these groups of writers regarded the woman as the benchmark 
of societal unity and continuity. In other words, women were seen as ‘subjects for 
society’. They performed the tasks of motherhood, acted as dutiful wives, and raised 
new generations. The common perception throughout the period of Turkish 
modernization and in the opposing movements of the time was that women were 
symbols, and were building blocks of society. This is a very significant point of 
intersection between two distinct modes of thought, the modernist elite on one hand 
and the Islamists on the other. As a result of this common perception, women in
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today’s Turkey form their identities not through their own ‘wom anhood’, but by 
interacting with and ‘etherizing’ one another. From this point on, we will examine 
the course of Islamism and where women have stood along this path.
1.2.3 W O M EN A N D  TH E D EVELO PM EN T OF IS L A M IS M  F R O M  TH E  
P R O C LAM A TIO N  OF TH E REPU BLIC  TO TH E 1960S
The Republican era was a very significant time in the development of the general 
characteristics of Turkish political culture. In this period, it was made clear what the 
boundaries of the public sphere were, who the true controllers of this sphere were, 
and who was going to be ousted from the sphere. In today’s Turkey, as Keyman has 
claimed (1997), Kemalism, the dominant mode of thinking founded in the 
Republican era, continues to be a .strong traditional force. What do we find when we 
try to analyze this period from a historical point of view?
1.2.3.1 S T  A  TE  PO LIC Y W ITH  REG ARD  TO ISLAM :
In the War of Independence, different social groups were unified within an
alliance. But once the war was over, and the proclamation of the Republic came,
cracks appeared in that alliance. According to İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak:
“During the War of independence, prior to the establishment of the 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal had sought and won the cooperation of 
the Anatolian local ulema and the sheiks. In fact, Islam had been 
highly instrumental in the mobilization of the peasantry...Once 
however, the war of Independence was won, the Kemalists carried 
out a radical policy of state secularization’’ (1983: 426).
Moreover, “In this period religion is controlled by the state by using different but
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overlapping strategies. The secular character of Turkish state always necessitates the 
control of religion, and it has defined and set limits on the complex relationship 
between politics and Islam.” (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 427) According to Omit Cizre 
Sakallioglu “In the pursuit o f a strategy with regard to Islam , the pendulum has 
swung widely, moving from repression to accommodation”(1996: 231-51).
In 1920-28, the regime that had been based on the Caliphate and the Sultanate 
was abolished. As ‘tekkes’ and dervish lodges were closed, efforts were made to 
form a ‘compliant Islam’. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established, and 
was made subordinate to the Office of the Prime Minister. As Niyazi Berkes has 
stated “It is erroneous to think that Islamism was completely eradicated in Turkey 
with Kemalist reforms. What was, in fact, eradicated was the place of Islam in the 
state-religion synthesis o f the Ottoman regime” (Berkes, 1984: 69). In other words, 
the new regime took on a different and more limited role with regard to Islam.
The republican elites assumed that religion in Turkey should have the same 
function as in modern Western societies. Religion should be drawn back somewhat 
to the level of a matter of conscience, and belief or non belief should be adopted by 
individuals of their own free will. In brief, the underlying theme of the newly
Although the transformation of the position of religion is started with the foundation of the 
Republic and with the principles of Atatürk, we come across works which state that the 
position of Islam in the Ottomans was not the same as in the Asr-i Saadet. One can consult to 
Mardin’s commentaries on it. Mardin has pointed out the tension between the Islamic and 
bureaucratic components of the Ottoman rule. According to him, “It was Islamic in the sense 
that Islam was the religion of the state and that the Sultan’s primordial role was that of the 
leader of the Islamic community: it was bureaucratic in the sense that working for the 
preservation of the state colored the practice of Ottoman officials...At times, such as the 17th 
Century, the style of government was more 'Islamic', but by the middle of the 17th Century
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founded regime was secularism, more specifically ‘laicism’.
Nilüfer Göle (1997) has discussed this point of view clearly. According to her, in 
Turkey, as in other countries, secularism is considered to be the prerequisite of 
Westernization rather than of democratization. In other words, secularism, as a 
modernist ideology in Turkey, is linked to the state’s control of the public sphere 
(rigidly in the early years of the Republic, especially between 1923-46, but softening 
gradually from the 1950s to the 1980s). “Turkish secularism has meant the banning 
of religious orders, dress codes for public servants, and the imposition of certain 
types of audio-visual programming at state radio stations and television channels” 
(Göle, 1997:49).
The Turkish model of secularism introduced radical institutional changes at the 
executive and legislative levels. These included abolition of the Sultanate (1922) and 
the Caliphate in 1924; the abolition of the religious courts and religious titles; the 
adoption of a secular civil code of law from Switzerland in 1926, and declaration that 
the Turkish Republic was a secular state with a constitutional amendment in 1937.
In brief, religious activities in the public sphere and religion as a ‘matter of 
belonging’ adopted by society, were controlled and banned. Religious activism went 
underground, and was confined to family life or continued to exist in small 
communities. According to Serif Mardin this means that “the transmission of 
religious knowledge from one generation to the next was possible only through 
informal channels; family, the small community and underground ‘tarikat’
the pendulum had swung to a more bureaucratic style.” (1981:194)
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activities”(Mardin, 1983: 143).
İn addition to these changes, secularism became instrumental in creating a new 
model of citizenry that was secular, modern, and hard working. This took place 
primarily by means of the national education system, which was put under the 
authority of the Ministry of Education in 1926.
The state delegitimized religious education and established the supremacy of
secular modern education nationwide. The building of the nation state was thus
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accompanied by the centralization of education and the formation of its nationalist 
elite. According to Göle:
“The Arabic script was replaced with Latin script in 1928, and the 
Turkish language was cleansed of Persian and Arabic influences, 
with the result being a pure Turkish language. This was secured 
with the establishment of the Turkish Linguistic Institute (Türk Dil 
Kurumu) in 1932, which created a radical break from the Ottoman 
past and the Ottoman elite. The change of script from Arabic to 
Latin was a key element in the consolidation of secularism, because 
it cut the Turks’ ties to the language and script of the Koran, and to 
the Arabic and Muslim world in general. In their endeavor to 
demystify religion, the Republican elite encouraged the translation 
of the Koran into Turkish, and set out a mandate that the mosques’ 
call to prayer be in Turkish, not Arabic. Thus, language and script 
reforms caused a radical cultural shift toward the Western world, 
both symbolically and literally” (1997: 50).
More important with regard to this thesis, the introduction of secularism to daily
life is best illustrated by the current physical and social visibility o f women. In
terms of women’s status, the republican reforms and moves toward secularism
efforts were truly revolutionary for this so- called Muslim country. According to
Toprak (1994), the reforms included,
“...introduction of coeducation with compulsory primary school 
training; and equality through a new Civil Code that neglecting 
polygamy, and provided equal rights to women regarding
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inheritance and property ownership; the adoption of a new dress 
code which legally allowed women to remove the veil, and even 
outlawed the veil for civil servants; the granting of political rights; 
and finally, the opening of career and employment opportunities to 
women” (1994:298).
1.2.3.2 W OM EN AN D  TH E M O D ER N IZA TIO N  PO L IC IE S OF T H E  TU R K ISH
STATE:
In the impact of secularism in daily life is best illustrated in the enhancement of 
Turkish women’s physical and social visibility. Secularism was the driving force 
behind freeing women from religious practices such as veiling and segregation of the 
sexes. W omen’s participation in public life, as citizens and as civil servants, and their 
socialization with men defined the modern secular way of life and represented a shift 
away from a form of social organization that was framed by Islam (Göle, 1997: 51). 
”In Turkey’s modernizing program, women were depicted as the builders of a new 
life, a modern way of living both in the private and the public spheres.” (1997: 51) 
Similarly, Toprak has written:
“The Kemalist reforms concerning the legal, political, and social 
status of women was part of an effort to Westernize Turkish 
society. A catalogue of such reforms is indeed impressive for a 
Muslim country: The adoption of the Educational Bill o f 1924 
{Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu} which secularized the educational 
system and provided equal educational opportunities for men and 
women ; the adoption of The Swiss Civil Code in 1926 which 
outlawed polygamy and gave equal rights to men and women in 
matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property ownership, 
the adoption of Western styles in clothing in 1925 which legally 
allowed women to unveil; the granting of political rights to women 
in 1934; and finally, the opening of career and employment 
opportunities for women” (Toprak, 1981: 288).
However, Toprak (1981) claims that although Kemalism paid women special 
attention, it has not been very effective at changing the status of women in Turkish
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society, at least at the short run. In other words:
“Although such reforms were major steps toward the emancipation 
of women, their impact on women’s status in Turkish society 
should be assessed with caution. For one thing, the failure of legal 
measures in affecting changes in the lives of women living more 
closed communities is apparent. For example, the provisions of the 
civil code concerning marriage, divorce, or monogamy are often 
evaded in favor of more traditional arrangements that Islam has 
sanctioned for centuries...In short, the success of legal reforms in 
changing women’s condition has been limited to the extent that 
Islamic beliefs and traditions concerning sex roles have socially 
remained valid” (1981:288).
Toprak has also discussed at great length the invpact of Kemalist reforms on 
women’s issues:
“I think that appraisals of the Kemalist reforms concerning women 
miss the point that such reforms were not designed to change 
sexual roles but rather had a pragmatic political aim. I think, of 
strengthening the goals of the Kemalist Republic rather than a 
revolutionary redefinition of sexual roles. The Kemalist vision o f a 
modern society had the Western model as its parameters. The 
major goal of the Kemalist movement was to establish a modern 
nation state as defined by what I would call its quasi- ideology, 
namely, westernization. This quasi ideology determined the 
boundaries of what Kemalist reforms would attempt to accomplish.
Most of them aimed at transforming Turkish society from an 
Islamic into a Western setting. Hence the emancipation of women 
was a necessary corollary of the Westernization effort. It was a 
politically expedient means of inducing cultural transformation to 
the extent that women play an important role within the family in 
transmitting dominant cultural values to younger generations. It 
was not, however, an effort specifically directed towards a radical 
reassessment of sexual roles”(1981: 289).
According to Toprak, the Islamist’ assertions about women relate to the Kemalist 
reforms concerning women.
“The major concern of the Islamists in contemporary Turkey 
revolves around the question of community morality which is 
intimately linked with the status of women. The Islamists are 
especially critical of Western influences on gender relations, the 
family, and social customs. In their views, republican education 
and legal reforms have destroyed the balance that Islamic society
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had achieved in the division of labor between sexes. In contrast to 
the important role that Islam assigns to women within the family, 
republican secularism has led women to neglect their primary 
duties as mothers and wives and has encouraged them to seek 
public employment, the result has been the disastrous confusion of 
roles in the modern family”! 1981: 299).
Both Göle and Toprak agree that, during the Republican single party 
period in Turkey, the visibility of women in public life -as students, citizens, and 
professionals- signified a shift from a Muslim way of life to a secular modern one. 
According to Metin Heper, “Republican reforms were attempts made to socialize the 
people into becoming patriotic citizens of a secular republic rather than pious 
members of a Muslim community”! 1997:34).
From another perspective, in the Turkish case, modernity became gender specific 
in a sense. Ironically, women have played a central role in the rise of Islamism as 
well. The veiling of women in the 1980s and 1990s indicates the re-Islamization of 
personal relations, public spaces and daily activities. This means that women in 
Turkey are the bearers of symbols of different ideological forms of discourse.. On 
this point Deniz Kandiyoti !1991: 43) has shown that the appearance of women first 
as objects of political discourse, and later as political actors and citizens, was 
intimately tied to the changing nature of the Ottoman/Turkish polity.
How did the public sphere develop throughout the single party period? In the first 
years o f the Republic, in the single-party period of the Republican People's Party, 
the ‘public sphere’ was a place where social viewpoints pertaining to the past were 
rejected, and in which the state tried to build relationships and views that were to be 
considered dominant. A new space was opened up for women in this realm, since the
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aim was to build a similarity o f the public sphere of Western civilization, which was 
considered an example in the modernization process, and was passed on via women.
Along with this move, by placing religion under the control of the state, the
republican elite effectively decreased the power of religion in the organization of
relationships in the public sphere, deeming religious faith a matter of private
conscience. In short, during the single-party period, when the Caliphate was
abolished, religion was taken under close observation and came under the control of
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the state. In this period the power of Islam became limited and standardized (Tapper, 
1994: 8). In this way. Tapper indicated that (1994:8), the role of Islam was radically 
changed, and religion was relegated to a less dominant position in daily life, as was 
the Western way. Behind these policies and aspirations was the desire to form a 
nation state.(Lewis, 1968: 408) The aim of the Republican regime was to replace 
religion with nationalist ideology as value system.
On this point, Kandiyoti’s views help us explain why women were the carriers of
ideological symbols, and through which mechanisms they came to the fore as
representatives of their ideologies. Kandiyoti has stated that,
“...the current parameters of the women question were shaped by 
the historically specific conditions of the rise of Turkish 
nationalism, starting with the Second Constitution Period (1908- 
18) and leading to the Kemalist republican regime. Although the 
tensions between Westernism, nationalism and Islam are by no 
means resolved and continue to occupy a prominent place in 
current political debate, I am suggesting that the specificity of the 
Turkish case with respect to the emancipation of women can be 
fully appreciated only through an examination of the process of her 
emergence from an empire based on the multi-ethnic millet 
(national and religious communities) system to the Anatolia-based
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secular nation state” (1991: 23).
Hence, during the first years of the Republic, in the single-party period, women’s
vision of entering public life did not include changes in the division of labor
between the sexes, or changes in gender roles. Rather, the goal was to make ‘wom en’
visible as an important element of modernization. In fact, the issue of altering the
division of labor was ignored, and it was deemed appropriate that women continue to
carry out their domestic duties without challenge. According to Ayse Durakbasa;
“ The Kemalist female image reflected the pragmatism of the 
Kemalist ideology and was basically a combination of conflicting 
images: ‘an educated-professional woman’ at work; ‘a socially 
active organizing woman’ as a member of social clubs, 
associations, etcetera; ‘a biologically functioning woman’ in the 
family fulfilling reproductive responsibilities as a mother and wife;
‘a feminine woman’ entertaining men at the balls and parties.
While the first three images had been circulating in previous eras, 
the last was new and attempted to establish a Western style of 
gender relationship in Turkey. It signified the regime’s desire to 
Westernize, that is imitate the West and its civilization” (1998:
147).
In other words, whatever the reason, the republicans, in spite of numerous 
incursions into the family life of the Muslim, stopped short of questioning 
cultural definitions of womanhood. The new woman was to take her place in 
public life of the republic as an educated social woman (Durakbasa, 1988: 39-43). 
Women were viewed as mothers and wives, and any accomplishment reached 
through education would be seen merely as an addition to her already defined 
essential nature. Kandiyoti summarizes the dominant female image of the period 
as “the comrade-woman, and a sexual sister-in-arms whose honor and chastity 
remains intact in spite of her active participation in the struggle to liberate and 
improve her nation” (1988a: 44). She concludes, more importantly, that
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“nationalist and Islamist discourses concur in establishing a definition of woman 
congruent with the true identity of the collectivity, one in which the sexuality of 
women is kept under strict control.” (1988a: 46) From another perspective 
Nükhet Sirman (1989) interprets the main tenet of the Single Party Period as 
populism. According to her,
“...the official ideology of this populism proclaimed the equality of 
Turkish men and women. This state proclaimed gender equality 
produced many professional and academic women in Turkey who 
saw no point in a women’s movement since its aims had already 
been accomplishment by Kemalism over the years, these women 
organized in a number of associations that proclaimed the primacy 
of the values of the republic, education and motherhood. This 
double role that was prescribed for women still informs the world­
view of many contemporary academic women, the very people who 
were able to take advantage of republican reforms. For these 
women Islam constitutes the main threat to their existence” (1989:
14).
The way people and social groups have created their identities from two
opposing concepts is directly related to the experience of Turkish modernization
or Westernization. Being modern and being traditional are two mutually exclusive
states - one can not be both at the same time. It is assumed that the modern and
the traditional are theoretically incompatible. Charles Taylor (1999: 153-75) has
described this form of modernity as ‘acultural’.
“Acultural theories tend to describe the transition of modernity in 
terms of a loss of traditional beliefs and allegiances. This loss may 
be seen as coming about as a result of institutional changes: for 
example, mobility and urbanization are understood to erode the 
beliefs and reference points of static rural society. Or the loss may 
be positively valued, or it may be judged a disaster by those for 
whom the traditional reference points were valuable and for whom 
scientific reason is two narrow” (1999: 169).
Taylor has proposed that instead of speaking of modernity in the singular form, 
we should speak of alternative types of modernity. The minimal requirement for
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thinking in terms of alternative modernities is to opt for what Taylor characterizes as 
a cultural as opposed to an acultural theory of modernity. An acultural theory 
describes the transition to modernity in terms of a set of culture-neutral operations, 
which are viewed as input that can transform any traditional society: “On this view 
modernity is not specifically Western, even though it may have started in the West. 
Instead it is that form of life toward which all cultures converge, as they go through, 
one after another, substantially the same changes”(1999: 169).
There are two basic flaws in this theory. First, it fails to see that Western 
modernity itself is a culture with a distinct moral and scientific outlook consisting of 
a constellation of understandings of person, nature society, reason, and the good that 
is different from both its predecessor cultures and nonWestern cultures. Second it 
imposes a false uniformity on the diverse and multiple encounters of non-Western 
cultures with the allegedly culture neutral forms and processes (science and 
technology, industrialization, secularization, bureaucratization, and so on) 
characteristic of societal modernization. In short, an acultural theory is a theory of 
convergence: The inexorable march of modernity will end up making all cultures 
look alike.
In contrast, a cultural theory (Gaonkar, 1999), holds that modernity always 
unfolds within a specific cultural or civilization context and that different starting 
points for the transition to modernity lead to different outcomes. Under the impact of 
modernity, all societies will undergo certain changes in both outlook and institutional 
arrangements. Some of those changes may be similar, but that does not amount to
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convergence. Different starting points ensure that new differences will emerge in 
response to relatively similar changes. A cultural theory directs one to examine how 
the pull of sameness and the forces making for difference interact in specific ways 
under the exigencies of history and politics to produce alternative modernities at 
different national and cultural sites. In short modernity is not one but 
many(Gaonkar, 1999:118).
However, in Turkey, the concept of modernization and the state’s efforts toward 
this end have been considered as one and the same -’W esternization’. According to 
Çağlar Keyder (1998: 31), the most appropriate description of the Turkish 
experience in words that originate from the word root ‘modern’ is ‘to make 
modernized’. The silent subject that accompanies the phrase ‘to make modernized’ is 
the modernizing elite, and the aim of this elite was to force the Turkish public to 
accept the institutions, beliefs and attitudes that confronted with the elite’s 
understanding of modernity.(Keyder, 1998: 31) The most important distinction 
between imposed (from the top) modernization and self-directed modernization in a 
social process is that, in the former case, the overseers of modernization hold the 
state power and act in their own interests.(Keyder, 1998: 32) Keyder asserts that the 
fight continues in Turkey’s political sphere today between the authoritarian 
modernizing and patriarchal state, and modernist political liberalism and the concept 
of citizenship. He claims that democratic openness in Turkey will be possible only 
when the clout of the traditionally powerful state is eroded, and the public sphere is 
under the control of autonomous citizens.(1998: 42)
To reiterate briefly, in the first years of the Republic, during the single-party era, a
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series of reforms were implemented that called for the adoption of Western attitudes,
relationships, and styles of dress. The modernity of the state and its Western
inclination originated in the public sphere, and new ideas and approaches determined
who would be included within that sphere.'* Women were given an important task in
this modernization process. Kandiyoti asserted that,
“the post independence trajectories of modern states and variations 
in the deployment of Islam in relation to different nationalism’s, 
state ideologies and oppositional social movements are of central 
relevance to an understanding of the condition of women. The 
ways in which women are represented in political discourse, the 
degree of formal emancipation they are able to achieve, the 
modalities of their participation in economic life and the nature of 
the social movements through which they are able to articulate their 
gender interests are intimately linked to state building processes 
and are responsive to their transformations”(1991: 3).
Reformists emerged, not only in Turkey but in the other Muslim countries as well. 
They included nationalist men who wanted to better the position of women, and who 
were in favor of becoming m o d e rn ized .T h ese  elites were interested in wom en’s 
rights, and focused on matters such as education, gender differences, veiling issues, 
and polygamy. Some were interested in examining to what extent modernism and 
Islam were compatible. W omen’s issues were at the center of debate about the 
compatibility o f Islam and modernism.^®
18 See (Köker, 1990) for the evaluation and criticism of the modernization process of Turkey 
under Kemalism.Also see (Keyder ,1996), and (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1998).
'‘Tor the details of modernist reformers of the other Muslim countries see John L. Esposito 
1991.
"Tor elaborative analysis of this issue see, Afsaneh Najmabadi. 1991. “Hazards of 
Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology in Contemporary Iran” in 
(Kandiyoti, 1991:22-48). , Haleh Afshar. 1995. “Why Fundamentalism? Iranian Women and 
their support for Islam” Women:A Cultural Review , Vol.6, No. 1:18-33., Nahid Yeganeh. 
1993. “Women, Nationalism and Islam in Contemporary Political Discourse in Iran”
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Alongside with other issues about women, ‘religion’ was also much discussed 
during the formation of the nation-state. The general consensus regarding religion at 
the time and the limits of the public sphere established affected the way it became 
politicized in later years."'
“During the single party period, the government not only tried to 
contain the role of Islam in society, but also took steps to reform 
Islam according to its own vision. The purified Islam was expected 
to promote the creation of a society composed of nationalist, 
scientifically minded, and anti-traditional individuals. The state’s 
ideal was an Islam confined to the realm of individual conscience. 
In this conception, the intervention of government in religious 
affairs was a logical and necessary step to achieve the development 
of an Islam that would itself preach an effective seperation of state 
and religion” (Ayata, 1996: 42).
When forming opinions on these issues, one should recognize the fact that; 
although the state elite’s top-down reforms were effective in the public sphere, they 
were inefficient, at least in the short term, in the private sphere, in the organization of
Feminist Review , No.44:3-17., and also Margot Badran. 1991. “Competing Agenda: 
Feminists, Islam and the State in 18th and 20th Century Egypt” in (Kandiyoti 1991:201- 
237).
■'For the elaboration of this thesis see (Esposito, 1997; 1992). According to Esposito “The 
varieties of Islamic activist groups and experiences are a testimony to the flexibility of Islam, 
and of political Islam in particular. They illustrate the extent to which specific contexts, 
differences of political economy, distinctive personalities, and ambitions of individual 
leaders or ideologues and Islam’s capability of multiple and varied interpretations all shape 
the ideology and actions of Islamic movements. This diversity underscores the multiple 
meanings and usage’s of Islam by Muslim rulers and Islamic organizations and their 
differing attitudes toward and relationships with the West, as well as the diversity of 
strategies and tactics employed by mainstream activists versus violent radical 
revolutionaries. Islamic politics must be viewed within specific country contexts, because, 
far from a monolithic reality, it manifests a rich diversity of leaders, organizations, strategies
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daily life, in the formation of societal relationships. Positive effects in these areas 
would only have been possible through major economic change, and only through 
socio-cultural transformation from the bottom up. Turkey had to wait until the 1950s 
for this transformation.-·
As an overview of the religion issue in this context, during the first years of the 
Republic, in the single-party period, religion was banned from the public sphere and 
faith was transferred to the hands of individual conscience. However, since religious 
reform did not occur immediately, or in parallel with social transformation, religion 
returned to the public sphere whenever it found the opportunity. This did not occur 
because Islam was originally political, but because the Turkish modernization 
experience was unique. Since the state elite regarded religion as the main reason for 
backwardness, and as a symbol of ‘reactionism’, it was essential that religion be 
‘exiled’. This policy of neglect of, and disregard for, religion, which is a basic 
element of daily life, was a source of great shame for people who defined themselves 
according to religious references. Within the Islamic movement today, there remain 
strong feelings about this unjust treatment.
So far, one thing is very clear: there were always two main topics on the agenda 
with regard to the dynamics of modernization in Turkey. These issues were women 
and religion. It was not until the 1980s that the relationship between them changed.
and tactics.” (1992:4)
"For a in-depth analysis about the state and social classés see, (Keyder, 1988).
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1.2.4 STA TE ,R E L IG IO N ,a n d  W O M EN IN  TH E PERIO D  1950-1980
During the single party period, when the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was 
in power (1924-50), the development of a centralized state driven mainly by the 
bureaucracy, the military, and the spread of modern educational networks put new 
and sometimes complicated, demands on much of the population. The state increased 
its control over many aspects of public and private life, and placed pressure on 
specific social groups and political figures. The Westernizing reforms targeted 
powerful religious officials, religious leaders, and religious groups, transferring their 
public functions, such as law and education, to new state institutions. (Ayata, 1996: 
42) Equally important was the state elite’s introduction of new values, codes of 
behavior, and life style, all of which served to widen the cultural gap between the 
masses and the newly Westernized urban classes.
Things changed in the multiparty era, specifically when the Democrat Party (DP) 
came to power. It was then that the makeup o f the elite shifted, and a new type of 
elite emerged. The DP expressed the common opposition of the independent groups 
to the center’s policies on economic, ideological and cultural issues (Ozbudun and 
Tachau, 1975). In the 1950 elections, a total of 408 deputies were elected to a 
possible 487 parliamentary seats, with the party winning 53% of the popular vote. 
DP went on to win the next two elections, and governed the country until 1960. Since 
1950, DP political elite had voiced the interests of social groups that had become 
isolated, and had been forced in a weakened position by endorsing liberal concerns 
and bringing populist issues to the fore, the DP motivated the peasant-dominated
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voting public in Turkey. In doing so, ‘populism’ as a style of policy to attract votes 
of masses, became the efficient political style. (Ozdalga, 1979: 293)
What was D P’s attitude toward religion? The party’s approach to religion 
involved incorporating Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of 
Turkish politics (Ayata, 1997: 43; Zürcher, 1993: 243-44). In the DP view, religion 
was .seen as the social cement that would held society together. This also fit well with 
the party’s political attitude toward the ‘secularism’ of the Westernized elite. 
Emphasis was placed on the concept that religious commitment and social 
development did not threaten the positive efforts of a section of the single- party 
elite, who held that one cancelled out the other.(Sunar and Toprak, 1983) this period 
o f change, Sakalhoglu writes:
“Western observers frequently characterized the 1950-60 period in 
Turkey as a time of Islamic resurgence or revival. The signifiers of 
this so called revivalism has formulated as follows: In 1949 
optional instruction in religion was introduced into primary 
.schools; in 1950 schools to train mosque personnel called Imam- 
Hatip Schools were opened; a Faculty of Theology was established 
in Ankara, the recital of the ezan was allowed in 
Arabic...’’(Sakalhoglu, 1997; 237).
These were hardly the kind of changes that would dismantle the secular 
state. In any case, some of these permissive measures had already been initiated by 
the RPP in 1947. What these moves did was give legitimacy to Islam and traditional 
culture through the official politics of the country. After the single party had 
politically downgraded the position of culture, the DP, for practical rather than 
ideological reasons, partially reversed this. However, according to Sakallioglu, the 
D P’s policy o f giving back respectability to traditional culture and Islam did not
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involve any loss in the scope or intensity of state control over religion. (1997: 238)
Toprak and Sunar (1983) have reviewed this period in the context of the changing 
relationships between state, religion and politics. What they found interesting about 
this period was not the details of the so-called resurgence, but the transformation that 
began in religion and politics, and the relationships between these two. Under the 
authoritarian regime of the early Republic, relations between state and religion were 
marked by the virtual exclusion of Islam from the secularist political center. Religion 
was outcast, to the periphery of everyday life. But in the period of 1950-60, the 
country saw more mixing of center and periphery, largely in the form of clientelist 
politics promoted by the DP.
In summary, the republican changes had dictated growing encroachment by 
modern, national institutions, and utilitarian values on the everyday reality and social 
life of the masses, whose lives hitherto been steeped in tradition and Islam. In 
reaction to this, a new idiom and a new form of Islamic politics began to gain 
strength. In this new movement, religious values were intermixed with practical 
ambitions and traditional ways with modern approaches. Thus a new form of politics 
was born in the 1950s. In essence, the DP used Islam to get elected, and with this 
came the unplanned but steady progress of religious ideologization by marginal 
groups in society. They wanted to share in the benefits of modernization through 
participation in, rather than categorical rejection of, the secular institutions of the 
Republic. (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 431)
To get a truly accurate picture of the place of religion in the politics o f the DP 
period, we must also consider the impact of economic development and social
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change. In their first years in power, it was not necessary that the DP give major 
concessions to religion, for at that time the economy was doing well, unemployment 
was not a problem, and petty- bourgeoisie wealth was growing. But when the DP lost 
control of the economy, and the eeonomic situation of the mas.ses deteriorated'^, 
religion-based politieal discourse was a way of dealing with these conditions.
Following its victory in the 1954 elections, the D P’s power waned due to the
declining economy and opposition from within its ranks. Strategically, the party
*
started to use Islam more openly. The ehanging attitudes of the state and state elite 
led to revival of the Islamic movement. This was evideneed by the surge in 
circulation that was experienced by Islamic publishers at the time. The number of 
‘Nur’··* students who saw themselves as the followers of Said-i Nursi grew 
considerably, ‘Nureuluk’, as a social movement, expanded it’s social base during this 
period.(Tunaya, 1991)
The most influential publications of this period were the magazines like ‘Büyük 
Dogu’ ‘Sebilliirresad’, ‘Fetih’ and ‘Serdengeçti’. In general, their articles compared 
the RPP with the DP, and ultimately supported the latter.(Kara, 1988) The writings 
dealt with a range of subjects, from the negative aspects o f the repression of religion 
to reciting ‘ezan’( calling of Muslims to ‘namaz’ praying) in Turkish. There was 
more and more emphasis on Islamic thought, the writers began to criticize the rapid
The study of Keyder which treats the relations between state and classes in Turkey with 
respect to the change of the economic behavior, also offers us enlightening explanation on 
the crisis undergone by social classes in the course of history. See (Keyder, 1989) and also 
see, (Keyder, 1993).
■■'More information about 'Nurculuk' see ( Giiner, 1996).
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pursuit of secularization policy in the ideological and institutional spheres, and they 
envisioned a society in which Islam was more visible in daily life.
In brief, the basic features of the Islamic movement were that public opinion 
should be rooted in an Islamic stance, and that daily politics should be harshly 
criticized from this perspective. In this period, Islamists sought to express their 
ideology through publications that would reach the masses, identical to what 
occurred in the Second Constitutional Period.^'’ Said-i Nursi, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, 
and Nurettin Topçu were the most significant and effective Islamic writers of the 
period of late 1950s and 60s. Particularly in the wake of the 1960 coup d ’etat, the 
writings o f Necip Fazıl and Nurettin Topçu were popular in certain sectors o f 
society. The reason for this was that both authors expressed a common belief that, as 
a living cultural framework, Islamism had an important impact on people’s daily 
lives. In other words, they promoted the concept that, in daily life, and as an 
explanation for life’s events, religion provided an important reference point for 
people. They held that this was the reason that religion-Islam- was essential, and 
guide of life as living. (Kara, 1988)
Furthermore to this point, some of Mardin’s analysis (1994) is interesting. He 
states that Islamic discourse is an idiom that binds people, and that, in the case of 
Turkey and other Islamic cultures where religious discourse has a more elaborate 
structure, the role of symbols, myths, and constructed narratives should be
■"’This similarity forced from their intellectual character: That was the significance of 
publication facilities in which Islamism was developed..See( Kara, 1988; 1994), and 
Mardin,1995.
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considered when analyzing social issues. (1994; 189- 214)
At the history of he relationships between the Islamic political movement and 
Turkey’s political parties, Islamic groups have consistently supported right-wing 
parties; first, in opposition to RPP secularism, and then to cripple the rising leftist 
movement. In other words, in the path of political development in Turkey, the 
Islamic movement has largely been forced to pursue the anti-secular and anti-leftist 
line, rather than following its own independent program. This was the scenario until 
the beginning of the 1970s (Saylan, 1992).
At the political party level, the ‘Millet Partisi’ (Nation Party) was the first 
representative of Islamic political party. The party was formed by a group of deputies 
who saw the DP as merely an extension of the RPP. Established in 1968, the NP 
placed a lot of importance on tradition, custom, and social convention. However, the 
party was not influential with the electorate.
As time passed, the DP was perceived to have growing sympathy for Islamic 
milieus, and using religion for political ends. This, in addition to the failing economy 
and mounting DP authoritarianism, eventually resulted in steps being taken by the 
military, which has always held democracy and the implementation of secularism as 
a major goal.“^
In overview, there was a new relative calm in the way state-religion relations
26For a rich analysis of the military coups in Turkey see,(Evin, 1994), (Heper, 1987)., and 
also see (Ahmad, 1992).
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were run after the multiparty system was introduced. DP politics were effective 
during this period, but, on the other hand, the party’s use of religion in the fight 
against leftist ideas was also one of the reasons behind its change in attitudes. We 
also must recognize the impact of socioeconomic factors. The growing effect of 
capitalism on the economy form the time the DP was in power to 1960, the increase 
in migration from the rural to urban areas (Atalay, 1983; Mardin 1990), and the 
increase of activation of the society were the sparks that lit the fire of religious 
activism. What happened after the May 27, 1960 coup, and what was the state of
religious activities and discourse then?o
1.2.4.1 TH E PERIO D  B E T W E E N  1960-1980 :
The 1961 Constitution was fairly democratic, and made it possible for various
0 7
gioups to express themselves in the public sphere."
“The new constitution of 1961 incorporated measures of liberal 
democracy and political pluralism in reaction to the policies of the 
DP, which had turned increasingly authoritarian. The military 
government between 1960 and 1961 used Islam as an underlying 
ideological principle o f its reform platform” (Sakallioglu, 1996: 
238).
It was in this pluralist political environment that an explicitly religious political 
party was founded for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. This was
the National Salvation Party."*  ^ At the time the party was established, there were two
■’For the comparison of the Constitutions of Turkish Political system see (Parla, 1994).
■^The National Salvation Party was originally organized in 1969 under a different name, the 
National Order Party. But these party was disbanded by the Constitutional Court after one
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major political parties and several minor parties in the system. At the center right was 
the Justice Party, successor to the DP, and at the center left was the RPP.
According to Toprak and Sunar, “The NSP’s ideological posture and its social 
program reflected in important ways the cultural, social and economic changes which 
Turkish society has undergone, and the kinds of problem and issue which have 
become salient since 1946”(1983: 434). The changes were mainly socio-economic, 
and included urbanization. There was a mixture of old and new -tradition and 
modernity- as this led to the emergence of a mass of frustrated people who were torn 
between tradition and modernity.
In other words, one of the best ways to understand the discourse of political Islam 
and the parties affected by this discourse is to study the processes behind social 
changes that have occurred. Also, it is impossible to analyze the Islamic movement 
merely in terms of the expansion and reduction of the political space allotted to it by 
the state elite. Whatever the policies of the state were, Islam continued to be an 
important cultural reference that helped people run their daily life and explain its 
events. However, the Islam that we refer to here is one that is specific to Turkey, and 
we should be clear that what is traditional and what is sacred is often mixed in the 
Turkish context.
The inauguration of the National Salvation Party marked the begining of true
year for violating the law of the Organization of Political Parties which forbidden the 
explanation of religion for political purposes. However the Party was established at 1972, 
this time with different name. The National Salvation Party, by Necmettin Erbakan.
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representation for Islamism as a political party. The NSP played an important role in 
Turkish political life from 1973 to 1980. The party recorded considerable success in 
its first race for power in the 1973 elections, grabbing 11.8% of the total vote and 
winning 48 seats in Parliament. (Toprak, 1991) Despite its poor electoral support, 
with neither of the two largest political parties (the RPP with 186 seats and the 
Justice Party with 150 seats) in a position to form a majority government, the NSP 
became the key party in the formation of coalition governments. In 1974, the party 
entered into a coalition with the social democratic RPP, but this awkward alliance 
did not survive long, and was dissolved by the RPP after the Cyprus crisis that same 
year.
A new coalition, known as the first National Front Government, was formed from 
the Justice Party (successor to the DP), the NSP, and the Nationalist Action Party 
(NAP). As part of this union, the NSP pursued a very active political line; however, 
this government was abolished with the decision to hold the election of June 5,1977. 
The RPP came out on top in the 1977 election, but since the government did not win 
a vote of confidence, a second National Front Government was formed. However, 
this coalition was unsuccessful at coping with the rising problems of terrorism and a 
high rate of inflation, and was replaced by RPP government in January 1978. Under 
this administration, the terrorism and inflation problems persisted, and an election 
was held the next year. With the 1979 elections, a minority Justice Party government 
was formed with outside support from the NSP and NAP, but political instability, 
terrorism, and the economic crisis persisted. Ultimately, the continuing political 
instability led to military intervention, and the army banned the NSP, as well as other 
political parties. (Heper and Evin, 1994)
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What were the basic policies of the NSP in Turkish political life, and what 
traditions did it establish; what did the party stand for, who did it support, and who 
were the NSP sympathizers? The literature reveals that the NSP was supported by the 
petty commodity producers, lower-middle classes, and the newly modernizing 
groups. According to Mardin “A close correlation has been found between the 
economic growth of provincial centers, the increase of associations for the support of 
religious activities...while there is not firm evidence of esnaf support of the NSP, the 
strength of the NSP in Turkish provincial towns where esnaf are strong make a prima 
facie case for such links.” (1977: 292)
On the other hand, the NSP did not attract the attention of Islamic groups.
Being the first party to openly challenge the Western discourse of the regime on
the basis of Islamic tradition, the NSP had difficulty rallying the support of the
masses since the general public had felt dominated by the secular Western front
since the founding of the Republic. One of the reasons for the party’s success
was that its policies did not paralleled the values of certain sectors of the public.
“The NSP was in fact continuing the century-old discussion 
between Islam and the West ideologically. At the end of the 19th 
century and beginning of the 20th century the parties to these 
discussions were Islamists and pro-westerners. While pro­
westerners were defining the view that the Empire could be saved 
by adopting the principles-without distinguishing technology and 
civilization-of the west, Islamists talked about benefiting from the 
technology of the west but protecting the Islamic values. To some 
extent the NSP was reiterating the views of the Islamists of the 
Second Constitutional Period.” (1981; 250)
Just like the traditional Islamic groups, the NSP associated the recession of the 
Ottoman Empire with the rejection of the Islamic civilization for the sake of
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Westernization. The NSP advised a return to moral values so that Turkey might once 
again be a large and powerful country. In other words, “...the prerequisite for Turkey 
to be a big country, was to return to Islam and civilization created by it” . 
(Toprak, 1981:250)
Therefore, the party had much in common with the Islamism of the past. What
was new in the NSP was its independent political identity. The NSP’s vision of
progress and development, and its discourse full of moral values, appealed to the
parts of society that were already becoming modernized. Although the NSP’s
discourse favored a return to Islamic tradition, the party and its discourse were
actually a product of the modernization process. More than ever before “...Islam
became, through the NSP, something more to be believed than to be lived. Hence
Islam as advocated by the NSP, come to resemble more the modern ideologies,
which the NSP vehemently denounced, than the old Islamic convictions of the
traditionals” . (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 441). According to Toprak and Sunar:
“... the republican reforms have released the individual from the 
shackles and the bigotry of the small, traditional community, it has 
left him wondering and deprived of an ethos grounded in a 
symbolism believed to be true. With the rapid increase in social 
mobility, urbanization and incorporation of the masses into the 
national life of the country, this problem has become more acute 
than ever before...Islam will continue to play an important role in 
society- not however, in the form of a mass movement, an Islamic 
revolution or revolt, but largely as an ethical guide to promote good 
civic behavior and social peace, and as a private experience for 
individuals”(Sunar and Toprak;1983:441).
Similarly, Sakallioglu underlines the importance o f economic factors in the rise 
of Islamic-oriented groups. “The standard argument for the genesis of political Islam 
in the 1970s emphasizes economic grievances along with the cultural alienation of
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small merchants, businessmen, and artisans. Traditional- conservative elements in 
the periphery, often culturally alienated and economically deprived, have been 
depicted as the natural electoral base for the party.” (1996; 241)
In addition, the impact of Kemalist policies on the development of the NSP needs
to be taken into account. It must be noted that the NSP not only appealed to the
disenchanted traditional sectors but also to voters in the most rapidly developing
areas. This means that the massive expansion of modern secular education and
«
economic development led to rising expectations on the part of these segments, 
which were unfulfilled by existing political parties or their organizations. In this 
sense, the party voiced “not the reaction of tradition, but the protests of those who 
wanted a large political and economic role in the expanding world of 
modernity”(Sakallioglu, 1996; 242). We must consider the N SP’s two-sided rhetoric 
in order to better analyze the sociological standpoint of its supporters. On one hand, 
the party endorsed Islamic values (the cultural side), and, on the other, it promoted 
development and industrialization. Hence, it is inaccurate to consider the NSP a 
‘radical Islamic party’.
What place did women hold in the NSP organization and its discourse? Before 
answering this question we need to look at a snapshot of the position of the Turkish 
woman in the period from 1950 to 1980.
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1.2.4.2 WOMEN, RELIG IO N, AN D  ID EO LO G IES
In the preceding section, the reforms that helped improve the status of women
were discussed. In accordance with the way the Republican regime defined itself,
women were expected to participate in the public sphere, and were also expected to
bring up new generations who were devoted to the Republic. Although it is true that
the reforms of the Republic initially affected the lives of relatively few women,
history shows that the scope of this impact grew. Over time, women from all
*
different parts of society benefited from the opportunities brought by the reforms. 
However, the founding of the Republic was not the only driving factor behind the 
increasing appearance of women in public, their new roles, and their improved status. 
The growing influence of modernization and capitalism also played a role in 
bettering the position of women, since they were also part of the system, or at least 
were active in the economic network imposed by capitalism. (Moghadam, 1996)
Kandiyoti suggests that women in Turkey gained some freedom, but were not 
totally ‘liberated’ by the Republican reforms. Modernization in Turkey did not alter 
the traditional values and customs of Turkish society. These cultural traditions 
continued to be followed. Hence, women were not liberated by modern values; the 
traditional patriarchal institutions maintained their control on women. (Kandiyoti, 
1987:317-338)
There is also another important point. Women who came to the fore in the public 
sphere appeared, not with their personality and femininity, but with a contrived 
masculine look. Especially in the early years of the Republic, the typical features of a
66
woman in the public eye were presenting themselves as asexual and masculine. In 
short, since the public sphere was regarded as a masculine territory, the women there 
had to be more like men in order to secure their presence. The pressure was 
particularly great for professional women with high-level jobs, who survived by 
"desexualizing’ themselves or taking on the external traits of men, and by putting 
their family life on hold-either by not getting married at all, or, if married, by not 
having children. During the 1950 to 1980 period, the women of the time represented 
two different ideologies: Kemalism and, as of the mid-1970s, socialism.This was a 
period in which women shed their role as elements of civil society for the sake of 
ideologies that had nothing to do with them as woman individuals.
In parallel with this, however, even though Islamic politics eventually took its 
place in the political system, women remained excluded from these politics both 
discursively and symbolically. Sule Yüksel Şenler was one of few exceptions. 
Beginning her political career with Nationalist Action Party , she gravitated toward 
Islamism under the influence of her brother, who was a student of ‘N ur’. She 
became a ‘woman writer’ and promote of Islamism, criticizing daily politics. In her 
writings. Şenler (1991; 1992)criticized the way women were treated as sexual 
objects, stating that Islam valued the woman, rising her status, and invited her to find 
her true path." Şenler challenged the ‘modern woman’ model promoted by the 
Republican regime. She often mentioned the need for women to wear a veil. But she
29
The poet that was written by Şenler has summarized all of her views on woman issue: 
“Woman is the appreciated one. She is like a sacred diamond for preservation. The most 
appreciated value of her is her modesty. If she is not modest, she is like a rock. What is the 
place of women in the earth? Where is her sacred role? The real freedom of her is the 
veiling....Please veil the women, give her freedom...’’(1991:15-16).
67
did not emphasize the significance of public participation for the devout Muslim 
woman. One had to wait until the end of the 1980s to witness discussion of this 
subject in the discourse of Islamist women.
One thing should be made clear at this point: The appearance o f women in the 
public sphere is a common denominator for all women’s groups, and is directly 
related to Turkey’s modernization process. During this process, many women began 
to contribute to the country’s economy, with their wish to work and earn money. 
Many also took the opportunity to get an excellent education, and they became 
prominent in their professional jobs. However, there was another group of women 
who came under both direct and indirect influences o f modernization, but 
encountered some problems.
In Turkish political history, the 1990s has been the period for real questioning of 
the boundaries of the public sphere^’, and for the emergence of different social 
movements and the establishment of a new place for women in the public sphere. 
The Islamic movement has also changed its parameters during this period, which is a 
reflection of internal discord. The movement has also evolved to become not only an 
alternative point of view, but a way of life. In the following section, with a focus on 
the role of women, I will analyze the way in which state-religion relations have been
Although modernization is expected to increase the status of women , we can observe that 
this modernization process may bear paradoxes concerning the women. For instance see, 
(Erturk,1990;Gbk,1990)
^'The usage of the concept of ‘public sphere’ in literature in Turkey increased in recent 
years.See,(Keyman 1996; 1997) For an elaboration of the use of civil society concept in 
Turkish context see (Sarybay,1994). He has analyzed in this book the relationship between
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defined in the post-1980s, and look at the course of the development of the Islam.
L2.4.3 TH E ISLA M IC  M O VEM EN T A F T E R  1980: ‘IS L A M ’ A S  A  W A Y OF  
L IF E
An important body of social science literature that focuses on Turkey in the 1980s
and 1990s characterizes the period as one of progressive and favorable
democratization, of a decentralization of state, and most importantly, of a
*
development of civil society and a certain sort of pluralism and multiculturalism in 
Turkish society. In the literature, Islamic revivalism in the post 1980s, is viewed as a 
sign of democratization and the development of civil society. Tslamization’ in 
Turkey is interpreted within the discourse of the awakening of civil society. The rise 
in popularity of the formerly banned ‘tarikats’, the flourishing market for Islamic 
publications, and the adoption of the headscarf and veil by an increasing number of 
women were all cited as evidence of the return of the repressed (Robins, 1996) by the 
po,st Kemalist social scientists (Yashin, 1998).
Turkish political life in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup was full of 
controversy. This period witnessed the significant changes in the economic, political 
and cultural spheres. There are varying explanations as to how this come about. 
However, despite the different points of view on this subject, all agree that the 
development of Turkish civil society in 1980s was characterized by upward social 
mobility and the appearance of new divisions o f society in the public sphere.(Heper, 
1988: 9) Two reasons have been cited for this change: first, the transformation that
Islam civil society and postmodernism.
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occurred in Turkish politics at the time, and second, the emergence of independent 
social groups that promoted new discourses.
The period after 1980 witnesses a kind of ‘thaw’ in Kemalisim, the official
ideology of the state. With new economic policies and under pressure from the
international order, the principle of statism came to be almost completely rejected by
the governments. During this time, Atatiirk’s political doctrine was used as way of
protecting against the extremist tendencies of the left and right, rather than as a
*
general basis for public policy and the system. After 1980, there came a change in 
the roles of the classic elite -the military, the bureaucrats, the intellectuals-, as they 
distanced themselves from the missions of the first years of the 
Republic.fEvin, 1988:213)
“The political situation in post 1980 Turkey reflects the 
disappearance of the chief cultural cleavage between the center and 
the periphery. The reasons for the disappearance of this cleavage 
rest with socio-economic factors rather than political ones. As a 
result of change in the economic principles, replacing a long 
tradition o f distributive patrimonialism with market economy, a 
class based society is in the making. Meanwhile the traditional state 
elite in the bureaucracy are being replaced by managerial cadres.
The change in economic culture has not only resulted in the 
ascendancy of new cadres into positions of influence but also led to 
a redefinition of status in society. Whatever the final form the 
emerging pattern of cleavages will take, it is certain that it will 
reflect the range of choices in a pluralist society” (Evin, 1988:
213).
Moreover, we should also mention that there were important changes occurring in 
the positions of intellectuals who had played key roles as repre.sentatives of the 
opposition, as proponents of alternative ideas in the modernization process.^“ These
For an enlightening work on the analyses of the development of science in Turkey related 
to the official ideology of the state, and positivism, see (Arslan, 1991; and 1999).
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individuals often discussed liberalism, democracy, and human rights. The rise of a 
new generation of intellectuals, and their allegiance to society and the public as 
opposed to the state, was a major force behind the shifting of boundaries between the 
periphery and the center.
Two most important concepts of the post-1980 period were, ‘civil society’ and 
‘liberalism’. Some of the policies implemented by Turgut Özal, the ex-leader of the 
Motherland Party, which came to power in 1983, left deep imprints on Turkish 
political life, and facilitated the development of civil society. The privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, the granting of funds to municipalities, growth of the 
market economy, and principles of free enterprise - all which were constantly 
defended by Özal- had a major influence on public opinion. (Heper, 1990: 6)
Liberalism became one of the hottest topics of discussion with regard to culture
and economics. The debate on liberalism, and its introduction through the political
party, clearly reflects the way relationships in society and between state and religion
changed during this period. Nilüfer Göle summarized this as follows:
“In terms of the state society relationship, the post 1980 era has 
been a turning point in Turkish political development. During the 
1980s, the autonomization of civil societal elements from the grip 
of the center- a process that started in the 1950s -became more 
pronounced. This autonomization has, in fact, taken on a novel 
pattern. Whereas the modernizing elite of the earlier decades took 
as their basic mission the secularization of Turkish politics and the 
transmission of Western values to that polity and to society, the 
technocratic elite of the 1980s defined their goal less in terms of 
educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and 
pragmatic rationality”(Göle, 1994: 213).
Thus, form this angle, the post-1980 period in Turkey is seen as a crossroads. As 
Göle summarizes.
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“ the state induced modernizing process which had started in the 
mid-19th century and had become institutionalized during the 
1920-1980 period, virtually came to an end as the leading political 
paradigm. With the relative autonomization of economic activities, 
political groups and cultural identities, an autonomous societal 
sphere began to develop, and the focus has increasingly shifted 
from the state to society; consequently, the modernizing elites 
began to develop, and the focus has increasingly shifted from the 
state to society; consequently, the modernizing elites began to lose 
their power to transform the society from above, and were 
increasingly replaced by more representative elites.” (1994: 222)
It means that, although in one sense, the 1980s could be called a period of 
depoliticization, it was also one that witnessed the emçrgence of new political issues 
that were closely connected with the new social divisions that came to the fore then. 
As ideological confrontations over systemic preferences abated, conflict over general 
abstract issues was replaced by debate on more immediate problems. 
(Göle, 1994:214)
In this environment, Islam, as an issue, was reinvented at the political level after 
1980. This breathed new life into the civil society, with new dynamics of political 
participation and political protest.^^In other words, as Göle asserted, “the debate 
between the secularist Kemalist elites and the religious Islamist counter elites on the 
direction of social and cultural change in Turkey is taking place in an environment 
accustomed to electoral politics and public debates that shape public opinion and 
influence government policies.” (Göle, 1997: 48)
In this new era “Islamicist movements did not merely involve fundamentalism; 
they also allow political participation by new social groups that began to experience
About the enlargement of civil societal space after the 1980 period in Turkey, see
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upward social mobility and, for the first time, attempted to acquire an urban 
identity(Gble,1994: 218).
Another viewpoint is that post-1980 Turkey was a product of many different 
developments: the breaking of Kemalism’s promise of modernization, the break up 
of the identity it has anticipated for this society, the cultural remodeling of the rural 
face of Turkey (Robins, 1996), changes in all that had been suppressed by elitism, 
people’s growing wish to benefit more from the promises of a consumer based 
society, and, most importantly, the recognition of the parts of society that had not 
been able to express themselves previously.
People questioned the dominance of the elitist culture, which had not permitted all 
the ‘colors of society’ to participate in the public sphere. These social groups had 
been marginalized by the values of the private sphere.^"^ It has been noted ((^aha, 
1994) that two separate social groups, Islamists and feminists, chose to move their 
private sphere to the public one. The choice by certain sectors of society to define 
their class and economic level through cultural identity and, ultimately, gain access 
to the opportunities of modernization, is not specific to Turkey in 1980s and 90s. 
With the influence of globalization, this is occurring all around the world. What is 
specific to Turkey is that Islam found its place as a way of life and an identity in 
Turkey, and it developed strategies to challenge those in power and gain more of a 
presence in the public sphere.
(Toprak,1996).
For the effects of globalization on the identity construction process, see, (Featherstone, 
Lash and Robertson, 1995;Robertson, 1992).
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Islam has emerged as a dynamic element in culture, and has gained a strong 
presence in civil society. Religious foundations, known as ‘vakifs, provide education, 
housing and health care for those who are victims of the state’s inadequate social 
services. The movement has also spearheaded the development of a parallel Islamic 
market economy. With its alternative system of social support and community based 
benefits, contemporary Islamism is both a product of and a critic o f endogenous 
forms of modernity (Esin and Cindoglu, 1999)
Further, Mardin states that "...the part of the religion assumes in modern Turkey
is a function of the reaction to new social conditions: economies of scale, the
mobilization of the periphery, mass society, politicization, mass media, the
disenchantment of the modern world” (Mardin, 1996: 165) According to Margin,
during the 1980s, religion became the autonomous identity. By identity he meant the
boundary constructing force that causes the formation of the collective. “What we
have seen in post 1980 Turkey are steps toward the construction o f such a
collectivity rather than a conspiracy by politicians to use religion” (1996:
166)Mardin’s perspective on the rise of Islam in post-1980 Turkey includes other
interesting points. He also states that;
“the fact that many laypersons in the post 1980 period have been 
engaged in what can be termed a hermeneutic exercise for 
enriching their Muslim culture, and the fact that they take the 
Western philosophic discourse seriously, shows the other aspect of 
this issue. The inheritance of many republican institutions, which 
have required legitimization, and the continuity of its social fabric 
in present day Turkey necessarily move religion in the direction of
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a general secularization. In the long run, it may be possible to think 
of the transformation of Turkish Islam into a ‘civil religion’” 
(Mardin, 1996; 168).
Göle adds to Mardin’s points, stating that “Islamism, both in its ideological
formulations and sociological practices, has created new hybridization between
tradition and modernity, religion and secularism, community and religion”(Göle,
1997:55). It has also been said that:
“...contemporary Islamism criticizes both traditional interpretations 
of Islam and modernism. It is neither a direct product of religious 
and cultural traditions nor a straightforward representation of 
Muslim identity. Contemporary Islamism is a cultural and political 
deconstruction of the Category of “Muslim”. It is a critique of and a 
discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an 
endeavor to rename and to reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it 
from traditional interpretations and by challenging modernism. It is 
radical both in its critique of traditions, considered responsible for 
the possivity and the enslavement of Muslim people, and it is desire 
to set up a radically different civilization based on the Islamization 
of all spheres of life from the conception of the self, to the 
organization of the life-world, and to the politics of government”
(Göle, 1997: 55).
In order to better understand the Islamic movement’s development in Turkey after 
1980, we need to analyze the character of Islam at that time. Through which channels 
did Islam enter, and become influential in, politics and social life at this time? Where 
did women fit into the movement?
The Islamist movement is not homogenous. When we discuss this movement 
today, we do not refer to a movement that is only represented on the political stage. 
The Islamic movement is made up of a number of distinct sects, movements, parties, 
forms of activity, and points of view. This has given rise to differences of opinion
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and debate on issues ranging from the interpretation of religious principles to 
dilemmas about changing society and the economy (Çakır, 1991).
The world of communication is where religiosity and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism are most visible, in books, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, 
videocassettes and so on. Ayata (1993) has classified the different publications under 
three main headings: the traditional Sufi orders-primarily the ‘Nakşibendi’, but also 
the ‘Kadiri’, ‘Rufai’ and others; religious movements of republican origin - ‘Nurcu’, 
‘Süleymancı’, ‘Işıkçı’; and the independent or nontraditional Islamists (radicals), 
which include a number of groups and factions.
In Turkey, to understand the power of Islam in helping the individual grasp the 
meaning of the universe and daily life, one should not refer to the views represented 
by political parties, but instead to the way of Islamic life experienced in the 
previously mentioned ‘tarikats’. Although there is not total agreement between them, 
the common function of all the tarikats is to provide guidance for their followers, to 
put aside the issues of interpersonal relationships and make Islam a part of life. In 
Turkey, Islam’s role as a ‘moral ethos’ (Saktanber, 1997) is realized through the 
‘tarikats’. These religious orders also function as solidarity organizations, helping 
students who need accommodation and finding jobs for women who cannot find 
employment because of their veils. Thus, despite their divergent and varying specific 
views as a whole, tarikats provide an alternative form of social support 
(Mardin, 1996).
On the political side, through the Refah Party (Welfare Party), Islam has emerged
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as an important force in national politics. Established on July 19, 1983, as one in a 
list of successors to National Salvation Party, the RP was founded by a group of 33 
former NSP members. The names given to their political parties by the Islamic 
.sections of society over time reflect the fact that these parties succeed one another 
historically, and that change is inevitable in their dialogue, just as national and 
political conditions change.
It is significant that the tradition that ultimately founded the RP had earlier 
shifted away from the word ‘order’ (National Order Party), which signified 
discipline, to ‘salvation’ (National Salvation Party), which has an increased moral 
element to ‘welfare’, stressing the economy. The ‘Fazilet Partisi’ (Virtue Party), 
which was established in 1988 after RP was banned, also represents how the party 
themes have followed the times. The use of the word ‘virtue’, which is defined as 
moral excellence or goodness of character, in place of ‘order’, ‘salvation’, and 
‘welfare’ reflects the changing form of Islam in Turkey: It is changing toward being 
a civil Islam, or as a way of life and as a specific morality.
Returning to the subject of the RP, there are some important points to note. Being 
a party that had functioned for 25 years with virtually the same team, Refah Party 
needed to change its concepts and slogans to be in tune with the changing 
atmosphere in Turkey. Islamic political parties, too, are practical, and they promote 
themselves in reference to the country’s existing political, economic and cultural 
situation. The modern, urban, democratic profile designed by the RP in the 1990s 
was clearly connected to social and political developments, and was a change made 
in an aim to seize power. The altered profile of the electorate and their demands
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generated some major modifications in the party’s image and slogans.
According to Laçiner (1994: 3-11), the RP efforts were rewarded in the local 
elections of March 27,1994, and winning the mayorship of many large cities, 
particularly Ankara and Istanbul, was considered a great victory. The slums, known 
as ‘varos’ (slum areas), were the center of RP votes in metropolitan areas. The 
people there had migrated from village to town to the big city, and were neither 
urban nor rural. They represented parts of society that were not benefiting from the 
consumer society, yet were under the influence of the trend toward rising 
expectations. Slogan of ‘just order’, and the solidarity and community spirit 
propaganda distributed door-to door by the RP, appealed to this ‘outsider’ section of 
society and gathered them under the party influence. In analysis, the modernization 
process, which began in the Tanzimat Period, as well as the cultural dimension and 
the incapacity of governments to overcome the modernization-induced identity crisis 
in some parts of Turkish society, were the factors that enabled the RP to come to the 
forefront, especially in the metropolitan areas (Mardin, 1987; Göle 1996).
Historically, as Saribay has indicated (1985) the section o f society that has 
supported religious movements or religion-based political parties is the small and 
middle scale artisans/tradesmen in the metropolitan and rural areas. However, the 
people who were pulled toward religion in the mid-1980s, who formed an effective 
religious movement in Turkey and created a new alternative via the RP axis, were 
not people that had necessarily ever been affiliated with the Islamic movement.
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These new elements included the ambitious Muslim capitalists who had achieved a 
good position both in urban areas and in the growing economy of rural towns that 
were rapidly becoming industrialized. The new joiners also included well-educated 
technical administrative staff, a group of youth who had received foreign language 
education in high school, as well as well educated, professional urbanized women 
and a .segment of the working class.
These new components of the Islamist movement supported the traditional 
platform of RP and its opposition to the policy and practices pursued by the Republic 
of Turkey in the name of the ‘laicism’. But there was something else as well. These 
new segments of Islamism went beyond criticizing the West and Western social 
order. They saw Islam as a new alternative, and viewed Islam not only as a 
framework for belief and worship, but as a basic element of daily life.
These new additions to the Islamic movement updated the reactionary, more 
traditional line of the RP. They transformed the old party platform, which was not so 
different from other conservative party’s approach to political social order apart from 
the secularism issue, and created a new image of the RP as a party that was 
committed to radical change at least at the economic and cultural aspects of the 
country. The hottest centers of Islamist movement development were the city slums 
(Lapiner, 1994:6).
The attitude of the new elements that gravitated toward the Islamic movement of 
1980s was very different from that of the traditional voting base of the RP. It is 
important to clarify the point of view held by this new element, and what is so
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strongly opposed. The essence and objective of ‘laicism’ in Turkey was to banish the 
traditional ‘eastern’ or so-called ‘reactionary’ way of life from the public sphere, and 
to continue it to the inner world of the individual. The idea was to remove this way 
of living from the public eye and lock it up in the home and the mosques, thus 
allowing the modern- Western way of life to reign supreme.
The parts of society that joined the Islamic movement throughout the entire 
world, and especially in Turkey, after the 1970s made it clear that they knew the 
dynamics behind the modern life style, and how this lifestyle was being 
implemented. In addition to the opposition of these new groups, those who had 
initially been in favor of modernity began to criticize the modernizing process and its 
results.
In brief, as the 1990s approached, the method of the new elements of the Islamic 
inoveinent changed from a quieter approach to a more outspoken and militant one. 
There was also a move toward more intellectual activity which brought their ideas 
and policy better in tune with modern times. These newly visible segments of society 
kept their distance from the complexities and concerns of traditional Islam. While 
they created a new and different conservative right understanding of the 
sociopolitical struggle and the problems of modern society, they were careful to 
remain separate from the traditional Islam in promoting theii· discourse. (La9iner, 
1994: 11)
■^’For an elaboration of the ‘laicism’ issue in Turkey, from the different point of views see 
(Vergin, 1994;Tiirk6ne 1994;Erdogan 1994).
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As of the mid-1980s, the concept of creating a political alternative through the 
Islamic movement gained considerable steam. The Islamic movement had 
endeavored to create a place for itself in the economic/social network of the public 
sphere, and tried to build support through these channels. It created its own public 
sphere by founding Islamic organizations and associations, and establishing Muslim 
sites, financial institutions, aid organizations, media institutions, cultural 
foundations, and schools. According to Heper “in its efforts to garner votes, the RP
m
was supported by a complex network of Islamist economic ventures which included 
holding companies, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, women and 
youth groups, some 50 publishers, 45 radio stations, 19 TV channels, and hundreds 
of video and cassette producers” (Heper, 1997: 36).
However, the decisions of the National Security Council meeting of February 
28,1997, meant that the Islamic segment of society could no longer express itself as 
freely and openly. The activities of the ‘tarikats’ began to be closely watched by the 
city governorships. The veiling of women has become back as among the major 
issues of the country.
Cole’s observations on the political systems of Muslim countries are valid in the 
Turkish context. According to her in the political systems of the Muslim countries 
there is circle of confrontation . On the one hand. Westernization initiatives have 
been encouraged and realized through authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, this 
involves the bypassing of democracy, revival of Islamic practices and countermoves.
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These movements are not associated with democratic ideals and institutions, and are 
criticized by the Westernized elite. When the military intervenes to restore the 
.secular order, the circle is thus completed. (Göle, 1997b: 252)
From this point on, the place of women in the Islamic movement of the post-1980 era 
will be examined.
1.2.4.3.1 WOMEN A S  AC TIVE AG EN TS OF ISLAM ISM  A T  THE POST-1980 
ERA IN  TURKEY:
m
As explained above, during Turkey’s modernizing process, women were seen as
the builders of a ‘new life’, both in the private and the public sphere. The visibility of
women in the public sphere signified a shift from a Muslim way of life to a secular,
modern one. Therefore, modernity, in the Muslim context, took on a gender specific
meaning. As well, women played a central role in the rise of Islamism during the
1980s and ‘90s. The veiling of women and their participation in the public sphere
while wearing the veil represents the re-Islamization of personal relationships, public
spaces and daily practices. Toprak writes;
“the general characteristics of the Islamic movement in Turkey 
which have been transmitted into identity politics in recent years 
are especially visible in relation to the gender question. The Islamic 
fundamentalist movement is a reaction to industrial growth but at 
the same time provides the organizational mechanism to carve out a 
space for its members within the status hierarchy of Turkish 
society” (1994: 295).
Toprak has argued that Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey is primarily concerned
with the status of women and defines the parameters of:
“Islamic community in terms of a sexual differentiation of social 
and familial roles. The movement sees the defining characteristic of 
a Muslim society in its conception of women that in turn shapes the 
social organization without which Islam would have become a
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purely individualistic faith since it does not recognize a priesthood. 
Fundamentalist politics reflect a struggle to redefine women’s 
status in Turkish society” (1994: 293).
It is a fact that Islamic discourse has been driven mostly by men, and although 
they have attempted to redefine the status and roles of women, it makes sense that 
only the veiled ‘women’ themselves can truly determine what is good and right for 
them. It is interesting to note that, parallel to the expansion of the Islamic publishing 
activities in the post 1980-period, there was also an increase in the number of 
magazines published by women (Acar, 1990; Arat 1990).
In other words, women’s participation in Islamist movements has had unforeseen 
consequences. Islamic politics has enabled Muslim women to participate in public 
life -organizing meetings, publishing articles, establishing associations- and thus 
escape the private sphere and their traditionally defined roles. Islamism legitimizes 
this public participation, both in practice and in ideology. In practice, it justifies the 
visibility of women in politics and public life through women’s devotion and 
contribution to the Islamic cause.
Participation in higher education and Islamic politics is an example of how 
women have become visible, and have gained more ground in society. According to 
Göle:
“But there is a paradox in this mode of empowerment through 
Islamism. Women abandon traditional ‘life-cycles’, making their 
personal lives a matter of choice (for a professional and/or political 
career) but by the same token, women in Islamist politics acquiesce 
in incarnating the Islamic way of life, Islamic morality, and Islamic 
community. Hence, on the one hand, Islamism unintentionally 
engender an individuation of women, while restraining it on the 
other hand. Islamism provides women with access to public life.
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but an access limited to the good of the community. The 
politicization of the ‘Islamic way of life’ carries the potential to 
hinder women’s individual choices of life, professional strategies 
and personal expressions”(G61e, 1998: 64).
From one perspective, Islamist women have become the main figures in the 
process of establishing a position for Islam in the public sphere, and, in this respect, 
Islamist (male) discourse has supported some aspects of women’s participation. 
However, as Weber points out that once the disenchantment of the world has taken 
root, it is impossible to turn the situation around. Although new world can be made, 
it will never be the same as before. Once the educated veiled women break the mold 
and become visible in the public sphere, and once certain changes have been made in 
female-male relationships, women will not want to return the ways of the past, and 
even if they do want to go back this will not be possible (Weber, 1992).
It is important to make something clear here. When we discuss the ‘veiled 
women’ in Turkey, we do not refer to a uniform, homogeneous group of women who 
function within a narrow set of relationships. On the contrary, the ways in which 
Islam is experienced differ according to social class, region and ethnicity. By adding 
the internal divisions of Islam to this scenario, the result is a new category of women 
who have many differences as well as similarities.
In what ways have Islamist women in Turkey participated in the public sphere in 
the 1980s and especially the 1990s? There are two main considerations; first, the 
increase in the number of veiled students at the universities, and, second, the increase 
in the number and circulation of their daily and weekly magazines. Secondary to 
these forums, there have been panels, meetings, conferences, and courses organized
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by veiled women within the framework of the women’s branches of various 
‘tarikat’s, and of the RP.
A total of six Islamist women’s magazines began publishing in the post-1980 
period and have continued throughout the 1990s. Their titles are, ‘Mektup’(1985), 
‘Kadın ve Aile’ (1986), ‘Yeni Bizim Aile’ (1988) , ‘Sena’ (1993), ‘Kadın Kimliği’ 
(1993), and ‘Evrensel Kadın’ (1997). Although each is unique in its themes, the 
writing in these magazines fulfilled an important function, which was to establish the 
public opinion of veiled women by telling their stories in their own words. There are 
different interpretations as to the extent of the democratic elements in this discourse, 
its potential for liberalizing women, and its level of traditional undertones (Demir, 
1997). Göle has stated that veiled women express the tension between community 
morality and individualism. According to her;
“to the extent that rationality, individualism and critical thinking 
emerge as autonomous value-references for the Islamist elite 
formed through the modern system of education, the process of 
secularization can be said to be ongoing. In other words, the more 
the Islamists acquire a professional identity as engineers or 
intellectuals, the more the realms of the sacred and profane will be 
segregated” (Göle, 1997 a: 58)
Veiled women develop an alternative discourse in order to empower themselves 
and map the route that Islamic discourse will take in coming years. This discourse 
speak against the dominant ‘model woman’ defined by the existing system, and 
against the di.scourse generated by Islam on women and family life.
The main trait that distinguishes the Islamic movement of the post- 1980 period 
from that of earlier times is the position of women within the movement. For the first
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time in Turkish history, Islamist women have begun to speak for and about 
themselves. It was mentioned earlier that in previous years the intellectual men were 
the ones who wrote about how the women and family should live according to Islam. 
Taking this into account, it can be said that two main features characterize Islamism 
in the post-1980 period: the divided character of the Islamic movement, and the 
leading status of the women within the movement.
In other words, acting within boundaries that have been set by secularism and 
modernism from the beginning of the Turkish republic, those women who defy the 
dominant ideology’s definition of citizenship but also reject the male dominance in 
Islamic discourse manage to keep changing the status quo. However, with the 
Turkish state’s continued stress on its own particular version of ‘laicism’, and its 
control over the boundaries of the public sphere, no radical change occur.
Interestingly, despite what is happening in the political arena, paradoxically the 
veiled women try to live and experience their female status in a similar way to other 
women of the same classes in Turkey. However, the state’s continued efforts to 
pressure people into conformity and similarity ensures that Islam will always be first 
and foremost in the identities of these women. The formation of the veiled woman’s 
character and her position within the general Islamic movement relates directly to her 
relationships with other sectors of society, and to state policies.
The following chapters will try to expose and understand the feminine identity 
and womanhood experience of veiled, married, professional women in Turkey, 
women who are under the pressure of Islamic patriarchal codes because they are
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women, and are under the pressure of the official state ideology because they take 
Islam as a reference in giving meaning to, and legitimizing, daily life experience.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Especially in the second half of the 1980’s, one of the hottest topic in Turkish 
political and social life was ‘rising Islam’, or ‘political Islam’. The primary 
indicators of ‘rising Islam’, or ‘reviving Islam’ as it was called in the media, were 
veiled university student girls. These girls were the symbolic representatives of 
Islam.
Beyond being a witness to the protests and political attitudes of these women, as a 
student who shared the same climate with them, but not being one of them, I was 
very interested in their daily life experiences. The protests they have carried out may 
be the most powerful ones ever made by women in Turkish political history. What is 
behind these protests goes deeper than their being ‘puppets of Islamism’. At the 
same time, ‘feminism’’ was gaining a ground through academic women and was 
rising as well, as a new movement. As a woman who is sensitive to problems of 
women that are based on gender, I too took a stand on the feminist side. The more I 
read about feminism, the more my interest in veiled women grew, and I began to 
wonder more and more about their gender-related experiences. I felt that evaluating 
the.se women merely as passive puppets of Islamism was a betrayal to feminism
'Feminism has become an independent movement organized for women in Turkey is at the 
period after 1980. For further reading about this subject see, (Tekeli, 1990a; and 1990b)and 
(Sirman, 1989).
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itself. These women deserved to be evaluated in a deeper analysis, instead of passing 
them off with a reactionist judgement, as some popular media and some academic 
groups have done.
As women we share certain similarities and conditions, such as our way of 
thinking, we have some common points as living in the same society, and the 
necessity to run our lives within the same political and economic structures. We also 
live under the same patriarchal cultural umbrella, as the wet ones. But, on the other 
side, there are important differences in the way we sort out our life strategies.
It is inaccurate to comment on veiled women by taking them as the passive
conveyors of Islam, as it locks the progress of women and fosters gender
discrimination. These approaches treat veiled women not only as a homogeneous
social category, but also as ‘ahistorical’. As Haleh Afsar (1993)stated;
“Not only is the Muslim world divided, politically, culturally and 
in terms of its governments and social structures, but the women in 
these countries, like women everywhere, are divided by class, and 
sometimes caste, as well as nationality and degrees of political and 
religious allegiance. Islam is but one amongst many factors that 
shapes their lives”(Afshar, 1993: 14).
Also, in Turkey there is not only one type of Islam but a number of different 
types that relate to, and have a sprung from, ethnic identity and class. As written text 
alone, religion can have no real effect on people. It is religious needs, mixed with 
other issues, that determine the shape that Islam takes in a person’s life. These other 
issues are economic, political, and cultural in nature.
I approached ‘religion’ in this study, by revising the types of explanations
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that the sociology of religion offers.
2.1 ‘R ELIG IO N ’ FROM  A SO CIO LO G ICA L PERSPECTIVE:
Religious ideas are linked with social reality in mutually effective relationships. 
Methodologically, this approach owes much to Clifford Geertz’s (1967) definition of 
religion as a cultural system of symbols in which ‘religious patterns’ are ‘frames of 
perception, symbolic screens through which experience is interpreted’ while also 
being ‘guides for action, blueprints for conduct’. As modes of ‘symbolic 
formulation’ they, like the system they formulate, grow out of experience by which 
they are shaped, while perceiving wider truths and norms which they expound in 
order to influence and shape that experience. (Stowasser, 1993: 5)
Religious themes penetrate daily life by becoming part of other structural tools
of the society in which a person lives. Also, the parameters of economic, social and
cultural life can be expressed in religious themes, and this can motivate people in
their daily life. In Emile Durkheim’s approach, we tend to evaluate religion from a
perspective that considers religion as a society itself.
“Religious beliefs proper are always shared by a definite group that 
professes them and that practices the corresponding rites. Not only 
are they individually accepted by all members of that group, but 
they also belong to the group and unify it. The individuals who 
comprise the group feel joined to one another by the fact of 
common faith. A society whose members are united because they 
imagine the sacred world and its relations with the profane world in 
the same way, and because they translate this common 
representation into identical practices, is what is called a Church” 
(Durkheim,1995: 41).
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Durkheim states that the ‘sacred’ that is commonly expressed in various religious 
and mythological symbols, is, in the final analysis, nothing but an expression of the 
social. In his view, the basic function of all kinds of sacred symbols was to secure the 
solidarity of its different members, and, according to this analysis, religion 
constitutes the refined expressions of this social solidarity. Thus, there is a solidarity 
theme in the Durkhemian formula; that is, that religion unites all those who adhere to 
it in a single moral community. Religion is the glue of society, the source of social 
solidarity. What is misleading in this approach to religion? According to William 
Swatos (1994:148), Durkheim’s explanation of religious beliefs in a this worldly - 
.society- does not actually explain them at all; why, after all, is the worship of society 
any more readily explicable than the worship of gods? This question put to 
Durkheim by Swatos is a very useful one, as it opens up new horizons in the 
sociology of religion.
From a different perspective again, the leading figure in the sociology of religion. 
Max Weber, viewed religion as an entity in itself. According to him, religion cannot 
be reduced to economic, political or ideological interests, but represents a force, a 
reality in its own right.Weber’s primary interest was in religion as a source of the 
dynamics of social change, not as a reinforcement of societal stability. His study was 
the comparative and evolutionary understanding of relations between religion and 
society, and even between society and culture in general. Weber did not see religion
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as something that is controlled socially, in a collective way. Moreover, according to 
him, the same religion can be experienced differently by different social groups. In 
other words, differences in occupation and class positions bring together the different 
practices and benefits of religion in daily life. (Weber, 1993: 24) According to Weber 
“ religions are not logical and psychological structures that are free of conflict, but 
are historical structures. When they are investigated individually in terms of stability, 
it becomes clear that each has a series of conflicting motifs that get in the way of 
other religions. Stability in religion is not a rule but an exception.(Gerth and 
Mills, 1987:249)
Weber’s most valuable contribution is that he does not view religions as 
unchangeable static belief systems, nor does he see them as belief systems that are 
shared collectively, or which keep society going. On the contrary, he approaches 
relationships between people and society. He tries to analyze how people rationalize 
religion in their daily life practices. Thus he not only studied religion, but also 
implicitly studied how life practices are established and how relationships are formed 
between individuals and society.
W eber’s methods and ideas allowed sociology to expand considerably. In his 
study of the link between capitalism and Calvinism, he stated that Calvinism forms 
an ethic and that this ethic feeds Capitalism.(Weber, 1976) In essence, Weber was 
interested in how people organized and justified their daily social activities. He 
looked seriously at how religion affects this justification process. He did not deal 
with the theological features of religions, but with the effects religious ‘ideas’ have
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on social action. In other words, his theory was that the daily arrangement of social 
activity is guided by religious motives. More importantly, he asserted that religion 
leads to specific patterns of interpersonal relationships which determine social action 
(Özlem, 1990). In other words religious ideas are acted out by members of society in 
their interpersonal connections. Unfortunately, in his interest in the organization of 
social action, Weber focused solely on the experiences of men, and neglected the 
ways in which women validate religious ideas in their daily lives. Still, his 
contribution with regard to the effects of religious ideas and motives on daily life is 
one way of interpreting the Islamic woman’s relationship with religion.
This thesis will present the notion that veiled women form their justifications of 
attitudes about daily life according to the moral system of the Islamic voice. As 
Weber said, religions are effective at organizing the network of relationships that is 
built around the ‘social meaning’. Swatos stated, “it is not our task to define religion 
sociologically but to observe and explain how and why people think and act 
religiously.” (Swatos, 1991: 188) Combining the ideas of these two thinkers, I will 
analyze how veiled women structure their daily life in relation to religion, and ask 
how and why are they use religious motives to Justify their everyday social activities.
For veiled women, religion-Islam- eventually presents itself as an issue in the
decisions made along the way to defining ‘way of life’. Swatos’ ideas support this.
“We will in all likelihood continue to see competing 
epistemological systems for coming generations. What creates a 
tension in modernity that was not as easily present in earlier eras is 
that media of mass communications bring competing 
epistemologies- and with them alternate systems of action 
(moralities) - immediately into interaction, confrontation, and
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competition with each other, and this, in turn, cannot be divorced 
from resource allocation, to which there are obvious limits. Many 
individuals in today’s culture have reached a state of cognitive 
overload- they simply are no longer able to assimilate and evaluate 
the multiplicity of various descriptions of reality which face them. 
The worldwide religious resurgence, with its political dimensions 
and agendas, represents one attempt to cope with this condition” 
(Swatos, 1991: 224).
Different from Swatos’s view, Peter Berger’s (1967) opinions on religion are also 
of interest in this thesis. Berger was influenced by Weber’s methodology in some 
respects, and explains religion in the context of the dialectical relationship between 
society and the individual. Berger’s notion of religion as sacred canopy has been 
widely referred to in the social sciences. His arguments start with the assertion that 
reality is socially constructed; that the world we live in is essentially our own design. 
According to Berger, there is a selective process at work in the reality we experience. 
The actual world is infinitely complex, even chaotic, making it much too rich to 
experience meaningfully without some filtering process. That process involves the 
use of symbolic categories. The worlds we know, the pictures and mental images we 
share, all help to reduce the raw world to a reality that has order and meaning. 
Recognizing the importance of symbolism-words, utterances, ritual, language, 
culture-is obviously an important block in the edifice on which Berger constructs his 
arguments about religion. He rejects Marxist, behaviorist, and instinct theories that 
reduce human processes to sheer economic or physiological needs. For Berger, the 
symbolic realm is both prior to and constitutive of our every experience of the world 
(Wuthnow, 1986:128).
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Also, according to him, religion is a type of symbolic universe. Religious 
teachings characteristically serve to shelter the individual from ‘chaos’ by providing 
explanations for suffering, death, tragedy, and injustice. They integrate the 
individual’s biography by providing an overarching frame of reference that applies to 
all of life, that locates the individual ultimately in space and time, that specifies an 
ultimate purpo.se for the individual’s life, and thus permits daily activities be 
organized around the fulfillment of this purpose. In addition to religious teachings, 
religious rituals provide mechanisms for containing the potentially disruptive 
experiences of mourning, on the one hand, or of transcendent joy, on the other. 
(Wuthnow, 1986; 128)
There are some similarities between the theories of religion proposed by Weber 
and Berger. Weber insists on the morality/ethical aspect of religion, and Berger 
highlights its symbolic role within the construction of social reality. In his definition 
of religion Berger stresses that faith is established through human activity. This 
means religion is a reality that inevitably draws on cultural materials, that is filtered 
through the symbolically constructed reality of personal experience. Berger’s basic 
argument is that culture is continuously produced and reproduced through an 
ongoing dialectical process- it is a ‘human construction’. (Berger, 1967: 98) He says 
that the role of religion within this construction process can be decreased relative to 
the rise of other symbolic sources of meaning, and calls this process ‘secularization’.
According to Berger (1967: 107) secularization is the process by which sectors of 
society and culture are separated from religious institutions and symbols. In his
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words,
“by secularization we mean the process by which sectors of society 
and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
institutions in modern Western history, of course, secularization 
manifests itself in the evacuation by the Christian churches of areas 
previously under their control or influence-as in the separation of 
church and state, or in the expropriation of church lands, or in the 
emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority. When we 
speak of culture and symbols, however, we imply that 
secularization is more than a social- structural process. It affects the 
totality of cultural life and of ideation, and may be observed in the 
decline of religious contents in the arts, in philosophy, in literature 
and, most important of all, in the rise of science as an autonomous, 
thoroughly secular perspective on the world. Moreover, it is 
implied here that the process of secularization h;is a subjective side 
as well. As there is a secularization of society and culture, so is 
there a secularization of consciousness. Put simply, this means that 
the modern west has produced an increasing number of individuals 
who look upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of 
religious interpretations” (Berger 1967: 108).
Thus, Berger emphasizes both the objective and the subjective aspects of 
secularization. He addresses the question of where secularization begins. One source 
of .secularization, he says, is subjective-that which replaces religious explanation in 
people’s thoughts about their lives. Science leads the way here. The second source is 
pluralism, the presence of multiple reality-defining agencies. The consequence of 
both pluralism and subjective secularization is the ‘relativizing’ of outlook, hence the 
loss of certainty, and thus crisis of credibility. The crisis of credibility leaves religion 
in a most difficult situation in the modern world. Secularization, both subjective and 
objective, ensures that religion becomes largely a private matter, since no form of 
faith will be credible to everyone in any society. As a result of this, the public face of 
religion largely disappears (Hammond, 1986: 148-9).
However, what Berger says about secularism is based purely on theory. The idea
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of science’s taking the place of religion in the modern world, simply labeled 
‘secularism’, is a matter of considerable debate. His theory certainly does not hold 
true for Turkey, where highly educated people are leading figures in the rising 
Islamic movement. Many members have basic science backgrounds, including 
professors of engineering, medicine, and physics, and these individuals continuously 
express themselves in ‘Islamic voice’. Thus although Berger’s view that science will 
take the place of religion may seem to make sense in general terms, it does not hold 
true in some cases.
W eber’s previously mentioned ‘disenchantment of the world’ thesis is similar to 
Berger’s secularism theory. Weber argues that this disenchantment comes from the 
higher level of rationality that accompanies scientific reasoning, which is based on 
means-to end calculation. He states that, in the disenchantment process, the meaning 
of the world or ‘cosmos’ is established within the boundaries of scientific reasoning.
One should consider religion as a way by which individuals come to understand 
themselves, and a way in which we develop and rationalize the world around around 
us. Religion is a morality that guides people in defining appropriate manner and style 
for their relationships. Its most significant characteristic is its legitimizing and 
justifying influence on social action. Through this legitimization, or, according to 
Weber, this ‘rationalization process’, people form a specific morality, that guide 
their everyday social relations. Weber’s point of view on the relationship between the 
‘rationalization process’ and religion should be considered in more depth at this 
point. According to him, the attempt to adjust to economic, social, cultural and
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political systems through legitimizing them with religious themes is not only 
common to Protestant Puritans, but is seen all over the world. Justification plays a 
large role in the way people organize their lives.
W eber’s ideas have contributed significantly to the sociology of knowledge. He 
views individuals (men) as not only products of society but as affecting society’s 
general structure, and as individuals who are able to think for themselves instead of 
thinking of themselves as a merely elements of society.
In this framework, according to Weber (Parsons, 1993: XV), rationalization gives 
ideas their power, because it intensifies and deepens the meaning of inherently non- 
rational, and ultimately non-rationalizable, aspects of human experience. In Weber’s 
way of thinking, there is always tension between the rational and the non rational. 
According to him “religion affects action most forcefully when the tension between 
non-rational motives and a powerful rationalizing impulse is at its height” (Parsons, 
1993: XVI).
In his study of religion, Weber did not focus on religion as a theologian conceives 
it, but upon the relations between religious ideas and commitments and other aspects
'As many theoreticians in social thinking history, Weber makes analyses by assuming them 
men is the social actor. Moreover he stressed out that the Protestant moral is very effective 
on men’s attitudes and behaviors. In other words he only stressed out the effects of 
Protestant moral on organizing the relations in the public area and he didn’t even stressed out 
women except for the few examples. . For an evaluation of Weber’s thought from a woman 
insight see, (Bologh, 1984; and 1987)
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of human conduct, especially the economic characteristics of human conduct within 
a society. He tried to understand the relationships between religious aspects and other 
aspects of human behavior. In Weber’s theory, “The central problem was whether 
men’s conceptions of the cosmic universe, including tho.se of Divinity and men’s 
religious interests within such a conceptual framework could influence or shape their 
concrete actions and social relationships, particularly in the very mundane field of 
economic action”(Parsons, 1993:XXX).
This thesis through combining Swatos’s and Weber’s ideas on religion. Hence, in 
this study of veiled, married, professional women, religion is treated as a form and 
source of legitimacy and morality. From there on, how and why women act, think, 
and justify activities based on religion are analyzed. The main aim is to examine 
how veiled Islamist women perceive themselves and why they see themselves this 
way. What kind of ‘womanhood’ do they experience? How are they juggling 
religious ideas with modern life interests? What kinds of resistance or bargaining 
strategies are they developing in their everyday life experiences.These issues 
required a specific method of study.
2.2 W HY FIELDWORK?
In social sciences, the nature of the subject and the desired goals of the researcher 
determine the most suitable method. For example, if the aim is to focus on the way of 
working veiled women live their lives, then the method should answer the question
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‘how’. This thesis started with the idea that every woman’s life has a form of 
‘internal strength’, and a story in which she adopts an interactive, defensive, and 
resistive stance instead of a position of surrender. This makes it possible to view 
veiled women not as passive subjects or ‘puppets of Islam’, but as active proponents 
of Islamic dialogue who struggle and fight back when needed.
In this thesis, instead of taking an approach that views society and the social order 
as a "sui-generis" entity, and the individuals as the absolute forms of this entity, an 
ethnomethodological perspective is adapted. This approach focuses on the 
interpretations and experiences of individuals in this entity, and how they reproduce 
this entity in their reciprocal relationships. It does not view the social factuality as an 
absolute.
Harold Garfinkel (1967), who is one of the main proponents of 
ethnomethodology, underlines the necessity for interest in how social order is 
maintained rather than how it is built. Briefly, ethnomethodology deals with how 
society members bring social order and rules in tune with each other. In this thesis, 
the importance of stress on the setting style of daily life is acknowledged and dealt 
with through ethnomethodology.
In short, there is a dialectical relationship between the individual and society, but, 
in order to understand social organization, one must refer to a wider-scale, cultural 
world. The arguments in this thesis take this into account.
One of the reasons I chose to take such a methodological position relates
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primarily to ontological and epistemological assumptions, because there is direct
relationship between the social researcher’s epistemological and methodological
approaches. My answer to the questions of ontology and epistemology is that I
consider veiled women to be literate people who have the capacity to coordinate their
actions with their desires and wishes, and who can think for themselves. This fits the
definition of modern individual, one who has the ability to think, and to take
calculated actions on the basis of this thinking process. And, within the framework of
the dialectical relationship mentioned above, veiled women carry out their actions in
*
a social structure.
2.2.1 W H Y QU ALITATIVE METHOD?
As argued in the previous section, a researcher’s epistemology affects his or her 
methodology. In sociology, the investigator’s approach to the society-individual 
relationship always guides the choice of data collection technique.
Anthony Giddens (1993) has emphasized that “the problem of the relation 
between the constitution of society by actors, and the constitution of those actors by 
the society of which they are members, has nothing to do with a differentiation 
between micro and macro sociology; it cuts across any such division” (1993: 27). 
Giddens proposed a .stance somewhere between micro and macro sociology, 
theorizing that society has a reality of its own above individuals, but that individuals 
have a reflexively accountable action, have the power to challenge this given reality.
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This dualistic relationship is more clearly represented in Alfred Schiitz’s 
approach. As a promoter of existential phenomenology, Schütz has applied the term 
“stock of knowledge” to make sense of the conduct of others who constitute and 
opei'cite within different meaning systems and multiple realities(Ritzer, 1988: 327- 
346). Throughout his life, Schütz continued to maintain a wholly rationalist position, 
according to which phenomenology could provide the basis for a full-fledged 
science of social conduct. Schütz begins with Weber’s account of meaningful action, 
seeking to show that, while this is in important respects correct, it needs to be 
complemented and expanded by a study of the natural attitude, or what Schütz also 
calls the “common-sense world” or “everyday world”. For Schütz the subject matter 
of sociology is the manner in which human beings constitute, or create, the world of 
everyday life (Ritzer, 1988: 327).
On the other side, ethnomethodologists are concerned with how the natural 
attitude is realized as a phenomenon by actors in day-to-day life. To 
ethnomethodology, action is to be treated as rational only in so far as it is 
accountable. Indeed, the central postulate of ethnomethodology is that the activities 
that produce the rules of everyday life are identical with the actor’s procedures for 
making these rules intelligible (Ritzer, 1988).
The production of society is always, and everywhere, a skilled accomplishment of 
its members. If human beings make society, they do not do so merely under 
conditions of their own choosing. In other words, it is fundamental to complement
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the idea of the ‘production of social life’ with that of ‘social reproduction’. 
According to Giddens (1988) “Every act which contributes to the reproduction of the 
structure is also an act of production, a novel enterprise, and as such may initiate 
change by altering that structure at the same time as it reproduces it- as the meanings 
of words change in and through their use”(Giddens, 1988: 27). Giddens’s words 
explains this point well.
“The realm of human agency is bounded. Human beings produce 
society, but they do so as historically located actors, and not under 
conditions of their own choosing. There is an unstable margin, 
however, between conduct that can be analyzed as intentional 
action, and behavior that has to be analyzed nomologically as a set 
of occurrences. In re.spect of sociology, the crucial task of 
Homological analysis is to be found in the exploration of the 
structural properties of social systems. Structure must not be 
conceptualized as simply placing constraints upon human agency, 
but as enabling. This is what I call the duality of structure.
Structure can always in principle be examined in terms of its 
structuration. To enquire into the structuration of the social 
practices is to seek to explain how it comes about that structure is 
constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is 
constituted structurally’’(Giddens, 1988: 169-170).
In short for Giddens, the production of society is brought about by the
active constituting skills of its members, but draws upon resources, and depends
upon conditions, of which they are unaware or which they perceive only dimly.
“Three aspects of the production of interaction can be 
distinguished: the constitution of meaning, morality and power 
relationships. The means whereby these are brought into being can 
also be regarded as modalities of the reproduction of structure. The 
idea of duality of structure is a central one here, since structure 
appears as both condition and consequence of the production of 
interaction. All organizations or collectives consist of systems of 
interaction, and can be analyzed in terms of their structural 
properties, but as systems, their existence depends upon modes of 
structuration whereby they are reproduced”(Giddens, 1988: 165).
In this sense, Giddens has developed the term ‘structuration’to explain social
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production or the reproduction process. According to Giddens, structure has dual 
character. He also developed the concept of duality of structure, and did so in order 
to conte.st two main types of dualism. One of these is found in pre-existing 
theoretical perspectives. Interpretive sociology’s are strong on action, but weak on 
structure. They see human beings as purposive agents, who are self aware and have 
reasons for what they do; but they have little means of coping with issues that quite 
rightly bulk large in functionalist and structural approaches. The second group of 
approaches, on the other hand, while strong on structure, has been weak on action. 
Agents are treated as if they were inert and inept- the playthings of forces larger than 
themselves.
In Giddens’ structuration theory, it is not the case that actors create social 
systems.Rather they produce or transform them, remaking what is already made in 
the continuity of practice. According to this view, structure both constraints and 
enables human agency. Giddens suggest that this humiin action is reflexively 
accountable action. However, it is important to note that he formulated his theories 
for the ‘late modern’ Anglo-Western societies. It is not possible to superimpose all of 
his judgements on Turkish society because Turkey, as a latecomer to modernity has 
not experienced modernism for as long, or in the same way as Western societies.
How do Giddens’s thoughts contribute to this thesis? His statement that “structure 
both constraints and enables human agency” is very interesting in terms of the topic. 
Islamist women certainly live in a social structure that both constraints and enables 
them. They are affected by textual Islamic discourse, and there are many different
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ways they take part in and promote the Islamic movement. Many have the power of 
education and professional positions. Yet they do not fit into the type of women 
envisioned by hegemonic ideology as Turkey’s modernity. Veiled women are part of 
the Turkish social structure. Therefore, they are also play roles in the morality, 
meaning, and power relationships mentioned by Giddens, and are social actors who 
are effective in the formation of all these things. Because they are women, patriarchal 
power relationships are replayed over and over through generations, and these roles 
are tied in with the other roles they play in life. This means that they have different 
subject positions, but all of them effect each other.
Also of interest with regard to this thesis are radical social(ist) theorist Chantal 
Mouffe’s (1993) arguments about how the expression of different subject positions 
leads to social action. Mouffe has a different perspective from that of Giddens in 
terms of her analysis of how a radical democratic society is established, and of her 
criticism of liberal democratic society. Giddens is considered as a sociologist of the 
late modern times; Mouffe focuses more on the political aspect of society than on 
society’s rules of operation. However, Giddens’ and M ouffe’s views merge with 
respect to the individual society relationship. Mouffe places more emphasis on how 
members of society experience citizenship, and conceptually differentiates the 
‘individual’ from the ‘citizen’.
According to Mouffe, the social agent is made up of a mix of subject positions
“that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, 
construed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no 
necessary relation but rather a constant movement of 
overdetermination and displacement. The identity of such a 
multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent 
and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those
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subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification. 
It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as If we are 
dealing with a unified, homogeneous identity. We have rather to 
approach it as a plurality, dependent on the various discursive 
formations; and to recognize that there is no a priori, necessary 
relation between the discourses that construct its different subject 
positions” (Mouffe, 1993:77).
MoLiffe’s most important contribution is her insistence that different ‘subject 
positions’, or viewpoints, be articulated. According to her, every opinion has an 
essentially unstable discursive structure, since it is submitted to many forms of 
expression that constantly challenge and transform it. “This is why there is no subject 
position whose links with others is definitively assured and, therefore, no social 
identity that would be fully and permanently acquired”(Mouffe, 1993:78).
We can apply this to an assessment of the identity formation process of veiled, 
married, professional Islamic women. According to Mouffe, social identity is not 
something that is permanent, but is always under construction with respect to social 
actor’s different standpoints and relationships. It follows that a study of these 
women’s ‘experience of womanhood’ would be more accurate and significant than a 
study of their ‘identity formation’ because they have different viewpoints, and thus 
different sources that contribute to their identity with respect to their veiled, 
professionally working, and married statuses. The significant question here is this: 
How do they experience these different standpoints? How do they articulate and 
validate different discourses through these views? What are they experiencing and 
how do they justify their experiences as they play out the roles that these subject 
positions dictate?
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The qualitative method of in-depth interviewing most accurately answers these 
questions. Using this method one can gather variable but valid information that is 
based on subjective experience. This is what is required when studying veiled 
women, who have established their identity through many different paths.
What are the results of qualitative interviewing? First, it yields a rich 
understanding of other people’s lives and experiences. It is a way of finding out 
what others feel and think about their worlds, and requires that a relationship exist or 
be developed between researcher and interviewee. This type of in-depth interviewing 
helps explain why and how a culture is created, evolves, and is maintained. In 
addition, qualitative interviews explore social, political, and economic changes.^
Part of becoming a qualitative interviewer is learning to recognize and then
explore words that have rich connotative or symbolic meanings for the people under
study. In a positivist or quantitative survey, the researcher assumes that each
question means the same thing to each respondent. The interpretative approach is
totally different. More importantly, according to Rubin and Rubin:
“In qualitative interviewing, theories emerge from the interviews, 
not as mere extensions of the academic literature. The theories 
reach for broader significance but remain firmly grounded in the 
experiences and understanding of the interviewees. After you have 
a theory that you have built and tested, you can compare it to the
Vor a detailed knowledge about the qualitative method see, (Gubrium and Holstein ,1997), ( 
Marshall and Rossman ,1995), and ( Rubin and Rubin, 1995) and also (David 
Silverman, 1997).
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literature and locate your study with respect to other people’s 
writing, but If you start off with other people’s theories and only 
test them, you will not be able to see anything new; you may not 
even be able to see what is out there”(1995: 63).
Qualitative interviewing deals with how, and what questions. How are the realities
of everyday life accomplished? What is happening? What are people doing and what
does it mean to them? The questions address the context of meaning, as expressed
through social interaction and as mediated by culture. Ethnomethodologists do not
draw upon common sense accounts from everyday lifq to explain what is going on.
In other words, according to Gubrium and Holstein;
“Member’s explanations are not important, elaborated on, or 
systematized in order to employ them as explanatory devices.
Instead they are treated as indigenous understandings to be studies 
as topics not used as resources. In sum, ethnomethodology focuses 
on how members, by invoking rules and elaborating their 
application to specific cases, describe and constitute their activities 
as rational coherent, precedent, and orderly”(Gubrium and 
Holstein, 1997: 45).
On the other hand, ethnomethodological research does have certain risks. 
Members’s representation may be biased. The sociological message can become 
more about a concrete code. “By focusing on the how’s of indigenous accounting 
and explanation at the border of reality and representation, ethnomethodologists risk 
loosing track concern, even as they describe the “seen but unnoticed” realm of 
constitutive practice” (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997: 107).
In this risky situation, Michel Foucault’s (1972) ideas should be considered. 
Foucault suggests there is a connection between the collectively representational and
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the interactional, arguing that interpretive structures are embodied in discourse. 
Interested in relation between knowledge, language and action, Foucault explicitly 
focuses on the role discourse plays in constituting, configuring, and conveying 
knowledge. He contends that the way we understand and represent experience 
derives from, and is constrained by, sociohistorically anchored discourse structures. 
(Foucault 1972: 48) Foucault argues that discourses are more than systems of signs 
or signifying elements that refer to the context or meanings of objects and actions. 
They are not “a mere intersection of things and words: an ob.scure web of things, and 
a manifest visible, colored chain of words.” (Foucault, 1973: 36) Instead, discourses 
are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. They are 
compo.sed of signs, but what they do is more than use these things to designate 
others. Foucault points directly to discourse, both its structures and forms of 
expression, as the essence of reality construction. The notion of practice provides the 
vehicle for linking substantive meaning to experience. For Foucault, discourse is not 
a slender surface of contact or confrontation between reality and a language, the 
interaction of a lexicon and experience. It is much more like a complex and dynamic 
border engagement at the lived intersection of reality and representation. Foucault’s 
evaluations gain particular importance with regard to revising data as a text. Putting 
this in the context of this thesis, veiled women have their own voice and dialogue 
through which they explain themselves and the social events that surround them. 
Within this, the way social issues and everyday life is mentioned and presented is 
very important.
However, there are some important disadvantages to in-depth interviewing.
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Respondents may not talk about what has really occurred, but what they wish had. 
They may not explicitly explain some aspects of their life and experiences, and opt to 
remain closed. The power relationship between researcher and interviewee may 
result in certain points and experiences being neglected. It is important that the 
researcher try to equalize this power relationship in order to gather the best and most 
information.
On the other side, this method has many advantages. Particularly the life story 
method requires the respondent to actively participate in the research process. In life 
story-ba.sed interviewing, the interviewee recounts her life, paying special attention 
to significant moments and periods - education, wedding, birth of a child, beginning 
a career. By going through this process she reevaluates her life.
In researching this thesis, I encountered all the advantages and disadvantages of 
in-depth interviewing. The next section will describe the research process.
2.2.2 FIELDW ORK:
In this part I will try to answer the question that what kinds of dilemmas, and 
contradictions have I confronted and grappled with in the process of fieldwork?
I started the field research in December 1996 and finished it in April 1999. In the 
social sciences, fieldwork involves varying degrees of participant-observation and 
may include structural or semi-structural interviews (Nielsen, 1990; Wolf, 1996). I
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interviewed 12 working, married, veiled women using the in-depth interviewing and 
life story methods. As a participant observer, I also attended to seminars, 
conferences, Mevlits (special religious meetings that are organized for celebrating 
birth, wedding, or organized for the death people), engagement ceremonies, ‘henna 
nights’ and chats organized by ‘Islamic’ women in Bursa.
Bursa is among the industrial centers of Turkey, and it has some features that
characterize its souci-cultural structure. The most significant feature is its
continuously increasing population in parallel to migration process. The industrial
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investments and developing economy of the city pulls the migratory from the 
Eastern and South Eastern Entail, as well as the migratory from Bulgaria. These 
economic structure of the city has an effect on its souci-cultural structure. 
Additionally, the historical background of the city, being among the big commercial 
centers of Ottoman Empire affects the city’s cultural environment. The number of 
religious organizations are in relation with these background. Mustafa Kara (1990) 
has outlined 39 ‘Tekko’(a kind of small religious sect) in Bursa, in accordance to 
documents of 1925. According to this documents, among this ‘Tekko’s 10 of them 
were ‘Nakşibendi’, 12 of them were ‘Halvatiye’, 6 of them were ‘Kadiriye’, 6 of 
them were ‘Celvetiye’, and 2 of them were ‘Ruafiye’ groups. Today, it is very 
difficult to assume the number of ‘tekke’ organizations in Bursa. However, my 
participant observation experience enables me to assume that these historical 
background is still very effective on the organization of religious activities.
The participant observation process is very significant for the research process. 
Because, I participated in social and religious activities of Islamic women, and had a
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chance to gain insight into their social relationships, their conversations among 
themselves, their distinct and specific discourses.
Through the fieldwork I have sought to breakdown the hierarchical relationship 
between me and research subjects by cultivating friendship, sharing and closeness. 
However, it was very clear at the research process that when one is working with 
different or ‘marginalized’ peoples, ‘power’ differentials between the researcher and 
her subjects remain. This power relation source from the so called social distance
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between the researcher and researched subjects. Although I attempted to equalize 
relationships while in the field through emphatic and friendly methods, in many 
cases these methods did not transform my positionality or locationality, as an 
unveiled woman. I had some difficulties because of my standpoint as a modern 
looking woman researcher. In some cases, especially at the meetings I have attended 
as a participant observer, I have some difficulties on the issue that how would I 
behave. For instance, at the Koran reading sessions, they gave me a scarves to cover 
my head. But, I did not cover my head at any situation, and I tried to express them 
that, I am a researcher, and I participate only for the research. But at such situations 
certain degree of tensions were experienced between them and me. Because, my 
attitude to getting more and more for my thesis has caused me to feel of myself as a 
pragmatist At the research process I have questioned myself for a long time on the 
issue that whether everything I did was for the thesis? I think that this kind of 
problems are experienced by all researchers who do qualitative study. Because, on 
the one hand, you are talking about their life stories, about their intimate relations. 
On the other hand you are trying to protect the line as a researcher. The subjects of
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the study tend to see you as a friend. So, it is very difficult to arrange a relationship 
with the subjects of the research.
Also, the differences between our use of language has caused some tensions. 
Many of them were using some vocabulary or frames to express their life 
experiences. For instance, they were continuously using the words like ‘inşallah’, 
‘hayırlısı’, or ‘Allah’ın rızası’- frames that refer to Allah’s will on the destiny o f the 
individuals. These words are the symbols that give clues about their way of 
perception of their lives.
Therefore, the basic challenge for me was being accepted by research subjects 
while I was protecting my own position. I tried to avoid the tension that may be 
source from these difference. Moreover, there were many difficulties in these process 
for me stemming from the political context of the country. Veiling issue and the 
increasing religious activities were the hottest issues that occupied the agenda during 
the research process. Moreover, the politics toward the religious groups and activities 
has caused some difficulties for me to reach the research subjects.The political events 
that occurred during the research process, related to Islamic groups, peoples, or 
directly with veiled women, affected the research process negatively. Especially, the 
so-called ‘February, 28 process’- started with the National Security Council’s 
decisions on the necessity of the controlling of the religious groups or events in 
Turkey, because of their threat to the ‘laic’ character of Turkish state- has affected 
the research process directly. Because, Islamic people have felt themselves as in 
observation.
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On the other hand, one side of my identity as being a married one with a child 
helped me to reduce a social distance between me and the subjects. I have used this 
status as a rescuer when it was necessary. Also, my class background was 
insignificant in shaping my field relations with research subjects. My gender, age, 
marital status, and my conducts were much more central to their judgement of me. I 
was always respectful to their Islamic standpoint. I never developed an attitude of 
judgement. I always thought that the subjects of this research are the active, self
conscious agents.
At the interviews I conducted the life story method. The life story method usually 
involves gathering an oral history from the subject, and is a common research tool 
used especially by feminist researchers. The life story method strengthens ties 
between women by validating their experiences.(Gluck and Patai, 1991: 1-18) In the 
feminist approach to the oral history, the researcher deals mostly with the question of 
‘how’ rather than ‘what’.(Çakır and Akgökçe, 1996)
The life story method allowed me to highlight the most important events of the 
women’s lives, including school and university, marriage, giving birth, and starting a 
career. This give me an understanding of what they had experienced and what 
feelings they had encountered over time. I chose the life story and in-depth 
interviewing methods because they suited best my methodological and 
epistemological assumptions, which were discussed earlier in this thesis.
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Before each interview, I tried to win the confidence of the woman being 
interviewed by explaining the goal of my research. All of the interviews began with 
the life story of these women. Seven of the interviews were recorded on tape with the 
consent of the interviewee. The other four women were not comfortable with being 
recorded, so I took notes during their sessions. Each interview lasted approximately 2 
hours, and I was always invited to stay 30 minutes to 1 hour longer for tea or coffee, 
which I did.
Typically, each interview began with a certain degree of tension and inconfidence, 
but by the end the women clearly felt very comfortable, and invited me for a second 
visit. I believe that the life story method was responsible for this emotional 
connection. In this approach, the researcher talks very little, and the subject is able to 
tell their story and be heard, and this verbal réévaluation of their life tends to make 
women feel good. I found that the chats over tea after the interviews had ended were 
also very informative.
During the interview process, I wanted the women to focus particularly on the 
details o f their schooling, their time at university, decisions surrounding marriage, 
and when they entered professional life. It is not productive to begin such an 
interview with specific questions and answers. I simply a.sked “Could you tell me 
your life story from your birth to the present?” and found this got good results. Most 
women started to describe their lives in terms of common themes, such as place of 
birth, their mother’s and father’s professions, and then some skipped directly to their 
marriages without mentioning their education. Some told their story from the sole
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perspective of their marriage. I believe this to be another advantage of the life story 
method, since the way people think about their lives is information in itself. Once the 
researcher decodes the data after an interview, it is compiled and transformed into 
text. The investigator can then do a dialogue analysis, and explore the themes that the 
subject focused on most during the interview.
The women interviewed were contacted using the snowball method. Interview 
appointments were made by talking at least once face-to-face or by telephone. Some 
of the interviews were made in the women’s offices, such as in the case of the 
dentists and the pharmacist. Comparing the interviews made at home to those done in 
the office setting, I observed that the women developed a more formal but trustful 
relationships with me in the work environment, and were more natural but more self- 
conscious in their home environment. I think that both interview locations are 
significant in terms of the scope of this research. Interviewing women at work 
allowed me to observe their relationships with clients and colleagues. The interviews 
made at home provided information on relationships with other family members..
The first respondent, Nermin, was a friend of one of my students. This student 
arranged a meeting for us, after which Nermin suggested the names of other women 
who might consent to participate in the study. But, none of the women knew each 
other well, and only five had met each other before. In some cases, my feminist 
activities known in Bursa has caused to degree of inconfidence towards me. they 
labeled me as a feminist one who degrade them through their position in Islam.lt was 
very difficult for me to change this prejudice towards me.
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I participated in meetings and other activities of these women. During the research 
process I tried to make an observation about their life styles, their way of using 
materials, and their relationships among themselves.
The decoration of the houses and arrangement of space also gave clues about the 
women’s life styles. In general, their houses were decorated very simply. This could 
simply be due to the similarity of middle-class apartments in Turkey, the class to 
which the women I interviewed belong. However, I feel that the Islamic undercurrent 
influenced these house’s decor.The first thing that caught my eye was the television, 
which is always placed in the most obvious place in every house. I did not see any 
books or bookshelves in any of the houses, even though I was told by all of the 
women that they got their religious knowledge from books about Islam. The major 
difference between these houses and other middle-class dwellings is that framed 
prayers from the Koran were hung on every wall. The way people organize their 
living space is said to give clues about their personality. In the case of these women, 
the visible clues indicated that they are very modest people who prefer less rather 
than more furniture not extravagance. Possessions have been called ‘social 
hieroglyphs’. (Giirbilek, 1992) There are direct connections between a person’s 
possessions and the way they organize their social life. Today, we have a lot of 
evidence to support the claim that the consumption habits of middle-class families 
are very similar. Commonality in lifestyle and daily life activities brings similarity in 
consumption habits. The furnishings in these homes may be from an Islamic 
furniture manufacturer. Typically, in every house there is a sofa, a TV, a TV stand.
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and a range of white ware, depending on family’s financial situation. The only 
visible symbols of the faith in, and the reality of, Islam stressed in these homes are 
the framed prayers. Sometimes these signs are mounted only in the salon (or living 
room).
I was able to observe authentic Islamic decor at the ‘Cinar Women’s Platform’ 
which is a meeting of Muslim women’s groups in Bursa. These special gatherings 
are held in a Ottoman vintage house, which is now used as dormitory for girls. The 
top floor of the building is specially decorated for this group’s meetings. The family 
behind the ‘Yeni Asya’ ( ‘New Asia’ is a one branch of ‘Nur’ movement) group owns 
the building. There are no chairs or tables in the room, which is like a very large 
living room, the floor is covered with colorful carpets, as in the mosques, and floor 
pillows line the edges of the room. This place is not only used for the group’s 
meetings, but also for informal get-togethers, and for gatherings to discuss and 
interpret religious texts.
Another feature of these women’s houses is that they were very clean and tidy. In 
the interviews, the direct relationship between cleanliness as a lifestyle and religious 
belief was often mentioned, and the word ‘clean’ is used on its own and in secondary 
references. ‘Clean-hearted’, for example, is used to describe someone who has a 
good nature.
2,3 WHO A R E  TH E RESPONDENTS?
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AI! the respondents came from mobile social groups, they had moved at least 
once in their life, and had spent the majority of their lives in urban settings. Most had 
attended universities that were located away from their families. Their family 
backgrounds were lower or lower-middle class, and they all had received a better 
education than their families. In their families, these women represent the first 
generation of females to earn university degrees and work in salaried positions. Their 
fathers are typically small business owners, tradesmen, merchants, producers, and 
farmers. Only two are state officials. Their mothers have always worked in the 
home, the women grew up with the teachings of traditional Islam, rather than radical 
Islamism, and they are the first people in their families to have based their lifestyles 
on Islamic values. Their husbands are come from similar families. All of the 
husbands , except one of them, have a university or faculty graduation. Their 
monthly income is near to middle or upper middle class standards. In brief, the 
subjects of this thesis are women of a new and rising social group, and their goal is 
even greater mobilization and upward mobility.
NERM IN: RELIG IO N  TEACHER
Nermin is 34 years old, married, and has three children. She is from the Black Sea 
region of Turkey, and has rural roots. Her father was a small-producer peasant 
farmer. She identifies her mother as a ‘housewife’. Nermin was the first woman in 
her family to earn a university degree. She is a theology graduate, and has a 
master’s degree in the same area. She was attending a master while she was
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working as a Quran teacher. Her husband, whom she met at the university, is a 
religion teacher at lycee. Nermin organizes her everyday life with help from her 
sister, who lives in the same apartment building..
Nermin was born in a village of Trabzon. After finishing high school there, she 
attended an Imam-Hatip school. Nermin identifies herself as a real Muslim who tries 
to follow the word of Islam as clo,sely as she can. On the other hand, she is interested 
in Islamic mysticism, psychology, and sociology. She started working immediately 
after she got married, and has only stopped working for short intervals when her 
children were born. Nermin’s greatest aspiration is to become an assistant professor 
in the faculty of theology. Now her wish is coming true: She is working on her Ph.D.
GÜLER: H ISTO R Y TEACHER
Güler, whose father was a worker in Holland and whose mother is a housewife, 
was born in Holland. She is 27 years old. She attended school in Holland until the 
third class, and then came to Turkey, to be near her grandmother and continue 
school. She finished high school in Aydyn, and entered the university in Yzmir.
She said she had no religious inclination as a child, and only began to identify 
herself as an Islamist woman after first-year university. She says she was influenced 
by the opinions of friends, especially those from her dormitory and members of her 
class. She met her husband at university, and they married after graduation. They 
moved to Bursa because her husband’s family lives there. At the time of her 
interview. Güler was just starting a Job in Bursa as a teacher and administrator at the
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education institution that base on Islamic capital. Her husband works at the same 
school in the boy’s section. Güler was among the most clear and open respondents, 
and expressed a lot of confidence in herself.
ESRA: D EN TIST
Esra’s father was a teacher and her mother was a housewife. She is 40 years old,
and was born in Samsun. After graduating from an Ymam-Hatip school, she became
a student in the faculty of Dentistry at Istanbul University. She was very successful at
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the lycee. During her university education, she lived in a dormitory. She became the 
first woman from her family to earn a university degree. She met her husband, who is 
a doctor, during her university years. They settled in Bursa because Esra’s husband 
won an assistant professorship at Uludağ University. She has set up practice in her 
home by organizing a special room for dentistry. She has two children , and stopped 
working only for short periods when each was born. She identifies herself as an 
Islamist woman with a career in dentistry.
NURSEN: D EN TIST
Nursen is the daughter of a worker and housewife, and was born in Trabzon. She 
is 31 years old. While her father was working in Holland, her family lived in the 
village with their mother. But, when her father died as a result of an accident at work, 
her mother sold all their property and they moved to Istanbul to be close to Nursen’s 
uncle. She finished lycee in Istanbul and then entered the dentistry program at 
university there. She got married her husband when she was in the first year of 
dentistry, and continued her studies. Nursen also had two children while she was
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attending university. Throughout this period, her mother-in-law and her university 
student sister helped with childcare. Her husband is an engineer. While Nursen was 
attending university in Istanbul, he had to live in Bursa because of his job. After 
graduation, Nursen moved to Bursa so the family could be together. She initially 
worked part-time at a dental clinic, but, supported by her husband’s capital, has 
opened her own office.
HULYA: D EN TIST
Hiilya, 33 years old, was born in Afyon. Her father was in the military and her 
mother was a housewife. Hers is the only mother of the respondents who graduated 
from Girl’s Institutes. Hiilya has no religious orientation during her teenage years. At 
the university she met her husband, an Iranian who follows Islamism, and became 
devout at that time. They married while they were students without the permission of 
her family. The wedding was religious, but official ceremony was not made.. Hiilya’s 
life story is quite an interesting one. She moved to Iran with her child after she 
finished school, but she could not find work there. As a result, she returned to 
Turkey. Her husband as a doctor, graduated after her. They settled in Bursa because 
Hiilya’s family origin came from Bursa. She apprenticed at various clinics, and then 
opened her own clinic with some colleagues. She started to wear the veil after she 
met with her husband.
AYSE: PHARM ACIST
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Ayşe was born in Trabzon, where her father was a small tradesman and her
mother was a housewife. She is 35 years old and has two children. Ayse’s family is
originally form Trabzon, but they moved to Bursa many years ago. After attending a
girls’ high school in Bursa, she entered the Faculty of Pharmacy in Ankara
University. She lived with her uncle’s family in Ankara while she was attending
university. She said that her family was religious, but had always advised her that
education was more important for her. She wore a veil during her university years.
After graduation, she returned to Bursa, where her father helped her to open a
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pharmacy. She worked there for approximately two years, and then met her 
husband, whom neighbors had advised her family was a good match. They married a 
short time later. Her husband is a civil engineer who works for the municipality. 
Ayse continued working once she was married, and did not stop when her children 
were born. She explained that she was able to breast feed and take care of her babies 
in a room at the back of the pharmacy. In addition, her mother, who lives in the 
same apartment building has helped with housework and child care.
FATM A: TURKISH TEACHER
Fatma, whose father is a driver and mother is a housewife, was born in Nevşehir. 
She is 26 years old. After finishing primary school in Nevşehir, Fatma went to 
Ankara to continue her education, and lived with her aunt there. She started to wear a 
veil in her first year at the lycee. Her aunt and the husband of her aunt supported her 
religious orientation. Her family moved from Nevşehir to Izmir, and after graduating 
from the lycee she moved there to be near them . She attended University entrance 
exam courses that are funded by Islamic capital. After her graduation from
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university, Fatma started to work teaching at these Islamic capital based courses. In 
that role, she went to Kütahya to teach , and stayed with friends there. Her friends 
introduced her to her future husband. Once married, the couple moved to Bursa 
because her husband had a job there. She does not yet have any children.
NURCAN: PRIM ARY SCHOOL TEACHER.
Nurcan, whose father was a small tradesman and whose mother was a housewife, 
is 32 years old. Her family is originally from Trabzon, but she was born in Istanbul 
and moved to Bursa when she was five years old. She graduated from an Imam-Hatip 
school, then attended university at Çanakkale and lived in a dormitory while there. 
After graduation, she began work teaching at courses or private schools. She met her 
husband through neighbors who suggested they get together. He is a civil engineer. 
Nurcan started to wear a veil when she was a teenager. She says that her family was 
devout but that she was the only one who chose to cover herself. Nurcan has two 
children. She did not stop working after marriage or with the birth of her children. 
Her mother and mother in-law supported her in caring her child.
FATM A: BIO LO G Y TEACHER
Fatma, is 30 years old and was born in Tekirdağ. She attended university at 
Balykesir, and met her husband there. After a friendship, they decided to marry. She 
started to wear a veil after she met him, and after she graduated from university. 
Fatma’s father was a teacher, and her mother was housewife. She has two children. 
She began working when her children were at preschool, and gets extra help with
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childcare from her mother-in-law.
SERAP. CIVIL ENG INEER
Serap is 32 years old and was born in Eskişehir. She came to Bursa after she got 
married because her husband’s fciinily lives there. She met her husband while 
attending university. Her father was a artisan and her mother was housewife. Serap 
started working when she came to Bursa, and has not stopped since. She has two 
children. She started to licquent the ‘Milli Gendik Vakfy’(National Youth 
Foundation), which is near to her workplace. As a result, she became religious and 
decided to start wearing a veil. She says that her family was not devout Muslim, and 
her husband has responded negatively to her participation in religious activities. In 
her Islamic turn, she draws support from a network of friends.
MUGE: H ISTO R Y TEACHER
Müge is 31 years old. She was born in Bursa. Her father was a carpenter, and her 
mother a housewife. She attended an Imam-Hatip school, but did not win university 
exam. For economic reasons, she started to work in an accountant’s office, where she 
met her husband who was a police officer. They fell in love and got married, her 
husband ‘gave her permission’ to attend university, and when he got a job in Van 
she won the iiniversity at there. She attended university and had a family as well. Her 
mother-in-law supported her with childcare while she was studying. When her 
husband was killed on the job. Müge decided to return to Bursa. She now works as
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a history teacher at the lycee. She started to wear a veil as a teen, but says she learned 
much about Islam from her husband.
EM EL: KIND ERG ARTEN TEACHER
Emel, who is 39 years old, is from Bursa originally. Her father was a big farmer, 
and her mother was a housewife. She got her university education in Ankara, a 
pursuit that her family supported strongly. After graduating she moved back to 
Bursa. She met her husband at a friendship meeting, and they fell in love. She 
married him him without the permission of her family. Her family refused this 
permission becau.se of the low .social status of her husband and his family. She has 
two children. When she developed a serious illness, Emel decided she would become 
a devout Muslim once she got her health back. She began working after her children 
were grown, when her husband’s income started to decline. She works at the Islamic 
capital kindergarten in Bursa as a teacher.
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CHAPTER III
THE ‘ISLAMIC FAITH’ AND PROFESSIONAL, MARRIED, 
VEILED WOMEN
In researching veiled Muslim women, I take a point of view that supports the 
suggestion of an inevitable exchange and relationship between micro- and macro 
sociology, as stated by Anthony Giddcns (1989), or the relationship between ‘the 
objective probabilities and subjective expectations’ at the structuration of the social 
agency, as stated by Pierre Bourdieu(1990).' Some individuals see social order as a
' In classical sociology, society is concerned with integrity among individuals in relationships, 
and between society and the individual. This notion was best expressed by Emile Durkheim. In 
Durkheim’s understanding, society is formed from the interaction of individuals, but is different 
from the individual and its integrity. I do not agree totally to this idea, because it treats the 
individual as static and isolates him or her from the “momentum of society,” ignoring the 
individual’s active and sometimes challenging role within the society. In place of this notion, I 
suggest that the individual should be seen much more as an actor who is active, creative, and 
plays a role within certain rules and toward defined targets. I think that Gidden’s suggestion of 
the integrity of micro- and macrosociology expands on this point. Also, Pierre Bourdieu, a new 
voice in French sociology, promotes a concept of “social actor” similar to the one presented in 
this thesis. One of the central themes which unifies Bourdieu’s work is the attempt to understand 
the relationship between ‘subjectivity’-individual social being as it is experienced and lived, 
from the personal inside out- and the ‘objective’ social world within which it is framed and 
towards the production and reproduction of which it contributes. This theoretical project is a key 
aspect of Bourdieu’s attempt to develop a sociology which can transcend the 
subjectivist/objectivitist dichotomy. In his words: “...the analysis of objective structures...is 
inseparable from the analysis of the genesis, within biological individuals, of the mental
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“bad dream” in which they are forced do whatever is required and act in a precise way. 
However, society is influenced by individual’s attitudes, this ensures that social structure 
is subjected to inevitable change (Giddens, 1993: 167-168).
In this dissertation, I discussed the group women who are deeply influenced by 
Islamic principles, as “rational subjects” whose aim is to take a position in Turkey’s 
modern/capitalist social structure. These women speak of definite hopes for the future 
and the way they want to live, and they revise these hop'es, and the social structure, just 
by the fact of their existence in this new realm. This group of working veiled women are 
trying to arrange their lives both within the modern/capitalist social order and under the 
influence of Islamic belief. In the process of establishing their “ way of life ,” they are 
developing strategies by which they resist or accept the pressures put upon them.
Giddens (1991: 200-231) suggests that today’s society is one of risk society, and 
that people need to feel secure ontologically People achieve this by setting up secure 
lives for themselves, or by creating a framework that gives meaning to everything they
structures which are to some extent the product of the incorporation of social structures; 
inseparable, too, from the analysis of the genesis of these social structures 
themselves...’’(Bourdieu, 1990:14) Here, the key idea is that there is an adjustment between the 
individual’s hopes, aspirations, goals and expectations, on the one hand, and the objective 
situation in which they find themselves by virtue of their place in the social order, on the other. 
According to Bourdieu: “Outlooks on the future depend closely on the objective potentialities 
which are defined for each individual by his or her social status and material conditions of 
existence. The most individual project is never anything other than an aspect of the subjective 
expectations that are attached to that agent’s class” (From Jenkins, 1992: 28).
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do in life. Giddens has shown that this kind of need is pronounced most in people that 
live in the city. He talks in terms of the “modern person”, and makes no distinction 
between genders.
Generally, these ideas are based on the Anglo-Saxon world. There is a debate over 
how much the.se ideas would be applied to the modernization processes of societies and 
individuals other than Western ones. As a result, for societies that have undergone 
something similar in part to (he “Western experience,”* particularly the modernization 
process, and more recent changes, we need to refer to “hybrid” concepts that are based 
on various articulating subject positions, not concepts that would apply strictly to 
Western societies.
In analyzing the situation of working veiled women, we need to try to understand 
them not only on the basis of the veils they wear, but in terms of their higher education 
and chosen professions. Clearly, women with these kinds of life experiences have an 
overall viewpoint that stems from many intersecting lines of thought, belief, or subject 
positions."
"The subject position is formed from the coming together and articulation of different states of 
belonging. As Mouffe, who speaks from a PostMarxsist point of view has asserted that “...the 
social agent is not as a unitary subject, but he or she is as the articulation of an ensemble of 
subject positions, constructed within specific discourses and always precariously and 
temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject positions. Only with the nonessentialist 
conception of the subject, which incorporates the psychoanalytic insight that all identities are 
forms of identification, can we pose the question of political identity in a fruitful way.”
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These women are veiled, and they have moved the veil from symbolizing “religious 
belief’ to symbolizing a unique new niche in society, but they live the same experiences 
as other working women in terms of their basic “working woman” identity.^ Where their 
identity differs from that of other working women is their “veiled” state and their 
adoption of the religion of Islam as a “map for life.” In this thesis, my aim was to trace 
the experiences of veiled professional women rather than focus on their similarities and 
differences with regard to other women in society. I believe that this approach, which 
did not apply any hierarchical structure to categories of women and which centered on 
the genuine life experiences of veiled women, allowed me to be more objective^'in my 
research. In the following section, I will examine the ways veiled working women see 
themselves and their exijcricnces by listening to what they have to say about these things 
rather than analyzing experiences that might reflect some answers. Here I will attempt to
(Mouffe, 1993:71). See also (Laclau and Mouffe, 1998)
is not possible to talk about a unique “women” category. Women’s life experiences are 
changeable due to the social class’ state of belonging, ethnicity, regional differences, and their 
relationship with religion. But, according to the results of recent field research done by social 
scientists, even though a single and homogeneous women category is not spoken of, women 
share the same experiences because they live under the same patriarchal umbrella. See, (Abadan 
Unat, 1980), (Tekeli, 1990), and also (Kandiyoti, 1988; 1991), (Citci, 1999).
■*“Objectivity” here does not mean objectivity from a positivist point of view. In this context, the 
researcher’s objectivity views the research subject’s subjectivity as the base. See, (Harding, 
1990), and (Hekman, 1992)
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answer the following questions: In today’s Turkey, how much, and in what ways, does 
“Islamic faith” influence university-graduate, working, married veiled women’s 
explanations of their actions and experiences?
3.1 THE UNIQUE “ISLAM IC  F A IT W ’: “A L L A H  IS  TH E CONTROLLER OF A L L  
TH IN G S”
A  review of the texts of my interviews with the research group shows that these 
women have developed a special “language” for expressing their successes and failures 
through their life story. The Islamic faith is featured highly in this mode of expression, 
particularly the belief that “Allah” is everywhere at all times. “Allah’s” awareness of 
people’s every action constitutes the basis of this language or dialect. The most 
important writings on this belief are found in the Suras of the Koran. This “Islamic 
faith” also encompasses the meaning and context of people, the earth, and the universe.'^ 
“Allah,” the unique creator of all things, watches people’s actions everywhere at all 
times. All things - good and bad - come from “Allah.”®
■’Peter Berger’s ideas about “chaos” and “nomos,” in other words structuring a world and giving 
meaning to that world, are all have basis in reality, because, the belief system of the professional 
veiled women in this research group affect the way they find meaning in their existence in the 
world, and in the way they organize their social relations.
'’The Koran is the main, but not only source of the professional veiled women’s ideas and 
beliefs, which are translated into their daily life. It seems that the Koran, and its interpretation, is 
a life guide for the women in this research group. As mentioned in every Sura, especially 
‘Fatiha’ and ‘Bakara’, God is the creator of everything. ‘Al-i Imran’, the Sura which is about 
‘how bad and good both come from God’ says in verse 26: “My God, the owner of everything;
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Ayşe Saktanber, in her study on the Islamic ghetto in Ankara, analyzed the 
construction of Islamic way of life as an ‘other’ of secular one. In her analysis, she has 
asserted that the specific ‘Islamic faith’ and being an ‘other’ of the secular modern one 
are distinguishing marks of Islamic way of life. In this context, she asserted that; “The 
Islamic way of life is most clearly distinguished from the ordinary secular urban life 
styles prevalent in Turkey by the understanding of Islamic faith, iman, which entails the 
worship of God, and ibadet, ‘.service to God”’ (1994: 110). She emphasized the 
significance of the Islamic faith for Islamic people on the organization of daily life. 
Saktanber asserted that:
“This Islamic understanding of faith turns out be a struggle between 
secular and Islamic forces of society concerning the nature of Islamic 
law and the extent to which it can be contained in the politico-societal 
projects of the social order. This is a struggle over the formation of the 
.society’s basis of legitimization, and the movement of Islamic 
revivalism derives its strength from its claim of being able to form the 
basis of legitimization, and the movement of Islamic revivalism 
derives its strength from its claim of being able to form the basis of 
legitimacy on the structural characteristics of Islamic faith” (1994:
1 1 1 )
You can give to anyone you wish, or take from anyone you wish; You can raise anyone or berate 
anyone you wish. Good only comes from you. You have the power to do everything” (Atet: 52). 
Sura of Talak, verses 3: “He who accepts the way of God, he will be gifted. He is the one who 
obeys God’s orders. God has a measure for everything”.(Ates:557) Again, the same subject is 
spoken of in the Sura of ‘Talak’, verses 11,12,13,14 and 18: “Anything bad that comes to anyone 
is God’s will. He who believes in God, he will have good things in his heart. God is the only one 
who knows everything...He knows the visible and invisible. Nothing is secret from Him. He is 
the saint, the judge, the superior, the owner of judgement and power,” (Ates:556)
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Moreover, according to Saktanber (1997), these Islamic faith distinguishes the 
Islamic people from others who are similarly situated it the same social class. Because, 
Islamic faith effects “the choices people make to differentiate their life-style from those 
similarly situated in social stratification categories” (1997: 150). Accordingly, Islamic 
people try to organize their everyday life in the light of the necessities of Islamic life, 
with “posing challenges to the .secular ethics of modernity”(1994: 111). Saktanber stated 
that women because of their primary roles at the domestic sphere that is the place that 
Islam transformed into a living social practice, are the* crucial agents of the everyday 
articulation and reproduction of Islamic ideologies (1994: 111).
Saktanber’s studies have a significant contribution to this dissertation. Especially her 
sociological outlook towards Islamic people, and her analysis about the rendering of 
Islam into a living social practice filled the gap in the literature. Because, in the literature 
the analysis on the Islamic people are made with considering the traditionality vis-a-vis 
modernity arguments.
But, still there are many issues that have waited for further research. This dissertation 
deals with daily life experiences of professionally working Islamic women. How does 
their public appearance, and professionally working status affect their gender relations, 
specifically ‘womanhood’ experiences. So, the attention is not on the unique structure of 
the ‘Islamic faith’ and its effects on the daily life. Rather, the relationship between the 
different subject positions of Islamic women and their way of experiencing gender 
identities and gender relations are analyzed. But, it was evident in the interviews that
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these women’s self perceptions are highly affected by the Islamic faith that emphasized 
the principle o f ‘oneness’.
One common trait to these women is their lack of a sense of “me” or “I.” They do 
not view their victories and achievements as their own, and the word “I” is virtually not 
in their vocabulary. Expressions such as “ Allah helped me,” and “This happened by the 
will of Allah,” are commonly used when talking about successes or accomplishments. 
On the other hand, when speaking of bad outcomes or failures, they use expressions 
such as, “God’s disapproval” and “This must be good for me.” In this way, they are 
more introspective.
Many of the women explained their acceptance to university as an event that was the
will of “Allah,” not their own personal success. Nursen, who married and had children in
the middle of her dentistry studies, but still managed to graduate, spoke of this
achievement in terms of being “protected by ‘Allah’” and receiving His endless help.
She never mentions having played a part in her own success.
“I never brought school problems home, and I never brought home 
problems to school. I tried to keep a good balance. ‘Allah’ helped me a 
lot in those days. All my plans went well. Most of my friends say that I 
am not lazy, that I am efficient, but I don’t believe this. ‘Allah’ plays a 
big part in my achievements. Because of His caring, I was able to 
graduate from university much earlier than my friends.”
A similar account was given by Guler, who lost a year at university because 
of her veil but made up this year by taking extra credits and passing them all at once. 
She characterized her situation as follows:
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“When prohibition of veiling was abolished we felt we had won a 
victory. We continued our classes and I passed all the courses for that 
semester. But there were courses left from the first semester. In the 
first semester of third year, I took courses from both second and third 
year. Of course, there was a credit limit. You can only take a given 
number of classes. Registration forms are sent to student affairs. This 
meant that many of my friends couldn’t take enough courses because 
student affairs wouldn’t accept extra credits. My registration forms 
were sent there too, but they didn’t notice my extra credits. That was 
really great because I was able to take all my courses. I took three or 
four mid-terms a day. It was the help of ‘Allah,’ because there is no 
other explanation for this situation. When other friends couldn’t even 
taken one credit, I was taking four or five courses more, and I passed 
them all. I don’t think I am very intelligent. I took those lessons with 
the help of ‘Allah’ and managed to get good ‘grades, again with His 
help.’’
What are the mechanisms behind this way of thinking, where personal success in 
university achievement is down-played? I find this pattern of attributing rewards for 
achievement to something outside the self to be paradoxical. When everything is going 
smoothly, a person sees him- or herself as “protected,” that an external power is helping 
with the struggles of daily life. Since ‘Allah’ is with them, good things are happening, 
and this must be carried on till the end. Since ‘Allah’ helps a woman to get an education 
and graduate university, then ‘Allah’ will also support her in her working life. However, 
when things go wrong this is viewed as “Allah’s” appreciation, or disapproval. And 
since ‘Allah’ disapproves of any rebellious activity then the failure or bad outcome must 
be accepted as having had some element of rebellion against “Allah”.
Scrap, who became interested in Islam after her marriage under the influence of her 
friends, has some problems with her husband because of her faith, but she believes that 
these problems can be solved with “Allah’s” help. She explained:
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“I used to think about myself a lot. For example, I always wanted to 
be rich and have a good life. But with Islam I have learned that 
material happiness is not important, that emotional happiness is the 
main thing. In fact, we are not important as individuals. What is 
important is that everyone’s lives lead to prosperity. I thought that I 
should do my best to help people, to lead them to a life of prosperity. I 
felt that I should tell them about our religion. I have also learned to be 
patient. I was rebellious in the past. I wanted everything to happen 
immediately. Hz. Said Nursi said that ‘whoever stands against faith is 
banging his head against an anvil.’ I already believed in faith, but I 
learned later that patience calls for willpower. Now I have patience 
with my husband. Wonderful ‘Allah’ will open the best door for us, I 
am sure.”
Serap chooses to take the passive route, to wait for “Allah’s” appreciation about how 
to improve her relationship with her husband instead of trying to struggle with him. 
Instead of fighting and separation, she wishes for good things, and she does so to 
comfort herself psychologically and to win ‘Allah’s ’ approval. Here, Serap explains 
changes she made in her view of herself and in the way she organized her social 
relations once she adopted Islam as a life guide. “Being patient” and accepting 
everything without question or resistance are the basic themes in her account.
Guler was one of the women who fought fiercely for the right to wear veils in her 
university years. The fact that her activist days are over, and her ideas about “Allah’s” 
help with her registration forms and extra credits should not be seen as weakness and 
surrender, but as part of her survival strategy. From any other perspective, it would be 
difficult to find a relationship between their way of legitimizing daily actions and the 
radical resistance these women mounted with respect to the veil issue.
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It is important to note that the women who participated in this research spoke in 
much the same way about things. Although it is inaccurate to talk about a single 
homogeneous group in society that we call devout Muslims, as mentioned earlier, there 
is a “language,” or way of speaking, that is common to all strong believers in Islam. 
“Allah’s” awareness of people’s every move in this world, the necessity of self-control 
in actions and “Allah’s” appreciation as the price or punishment for certain actions form 
the basic parameters of this language.
Most of the women in the research group told me they were members of 
‘Nakşibendi’ or ‘Nur’ (including the ‘New Asia Group’) religious communities. I also 
want to underline that peoples’ interpretations of Islam differ, and this held true for the 
study group. These differences were certainly noticed, but this is such a broad and 
important topic that it could be the basis for an entire thesis itself. In the scope of my 
study, I analyzed these women without dealing with their membership in different 
religious communities.
In a very general sense, Mardin (1989) wrote that, the patterns that guide our 
attitudes in society represent parts of our cultural heritage. He stated that the way we 
organize our daily life is not a simple thing. We eat, drink, love, kill, and think in the 
frame of the cultural environments that shape our lives. (1989: 20). But sometimes these 
cultural maps that we use to construct our personality are subject to external threat. 
Mardin(1989), in his study on the relationship between the social change and rise of 
religious affiliation in Turkey, in the example of “Nurculuk movement” under the
137
leadership of Saidi Nursi, asserts that Saidi Nursi’s aim was to protect Islamic culture
from Western materialism. According to him:
“Said Nursi’s writings claim to serve one main purpose: to stop the 
inroads into the Muslim culture of what he saw as the materialism he is 
engaged in missionary work to revitalize the Muslim heritage of 
Ottoman and, later, Turkish Muslims...while he combated materialism 
because it negated Islam, he also realized that the influences of 
Western ways (ideas, institutions, practices) were destroying the 
cultural frame that Muslims used to establish a rapport with the 
everyday world.’’(Mardin, 1989: 8-9)
On the other hand, according to Mardin, Neither Said Nursi not the language that he 
was trying to develop perceive individualism in a positive way. Instead, the collective 
aspect of personal relationships was dominant. Said Nursi’s point of view were not of 
society cis a mechanism, but of a congregation of people connected by personal 
responsibility.(Mardin, 1989: 23) Mardin’s words on Said Nursi and his followers offer 
a good explanation of the perception of self and aspects of self-identity expressed by the 
women in the research group, even though the majority were not ‘Nurculuk’ members. 
The women I interviewed believe that morality is more important than materialism, and 
that they are in this to “be tested.” According to their belief, those who pass the test will 
••graduate” to the other world -  the afterlife -  a place that is real and forever. There they 
will experience happiness and peace.
Briefly, in Islam the individual and individualism almost never takes center stage. An 
individual means nothing on his own. It is assumed that people are merely bodies in 
.society, physical entities that engage in societal relations. Ali Bulac (1991) interprets 
this as follows: “ ... what commits man to the world with passion is his feeling about
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eternity - that he can neither solve its real meaning nor put it out of his mind. The 
irresistible proof of the hereafter in our imminent world is its desire for eternity.” 
( 1991:68)Bulac makes other important contributions to the Islamic understanding of the 
individual:
“Islamic culture sees the human organism’s brain and heart as the 
center of psychic life. The heart symbolizes the center of all spiritual, 
moral, intellectual, and organic actions. This may seem a radical 
contrast to our view of the modern man, who accepts rationalism and 
positive thinking as the only valid ways to produce scientific action 
and knowledge. The Koran talks about the ‘thinking heart’ in terms of 
a surprising definition. In this case, the source of art, intellectual 
knowledge, experimental scientific knowledge, intellectual intuition, 
and moral information based on discovery and desire is the heart’s 
mysterious, intrinsic, and wide base. Generally, in Islam the heart is 
God’s “Kaaba.” There is a huge difference between a heart-controlled 
man and a brain-controlled man.”( 1991:61)
Although the words of Ali Bulac cannot be directly applied to the situations of the 
women in this study, they do give some idea of Islamic concept of the “ideal 
man/woman,” whose values follow the heart (emotions) instead of the brain (thought).
In Islamic reflection, there is a desire to reach what is holy, a desire to understand 
creation rather than seek self-improvement. Modernism proposes that a person discover 
himself using his/her mind. In contrast, Islam’s understanding proposes that person 
achieve a wider life by searching the necessities of his/her creation. A person should do 
this in order to divert and change his/her inner and outer world, using his/her mind to 
know his ‘Allah’. In other words, all person has to do is try to understand the existence 
of ‘Allah’ and do his best to win his approval. This mode of thinking is directly 
connected with “religious faith” in Islam.
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Therefore, the Islamic women try to interpret and legitimize the world and events 
around them by using the Islamic faith framework. In other words, veiled women give 
meaning to everything in terms of ‘Allah’, who is always everywhere, and believe that 
they are being tested in this world. In the social practice that outsiders have called 
■‘reviving Islam,” veiled women claim that Islam is their spirit, and that they have 
chosen the Islamic way as their lifestyle. In other words, in transforming Islam into a 
social practice, people’s relationships with nature, society, and ‘Allah’ are revised, and 
an alternative understanding is reached. The idea of ‘Allah’ as the purpose of all 
existence and work in this world, and the idea of His watching over people everywhere 
are the basic beliefs of this alternative ethic. The Islamic notion of winning ‘Allah’s ’ 
approval in this world, and that Allah shows preference for such a person in the next 
world, underlines the importance of the next world to veiled women. Of course, what 
makes these women different from other women is not just their clothing, but also the 
way they give meaning to life through accepting these ideas about “Allah” and using 
them as a lifestyle guide. Their need for God’s approval in each of their successes and 
failures, events that significantly impact their lives, makes it difficult for the women in 
the research group to think only for and about themselves. They are the followers of 
Islam, so everything is for religion.
However, ‘Islam’ is experienced by these women within the social structure of 
modern-capitalist society, and with articulating it to their different subject positions. If 
we assume that modernity is not only an objective and concrete experience, but at the
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same time something which is lived through inside as a personal experience, what can 
we say about the “way” these women express themselves, legitimizes their life 
experiences? How veiled women concoct their network of connections and 
contradictions -  work life, relations with husbands, relations with children? In the next 
chapter I will address these questions.
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CHAPTER IV
VEILING AS A ‘SOCIAL PRACTICE’
In the past 20 years, a new form of dressing has emerged, not only in Turkey 
but also in other Muslim countries. Some women university students have begun 
wearing clothes that signify their Islamic faith. Though this mode of dressing is not 
uniform, its main feature is complete covering of the head/hair and the wearing of a 
full-length coat that hides the bodylines.
The Islamic way of dressing and the names applied to this differ from one Muslim 
country to another. Moreover, the form and color of the clothing varies with respect 
to regional differences, and the economic class and ethnicity of the woman wearing 
it. In general, this Islamic form of dressing is called ‘hijab’, or veiling : These two 
words are often used synonymously when referring to modest Islamic dress for 
women. In Iran and Afghanistan, this may mean a ‘chador’, which is a head-to-toe 
cloak; in Algeria it denotes a headscarf, often worn with a loose gown (Beinin and 
Stork, 1997: 213). According to Elizabeth Fernea, the veil “means different things to 
different people within Muslim society, and it means different things to Westerners 
than it does to Middle Ea.sterners”(1993: 122)
Even within Turkey this mode of women’s dress has different names that are used 
by various Islamist groups and others. In the popular media and some academic 
circles, it is called as ‘turban’, but most of the Islamist women call this specific
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dressing mode ‘tesettür’, and they insist on the differences between this new 
Islamic- sourced style and the traditional headscarf.'
The veiling of women has attracted the attention of academic circles and of the 
popular media. What is particularly interesting in this new style of dress is the social 
positions and aspirations of the women involved. In other words, the women who 
are wearing the'veil’ are urban, and they seek the opportunities of modernism.
#
However, in the literature, the ‘veiling’ issue has not been considered in the 
context of the subjective experiences and feelings of veiled women. All the attention 
has been given to the role of these women as representatives of political Islam. 
Physical appearance and dress codes have always been significant markers of 
political attitudes in Turkey, like in many Middle Eastern countries. In the Turkish 
case, the veiling of women has been considered a symbol of political Islam for two 
decades now.
It is assumed that women are the symbolic representatives of political Islam 
because they are seen as the creators of an alternative model of social life in terms of 
their roles as mothers and wives. The romanticizing of women’s role with regard to 
the ideal society of the past is a key feature of fundamentalist movements.
'According to Nilüfer Göle (1996), the use o f the ‘tesettür’ or ‘turban’ instead o f head scarf 
and the semantic difference between two designate the new profile of Muslim women. 
Because, distinct from the widespread use of the scarf, which is a reminder of traditional 
customs in the rural areas and towns, turban is seen as the representators of the 
fundamentalist movements when the political and collective power of religion is used against 
traditionalism.
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Fundamentalists see the woman who embraces her traditional roles of loving wife 
and nurturing mother as a soldier fighting a holy war for the sake of Islamic values. 
Her conduct, her domesticity, her dress are all vital to the survival of the Islamic way 
of life (Stowasser, 1993: 22). From this perspective, veiled women are ‘ahistorical’ 
passive puppets of the fundamentalist Islamic discourse. The ‘subject positions’, or 
different viewpoints and opinions held by veiled women, are ignored.
The meanings these women attach to the act of ‘veiling’ do not stem from 
intrinsic features of the veil itself. Rather, they have been derived from cultural 
dialogue and vast social networks. This means that actively religious veiled women 
are exposed not only to debates waged within Islamic circles, they also form their 
gender identities in the light of nonMuslim discourse on the gender relationships that 
prevail in Turkey.
In this section, I will trace the subjective meanings that these women attach to 
veiling, and will consider how different subject positions are expressed within their 
identity - building proce.ss. I will first borrow Mouffe’s (1993) arguments on identity 
formation. Mouffe has proposed that the social agent forms her identity through 
expressing various discursive formations, and states that there is no a priori 
relationship between these discourses. She also emphasizes that identities are not 
stable, but are always under construction with relation to the articulation of different 
viewpoints (Mouffe, 1993: 77-78).
Complementing these insights with the feminist notions o f standpoint.
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subjectivity, and bodily practice, we can say that discourses provide social actors 
with significant symbolic resources for identity negotiation, and for the 
legitimization of everyday social and bodily practices. Similar to Mouffe’s ideas, 
current feminist literature (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987) views identity negotiation as 
a process and everyday practice that is fraught with ambiguity, contradiction and
struggle.
From this point of view, in this section I will first critique the literature on the 
veiling of women in Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries. Second, I will try to 
reveal how professional, mairied, veiled women use their everyday experiences to 
lend a practical edge to their understanding of the veil, and their perceptions of 
themselves as Muslim women. I will also trace the subjective meanings of veiling, 
and the relationship between these meanings, gender relationships, and the 
perception of .sexuality.
4.1 TH E LITERA TURE ON THE VEILING OF WOMEN:
There is a debate in the literature concerning the social standing of Muslim 
women in the Middle East and in other Muslim countries.
4.1.1 ‘VEILING^ OF WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER MUSLIM 
COUNTRIES:
Many scholars have looked at the status of women, gender relations, and the 
effect of Islamic discourse on the determination of these relations. In this respect, 
some contend that Muslim women occupy a subordinate position in many Middle
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Eastern nations, and they highlight the traditional and gendered customs prescribed 
by Islam in explaining this lower status (Papanek, 1994; Moghadam, 1994; 
Afshar.1993).
On the other hand, many scholars argue that claims about the oppression and 
subjugation of veiled Muslim women may, in many regards, be overstated (Abu- 
Lughod, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1996; Haddad and Esposito, 1998). In this point of view, 
veiling is not equated with subordination of women, but it is stated that women are 
developing certain strategies for coping with the subordinative discourse.
Scholars who have considered the subjective experiences of veiled Islamic 
women have revealed that Muslim women’s motivations for veiling vary 
dramatically. Whereas some Muslim women wear the veil to express strongly held 
convictions about gender difference, others are motivated to do so more as a means 
of criticizing Western domination, or the Western model of femininity.
Maha Azzam (1996), who studied Islamic women in Egypt, emphasizes the sense 
of difference from the Western model as the main thrust behind the veiling. 
According to her;
“most women who wear the hijab believe that they are fulfilling a 
religious duty while some, mainly university students, believe it is 
partly a statement that they are not Westernized. Being 
Westernized in this context reflects sexual promiscuity and 
decadence, which is perceived as being partly symbolized by 
western fashions that constantly try to reveal a different part of a 
woman’s body...The hijab as well as being a symbol of cultural 
separateness from the West, also represents a strategy of 
accommodation by women to the political and social environment 
of their societies and a means by which they can function more
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easily and increasingly more successfully within them”.(Azzam, 
1996: 224)
What is the veiled women’s strategy of accommodation? Arlene Elowe 
Macleod’s (1991) study provides some insight. Macleod’s inquiry is quite specific. 
She asked, “Why are lower middle-class working Cairene women choosing the 
veil?” Throughout the 1980s, she followed a group of women whose lives had 
diverged from those of their mothers, and who had left a home- based domestic life 
for paid employment in government jobs. Although the Jobs were not terribly 
stimulating or challenging, they provided needed income. The women left their 
children with mothers, mothers in law, or other relatives, braved the Cairo traffic for 
distant work places, shopped at lunch or during breaks, and return home to prepare 
dinners and clean. They became caught in a double bind, as they now have twice as 
much work- at home and in the office- with little social support for their role as 
working women. Macleod labels this the clashing ideologies of gender and 
economics. (Baron, 1996: 179)
According to Macleod, to resolve the tensions and their own ambivalence about 
working, many women of this background have begun to veil. In this context, veiling 
is a symbolic action that helps to resolve women’s internal conflicts about competing 
roles. When the new veiling began at the university, it expressed a specific set of 
symbols; the symbolism shifted as the phenomenon moved beyond the university 
and became localized.
Thus, according to Macleod, veiling is both a protest and an accommodation on
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the part of these lower middle class working women. It is a protest against the 
women’s eroding position in a changing city. It also symbolizes their acquiescence 
and active acceptance of the primary female role as wife and mother. Macleod argues 
that the idea of ‘accommodating protest’ proves useful in understanding why it is that 
the opening of a new political space in the workplace has not led to political gain and 
greater equality, but rather to the reproduction of inequality.(1991:145) In this, 
Macleod goes beyond the rornanticization of women’s resistance to control. She says 
women do resist and protest, but they also acquiesce and accommodate. 
(Baron, 1996:180) Similarly, Lila Abu Lughod (1998) has discussed the effects of 
socioeconomic factors on the organization of daily activities of Islamist women in 
Egypt. According to her,
“...the decision to adapt the hijab, while initially, in the late 1970s, 
mostly a form of political action by intelligent university women, 
usually the first in their families to be educated, has now spread 
down to working women of the lower middle classes and up to a 
few rebellions upper class adolescents and movie stars. In rural 
areas, educated girls declare their difference from their uneducated 
relatives without jeopardizing their respectability by means of this 
form of dress. In short, adapting the hijab now has an extraordinary 
number of meanings and complications that need to be 
distinguished.” (Lughod, 1998: 255)
Moreover, according to Abu Lughod, there may be some differences between 
the ideal Islamic assertions and realized ones. So Islamist women have developed 
some strategies to unify Islamic assertions and daily life necessities.
“Many Islamists argue that women should not work outside 
the home, God having given them the noblest of occupations- 
raising his creatures. The reality is, however, that most of the 
women who have taken on the veil are in fact working or expect to 
work. Most families aspiring to achieve or maintain middle class 
status can not do without a second income”(Lughod, 1998: 255)
Mervat Hatem (1997) has noted similar trends among veiled women, and
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suggests that these women are seeking opportunities of modernity. She also
characterizes Islamist discourse as very modernist. According to Hatem,
“many secularists argue that an Islamist political triumph will spell 
the end of modernity. In addition to the political character of this 
claim, it ignores the fact that their dominant interpretation of 
modernity is not the only one available in public debate. The 
Islamists have their own interpretation of modernity. Conservative 
modern views of gender sit well with conservative Islamist 
views...In their discussion of an Islamic society, Islamists are 
unequivocal in declaring the importance of science, reason, 
professional education, and technology in the building of the new 
society. Since the Islamists groups and their discourses have been 
part of the historical development of modern society in Egypt, it is 
not surprising that the Islamist oppositional discourse is very 
modernist. It accepts the nuclear family and the modern systems of 
education and training as the basis of its alternative Islamic 
.society” (1997: 97)
On the other hand, there are also other scholars who call themselves ‘Muslim 
feminists’. They promote some of the oppositional discourse with regard to veiling. 
One of the these women, hatima Mernissi, argues that the veil represents a tradition 
of ‘mediocracity and servility’ rather than a sacred standard by which to judge 
Muslim women’s devotion to ‘Allah’. According to her, veiling is directly related to 
the male identity crisis in the Muslim countries. Thus, she explains in terms of male 
domination.(Mernissi, 1991; and 1987)
The debate concerning the veiling of women in the Muslim countries was 
summarized. Next, I will look at this as it relates specifically to Turkey.
4.1.2 VEILING ISSUE IN TURKEY:
Although there is an advense literature on Islam and Islamist living in 
Turkey, the works on Islamic women are limited. Three studies in the literature deal 
with the issues surrounding veiled Islamic women in T urkey.
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Nilüfer Göle’s (1996) study, which looked at veiled university students, traces 
the relationship between the Turkish modernization process and the veiling of 
women as an alternative to this modernity. Göle explored the complex relationships 
among modernity, religion, and gender relationships in Turkey. According to her, 
veiled women are modernizing themselves through veiling and by participating in 
the public sphere. She writes, “ ...the cultivated/enlightened person of the Kemalist 
project of civilization was strongly influenced by Western manners and rituals of 
behavior, then it becomes much more plausible to argue that the Islamic actors, in a 
sense, have altered the definition of historical agency with their subversion of the 
identification between westernized and civilized person, on the one hand, Islamism 
legitimizes Muslim identity and empowers Muslims as political agents of historical 
and cultural change. On the other hand, new Islamic actors, as they reappropriate 
modernity, challenge the Westernist mode of modernism. In other words, Muslim 
actors enter the historical stage through the Islamist gate, and once they are actors on 
the stage, an interplay is engaged between ‘Muslim’ and ‘modern’” (1996: 133)
From a different perspective, Ayse Saktanber (1995; and 1997) has taken a more 
sociological outlook in studying the women of the Islamic ghetto in urban Ankara, 
Turkey’s capital city. Her main question was, ‘‘How do people organize their daily 
lives according to so-called Islamic precepts which advocate the superiority of an 
Islamic social order over all others? According to her, in the realization of Islam in 
daily life, two contesting worldviews, Islam and modernity, cannot remain in their 
pure forms, as they can at the ideological discursive level. According to Saktanber;
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if modernity functions as an index in which the objective 
givens of social life are indicated, then Islamic thought serves as a 
lexicon from which the meanings of these objective givens can be 
discerned. Thus the socio behavioral strategy of ‘conscious 
Muslims’ is based on a rather simplistic belief that the mare they 
can learn about that index, the more knowledge they can acquire to 
alter it. they disregard the fact that the index of modernity is also a 
product of a variety of ideologies that have flourished from within 
specific discursive formations and that these ideologies, like all 
other ideological discourses, are nothing but semantic systems of 
coding reality... In the life strategy of the inhabitants of this urban 
complex which I have outlined above, the aim was not to reject the 
comforts and opportunities of modern life but to question the moral 
price a Muslim should pay for their attainment” (1997: 151)
Moreover, according to Saktanber, Islam is transformed into a living social 
practice with the efforts of women. Islamic women develop some strategies in this 
process. ‘‘...I term strategies of containment and resistance vis-a-vis the secular ethics 
of modernity” (1994: 105). However, it is very crucial to understand or analyze the 
que.stion that what kind of strategies do Islamic women, especially the professionally 
working ones, develop vis-a-vis the Islamic discourse while they are participating in 
modern subject positions?
Aynur Ilyasoglu (1994; and 1998), another feminist researcher of veiled women,
examined the situation of veiled, working, married women, dealing primarily with
their identity-building process. According to Ilyasoglu;
“What is meant by veil as a fact is the new veiling, “tesettür”. It is a 
demarcating symbol that serves to outline the Islamist gender 
identity. It is Islamic, as prescribed in Koranic verses, but it also 
marks the women move from the traditional woman image to the 
enlightened Muslim woman. It reflects the emancipated character 
of the latter, because it enables her to participate in public life 
through a process of ‘resocialization’” (1998: 259)
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Moreover, Ilyasoglu writes that through veiling the Islamic women are 
experiencing their own form of modernization. In her words:
“...Islamist women demand accesses to the domain within an 
encapsulated existence construed according to the principles of the 
Islamic faith. They attempt to update (or revive the undistorted old)
Islamic life and reconcile it with the opportunities open to women 
within the modern setting. What is intended in this process of self 
modernization that redefines the frontiers of the public and private 
is the emancipation from the boundaries of traditionalism and the 
creation of a secure arena (through faith)” (1998:259).
Though they are all of great interest, none of these three studies examined the 
social practices of veiled women with respect to their ‘womanhood’ that is produced, 
icproduced, and transformed in the process of relations between men, modernity, 
tradition, religion, and women themselves. This means that ‘womanhood’ is 
experienced in daily life in relation to the woman’s different identity positions, her 
relation webs. Therefore, in the next section I will try to elucidate the parameters of 
the distinct ‘womanhood’ of professional Islamist women, placing emphasis on their 
perceptions of veiling, sexuality, and male-female relationships.
4.2 SEXUALITY, WOMANHOOD, AND VEILING:
The interviews for this study concentrated on the specific ‘womanhood 
experience’ of veiled women with respect to their everyday life practices. I also 
explored what the subjective meaning of veiling was for these women.
All the women I interviewed wore a large headscarf and a long coat, a mode of 
dress called ‘tesettür’. The age at which the women started to wear the veil
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varied.The four of the respondents -Nermin, Esra, Fatma( literature teacher), and 
Nurcan -have indicated that they have started veiling at the age of 13-17 years old, 
when they began menstruating, or at the later ages of teenage period Three others - 
Güler, Nursen and Ayse- began to wear the veil in their university years, under the 
influence of friends. The others - Hülya, Fatma, Serap, Müge, and Emel- began 
veiling either after they met their husbands or after they were married.
There was not dominant color choice in coats and veils of these women. The color 
and quality of the veil differed according to their taste and financial status. In 
addition to studying their covered dress, I was also able to observe the way the 
women dressed at home. Some wore jeans, and others long skirts. They typically 
completed their outfit with a matching blouse or pullover. They always wore 
stockings at home, regardless of whether it was winter or summer. Two of them, 
Nurcan and Müge, those who wore skirts of a more trendy length, did not wear 
stockings in the house. All of their shoes were modest, but fashionable. The women,
I observed inside the house without their veils had simple hairstyles (no dye) but 
fashionable cuts.
The part of the way we participate in social life is by expressing ourselves 
through our bodies (Shilling, 1993). The way we dress, the way we style our hair- all 
these things give clues about who we are. As Norbert Elias says, “We experience our 
environment through our bodies” (1991: 134) Similarly, veiled women express who 
they are, or at least who they are not, with their body image and specific mode of 
dressing.
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When a woman adopts the Islamist stance, her body becomes a symbol of 
defiance of the existing social system, a place where an ‘alternative womanhood’ is 
built. The veiled women present their bodies in accordance to their Islamic faith. 
They have developed a unique manner of bodily actions, including sitting, walking, 
speaking. It is through this manner that they establish their unique relationships with 
the external world.
In other words, the.se women display their bodies in accordance with the way they 
perceive the world. They reorganize their physical actions by referring to their 
specific understanding of the world, with respect to their Islamic faith. Clearly, the 
‘veil’ is the di.stinguishing trait of the Islamist woman. It is the line of demarcation 
between the Islamist community and others. The body images they represent and 
their unique way of dressing affect how these women occupy social space and 
interact with others (Giddens, 1991: 204; and Turner, 1994).
In essence, people in action are bodies in action. The concept of body is a socially 
constructed one. Social relations profoundly affect the development of our physical 
being in almost every respect, in terms of size and shape, and in terms of how we 
see, hear, touch, smell and think. Still, our bodies cannot be explained simply on the 
basis of these relationships. Human bodies are intangibly transformed as a result of 
living in society, but they remain material, physical, and biological entities. The body 
is a central issue in questions of self identity, the formation and maintenance of 
social inequality, and the constitution and development of societies.(Giddens, 1991: 
204) Thus, according to Giddens: “The body is not just a physical entity which we
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possess, it is an action system, a mode of praxis, and its practical immersion in the 
interactions of day-to-day life is an essential part of the sustaining a coherent sense 
of self-identity”(1991: 99)
Through veiling, Islamist women declare that they are not like their Western 
counterparts. In the Islamist discourse of the past 20 years, gender has been at the 
center of identification with, or contrast with, the West, and the woman’s body is 
the site on which these concepts are based (Tucker, 1993: 114).
In short, wearing a veil is a specific style of dressing that represents a conscious 
choice. As such, it is directly related to the formation of body image and self- 
identity. Still, there is more than this behind the respondents’ decision to veil. 
Veiling designates a specific kind of womanhood and a specific set of gender 
relations. In the section below, I will trace the dynamics and characteristics of this 
unique model of womanhood.
All of the interviewed veiled women offered various religious explanations when 
asked about their motivations for veiling. If the questionnaire method has been used 
for this study , the only explanation I would have for this would be that these women 
wear the veil because of their faith. Although this religion-based account does not 
map out a good path for our understanding of the social and cultural meanings of 
veiling, it does provide some idea of the specific form of ‘faith’ that is involved in 
the Islamic outlook. The Islamic faith demands that body image and social 
relationships be regulated with respect to the belief that Allah is everywhere, all the 
time, controlling everything. ( the faith of Tevhid) In this light, by wearing the veil
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for their faith, women endorse and maintain a type of ‘moral code’ that determines a 
specific set of gender relations.
In presenting the research subject’s ideas on veiling, I will start with Esra, who 
was one of the older women. She explained her adoption of the veil and her feelings 
about this as follows:
“We were very young when we went to the Imam-Hatip school.
We wore a small headscarf then. My mother also wore this small 
type of scarf. My father was a great believer. He always cherished 
us. He was very happy when we started performing ‘namaz’ five 
times a day. We learnt a lot about religion through him. When I 
had my first menstruation and became a young woman, I decided 
on my own to go covered. This was something that happened 
spontaneously. I made the decision without pressure, but, of course, 
my family was happy about my decision.”
In these words, Esra emphasizes her spontaneous decision to become covered in 
the style of the ‘veil’, or ‘tesettür’. She wore a small scarf initially, but turned to the 
veil as a teenager. Some of the other women I interviewed relayed similar accounts. 
They started with a small traditional headscarf, then, especially when they started the 
university, moved to the veil style. Clearly, many of the respondents see the veil as 
distinct from the traditional headscarf, and are careful to note the difference between 
them and their mothers in reference to this small scarf. In this context, ‘tesettür’ 
distinguishes these women from traditional Muslim believers ( i.e. their mothers).
Many of the women I interviewed came from traditional backgrounds. They had 
a small-town or rural origin, but attended university in large cities. For them, the act 
of veiling is both an urban phenomenon and is related to their experiences in the 
education process. The educated status is very important in terms of understanding
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Islam today. These women criticize traditional verbal customs and traditions, yet 
commit themselves to the religious knowledge of Islam in attending to written 
sources. In general, it seems the conservative family background of these women 
was a decisive factor in their orientation toward Islam. However, they condemn the 
traditional practices of Islam, as well as the current understanding of the religion. To 
them, their style of covering is a sign of a true Islamic standpoint, which means 
expansion of the faith in all spheres of life, not solely as a matter of worship and 
pure conscience.
Seemingly in contrast to this, veiled women say that being a true or real Muslim 
requires a specific code that governs social relationships. This means that, by 
wearing the veil, a woman exercises control over her own behavior. This control is 
borne out both in gender relations and in general relationships with others.
In essence, veiling represents these women’s effort to free themselves from the 
given conventional patterns of life and behavior. Wearing the veil, which means 
taking a conscious Islamic stance, gives them a basis for an identity transformation 
that starts at the level of individual consciousness. Esra expresses this;
“...because of your veiling, people expect you to be a perfect.
During my university years, I was very tolerant of any extreme 
occurrence because I was in tesettür, and everybody expected me 
be tolerant and act perfect. For example, in residence at university I 
was always tolerant and quiet. I tried to be patient in order not to 
offend people...they turned the lights on at 11 at, or at midnight, 
but I couldn’t say anything. As I said, when you are in tesettür you 
are expected to be more tolerant...to be perfect. Of course it was 
difficult for us. We suffered at the expense of not offending others”
Considering the above, it is clear that to be in tesettür not only requires faith, but
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also a reassessment of interpersonal relationships, and , thus, the formation of a new
‘morality’ in the framework of faith. Moreover Esra’s words also convey the power
relationship that forms between Islamic veiled women and others. As she mentioned,
veiled women must be more polite, more tolerant, and more perfect. This translates
to feeling powerless and restricted. They do participate in the public space with their
veils, but they implicitly accept that this sphere is not their own. They feel that, in
order to be in this sphere, they must be a tolerant part. As the other side of the coin,
these behaviors were part of their faith. This is the way they show their belief and
faith to Allah. Because, Islamic faith necessitates not only pure belief, but it requires
the proveness of this ‘belief at the social relations level.Fatma, the literature
teacher, also talked about this power relationship in the public sphere.
“ I started to wear the veil because of my faith in ‘Allah’. I went to 
school in a veil, and uncovered myself at the doorway. Many 
people criticized me, but they did not affect me. I shielded my 
body with my faith. I thought that the right people would accept me 
the way I am. 1 stayed silent, I didn’t argue with them.”
Fatma says she chose to stay silent, that she did not discuss her faith with others. 
Her words convey how veiled Islamic women feel that ‘they are being watched’ 
within the public sphere. It seems they implicitly accept this sphere as not their own, 
and that if they want to be there they must be perfect, tolerant, quiet. Fatma 
described why she decided to wear the veil, and what this practice means to her, as 
follows:
‘‘I did not veil, or cover myself, in order to protect myself from 
men. I decided to wear the veil because of my faith. ‘Allah’ does 
not want women to go outdoors without the veil. When I walk 
uncovered, I feel I am worth less in his eyes. In any case, the 
reason why we want to protect ourselves from men is for ‘Allah’s’ 
sake. Some men are aroused just by shaking hands with 
woman...Men are sexually weaker than women. Women are
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sexually more perceptive and wise. A man whose wife has died has 
to get married again eventually. Why? Because it is a natural need 
for them. When her husband dies, a woman can live without 
needing sex. She can be sure of herself, but she cannot trust a man”
Fatma’s words are striking, not because they focus on differences between men
and women, but because they convey her perception of sexuality. She associates
‘covering’ with ‘protection’. The veiled woman gives a man the message that he
should be controlled in his manner with her. This highlights a conflict. In one sense,
covering is supposed to serve as a strong message to the outside world: ‘I am a
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woman of faith. Know my limits before you approach me’. In another, the veiled 
woman puts limitations and restrictions on herself, Fatma indicates that the veiled 
woman must watch her attitude, must be tolerant and understanding. With the 
introduction of this alternative to the existing woman model, the veil becomes not 
only a requirement ol faith, but also a signal that the wearer possesses this 
alternative morality. Thus, at this point Islam goes beyond being a faith and becomes 
a morality that influences the organization of interpersonal relationships. An ethos 
appropriate to Islam is being established. Being covered is a sign of the adoption of 
this ethos.
In other words, for Fatma and several of the other women studied, the idea of 
masculine hypersexuality and feminine vulnerability to the male sex drive is key in 
their rationale for veiling. The women’s words convey their specific conception of 
sexuality. As mentioned above, veiled women do not exist in isolation from the 
prevailing social norms and assumptions about gender relationships. As social agents 
within the Turkish social structure, they are affected by hegemonic discourses on
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sexuality, gender relations, and models of masculinity and femininity. In the next 
section, by considering their stance against the different discourses, I will trace these 
women’s articulating subject positions.
4.2.1 HETEROSEXUAL DISCOURSE AND VEILING:
It has become commonplace in contemporary feminist literature to claim that we 
should understand sexuality not as an essence or set of properties that defines an 
individual, or as a set of drives and individual needs. Rather, we should understand 
sexuality as culturally and historically defined and constructed. Sexuality should be 
understood more generally, as a series of cultural and social practices and meanings 
which both structure and are, in turn, structured by, social relations (Fraser, 1987:28).
Veiled Islamic women conceptualize sexuality in their own cultural and social 
contexts. I believe they do this by articulating the modernist heterosexual discourse 
with the Islamic discourse on sexuality.
Discourses“ on relationships and problems play a powerful role in shaping
^The term ‘discourse’ integrates a range of occasionally contradictory or exclusionary 
meanings in its daily and philosophical uses. In some cases it means the ‘situational context 
of language use’, and at the other it means ‘spoken and written language’. Discourse may be 
defined as text in context on the one hand , and as a set of texts on the other. Within the 
scope of the thesis I am tracing the definition of Ruth Wodak . She is describing a discourse 
as a form of social practice. In this definition it is assumed that every discourse is related to 
many others and can only be understood on the basis of others. Moreover “describing
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people’s experiences. The popular dominant discourse on sexuality assumes that
there are natural and inevitable differences between men and women due to their
fundamentally different biological makeup (Hollaway, 1996: 99). In this discourse, it
is assumed that men need sex more than women, who, in contrast, are viewed as
seeking intimacy (Dallos and Dallos, 1998: 134). In the literature, the collection of
beliefs that hold that men naturally have greater sexual urges and needs has been
labeled the ‘male sexual drive discourse’! Dallos and Dallos, 1998: 134) The male
sexual drive discourse does not state that women should enjoy sex:
■‘Female sexual pleasure is not important; generally they are 
expected to accept, yield, receive, allow and satisfy the man’s 
sexual drive, they are generally perceived as passive receipts of sex 
in the Male sexual drive discourse, any excitement being mainly 
function of the man’s ability to turn them on. reluctance to engage 
in sex may be put down as being due mainly to biology, women are 
not particularly interested in sex because they don’t have the same 
sexual drive as men, they are almost naturally reluctant.” (Dallos 
and Dallos, 1998:140)
As stated above, the veiled women I studied have adopted similar ideas about the
discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive 
event and the situation, institution and social structure that frame it: the discursive event is 
shaped by them, but it also shapes them, that is, discourse is socially constituted, as well as 
socially conditioned. It constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities 
of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense 
that it helps sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to 
transforming it.” ( Wodak, 1997: 6-10). Foucault (1990) had suggested that a repertoire of 
dominant discourse is constmeted in society, and these shape our thinking and experience, 
how we think about ourselves, our inner conversations and how we interact with each other, 
these are not simply imposed from above but are shaped, maintained and enacted locally in 
the interactions between people in various groups, relationships and families. So I think that 
veiled women are not the passive conveyors of discourses but that are reproducing them or 
rearrange them within their everyday life practices.
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sexual needs of men, seeing them as part of a natural uncontrollable drive. They see 
the .sexuality of women only within the context of heterosexuality. This means that 
they believe women’s sexuality is only there to serve men’s sexual desires. Nurcan, a 
primary school teacher, expressed this point of view very clearly.
“...I had a friend. She always talked to me how unhappy she was.
They came to the edge of divorce. I told her that she should rethink 
her sexuality. She listened to me, and now she gets along well 
with her husband. 1 believe that the woman should be the giving 
one in sexual intercourse. Some friends of mine say they find this 
difficult, and do not enjoy it. These things should not be said. The 
woman should please her man, because sexual intercourse is a 
natural necessity for men. I learned from the TV program that men 
should ejaculate because it is bodily need. That is to say, the man 
can ejaculate whether or not there is a woman present. What does 
this mean? It means it is essential for them, and there is also the 
following point: A man who is pleased with his woman in bed does 
not go to other women.”
Nurcan’s ideas are very typical. She describes sex in terms of something that is
done for the sake of the marriage relationship. Explicitly in her words are her
hetero.sexual as.sumptions about sexuality and gender relations. These veiled women
also assert that the devotion of a man to his wife is dependent on the woman’s sexual
performance. According to Nursen, one of the dentists:
“The woman should take care of her body. She should wear lace 
underwear to please her husband. Most men who leave their wives 
are unsatisfied sexually. I believe that partners should talk about 
this subject, and should try to please one another. If the man is 
happy at home he will not be interested in anyone outside. They 
always told us this.”
Like Nurcan, Nursen believes that a happy marriage and good husband-wife 
relationship is only possible under conditions sexual satisfaction. She also reiterates 
another point of view; that is, the acceptance of hegemonic discourse about men’s
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sexual desires. It is assumed that the woman’s body is a place in which men satisfy 
their sexual needs. This is an explicitly heterosexual assumption.
In addition to this ideas, the veiled Islamic women define the positions of 
ma.sculinity or femininity in terms of heterosexual assumptions. Heterosexuality is 
institutionalized as a particular form of practice and relationships, of family structure, 
and identity. Heterosexuality denotes a process of division by gender, and the 
concept is dependent on these divisions. For women, heterosexuality is an identity 
defined primarily by desire for men and the social and economic privileges 
associated with being the partner of a man, particularly the traditional roles of wife 
and mother (Richardson, 1996: 8-9). In this sense, heterosexuality both affords 
privileges to and disempowers women (Weeks, 1986). Here, it can be stated that the 
sexual is intermingled with the social. Heterosexuality is practiced socially.
The relationship between the sexual and the social has most often been theorized 
in terms of a distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’. The social realm, at 
least in Western context, is usually equated with issues that affect daily life. This has 
the effect of disassociating sexuality, conceptually at least, from many aspects of 
everyday life and relationships. The sexual realm, by contrast, is generally associated 
with the individual, personal aspects of our lives, as well as the idea of nature. More 
specifically, sexuality is grounded in the body, in our individual, essential natures 
(Jackson, 1996: 21-39).
This means that the heterosexual relationship encompasses much more than sex.
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It includes marriage, family roles. Thus, heterosexuality as a discourse has an impact
on domestic life. It influences how the domestic gender specific division of labor is
agreed upon. Jean Carabin (1996) has said that;
“ heterosexual acts usually take place within relationships, and a 
particular type of heterosexual relationship is hegemonic in 
Western societies: life-long, monogamous, cohabiting
relationships, legally sanctioned through marriage and producing 
children. However, the hegemony of this type of relationship is also 
being supported by the State, the church...”(1996: 51-52)
This means that sexuality is understood within the context of heterosexuality as a 
hegemonic form. Heterosexuality, as a patriarchal system, affects the social and 
domestic division of labor with regard to required gender roles Carole Delenay’s 
idea on this is a very illuminating. According to Delenay, “Instead of examining the 
way that gender affects social interactions, we need to study the ways that gender is 
constituted in social interaction, gender is not culturally produced and then affects 
the division of domestic labor, but rather the division of domestic labor is one social 
practice which constitutes gender.” (1990: 37)
The veiled Islamic women’s practice of wearing the veil in the name of 
‘modesty’ and being a ‘more devout Muslim’ relates not only to religious discourse. 
In my opinion, the hegemonic discourse on sexuality and the male sexual drive 
discourse also affect the formation of their views on sexuality/femininity and 
womanhood. In sum, the uniqueness of veiled women does not come from their 
veils, but from their different subject positions, in which different and overlapping 
discourses are articulated with each other.
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4.2.2 VEILING AND ISLAM IC DISCOURSE ON SEXUALITY:
Sexuality is a social construct. In the case of veiled Islamic women, this construct 
is patriarchal and Islamic. These women are under pressure from both the patriarchal 
sexual discourse and the Islamic one. Nursen’s final words on this subject, “They 
always told us this” remind us that these women are the social agents of a specific 
cultural social system. Their understanding of sexuality is not only shaped by the 
givens of this system, but also by the Islamic discourse on sexuality.
How has the Islamic discourse influenced these women’s ideas? Both of the 
lespondents quoted above see sexuality as a source of power, the power to direct 
their marriage well. Dallos and Dallos notes, “Financially dependent women use 
sexuality as a way of influencing their partners in that they have relatively fewer 
material resources” (Dallos and Dallos, 1998: 102) Curiously, though the subjects of 
my research all have an income equal to, or in some cases higher than their 
husbands’, they still see sex as a form of power^ a way of keeping their men faithful. 
Where does this paradox come from?
The Islamic discourse on sexuality and the discourse on men’s right to marry 
more than one woman have caused this fear-based tension. Both of the subjects 
above indicated that they would not tolerate their husband taking a second wife.
 ^ It is assumed that at the all domination or subordination relations there are a mechanisms 
in the hand of subordinated ones to resist the dominant ones. However in many cases these 
strategies or mechanisms recreates the existing hierarchies. See (Hirschmann and Di 
Stefano, 1996)
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They admit that classical Islam permits a man to have more than one wife 
simultaneously, and that the conditions of the time allowed this practice. However, 
they assert that, due to economic conditions today, men must not marry more than 
one woman.
It is interesting to note that all the research subjects describe sex in terms of 
something that is done for the sake of the marriage. They also assume that one of 
their role is to satisfy the man’s natural sex drive. Further, they discuss their mode of 
dressing with regard to hiding bodylines, asserting that erotic sexual features and 
attractiveness must be concealed by the veil when in public. Implicit in this is the 
assumption that the male sex drive is on, everywhere and all the time, and that the 
woman must protect herself from this in the public sphere.
Obviously, there is a strong relationship between sexuality and veiling. This 
relationship comes from the Islamic view of bipolarity of the sexes. The women’s 
clothing rules are also determined by this bipolarity. From the Islamic stance, 
clothes must conceal the body, and at the same time reflect the sexual dichotomy of 
the world. In this sense, the veil, as female covering, reflects the purity of women 
and segregation of the sexes.
Abdelwahab Bouhdiba (1985) has voiced some interesting ideas on the bipolarity 
of the sexes in Islamic discourse. He writes,
“There is a hierarchy of the sexes in the Koran. Indeed the primacy of 
man over woman is total and absolute. Woman proceeds from man.
Woman is chronologically secondary. She finds her finality in man. 
she is made for his pleasure, his repose, his fulfillment’’ (1985: 11)
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There is also, according to Bouhdiba, a relationship between clothing and
sociality in the Koranic message. “Clothing effaces shame, but it introduces man to
social life”(1985: 89) Similarly, the veil as a clothing form, is the door that opens
the way for Islamic women to participate in social life. Bouhdiba focused on the
comparison between the Koran’s message about sexuality and the real practiced and
perceived one in Arab-Muslim context. According to him,
“ The Koranic view of sexuality is total and totaling, the cosmic 
and the sociological, the psychological and the social rest on the 
union of the sexes, sexuality is the creation and procreation . It is 
affirmation and complementarity... erotic drive reigns everywhere.
Where there is life there is desire and where there is desire there is 
Ero.s” fl985:89)
These views of Bouhdiba come from the Koran, and are largely echoed in the 
views of the subjects of this study. The women see sex as one of their main 
functions in gender relations. In their lives, sexuality plays both positive and 
negative /destructive roles. To them, sexuality is of great significance to the marriage 
relationship, but only in terms of satisfying the man’s sex drive.
The important themes arise here. First, Islam permits legitimate sexual intercourse 
only within the context of marriage. Second, and more importantly, women are 
viewed as objects through which the sexual drives of men are satisfied. Bouhdiba 
writes that, “according to Koranic sexuality discourse women must not refiise their 
husbands. One ‘hadith’(The words of prophet Muhammed) even lays down that the 
woman who refuses her body and sleeps in another place but her husband’s bed is 
cursed by the angels until she returns to it”(1985: 89).
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This means that, like in the heterosexual discourse, women’s sexuality is solely 
functional. It is there for the satisfaction of men’s sexual desires. Since satisfaction is 
achieved from the woman’s body, her body is viewed as the source of the desire. In 
this sense, sexuality is seen as destructive in terms of the community. Since a man 
can potentially be aroused whenever a woman is seen or heard, women, as the 
source of this arousal, must be controlled. From the woman’s point of view, they 
need protection from the male sex drive. The interviews demonstrated that veiled 
women, themselves, have internalized the need to control their own sexuality. Emel’s 
words exemplify this:
“ Women should protect themselves from the dirty drives of men.
Their drive is a natural one. They are naturally, anatomically very 
different from us. Even the most devout man may be tempted when 
he .sees a woman in a mini skirt. The veil gives me a sense of 
dignity and honor.”
By saying this, Emel not only speaks of the advantages of the veil for women, but 
also degrades women who wear miniskirts, or who choose not to wear the veil. The 
distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is made with reference to style of dress. Moreover, 
she associates concepts of ‘honor’ or ‘dignity’ covering the body. Similarlyj Miige , a 
history teacher, repeated the importance of sex as an act performed for the sake of 
the marriage. Within this theme, she also made a connection with the concept of 
‘being clean’ as a devout Muslim. She said that both sexuality and cleanliness relate 
to the body, and that being a true Muslim requires that the body be treated in a 
specific way. According to her;
‘‘In our religion, the body is very important. An individual should 
pay attention to her body, because that’s where we carry out spirit.
A clean spirit is found in a clean, ‘helal’ (lawful) body. For this
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reason, ‘abdest’(cleaning of the body with respect to Islamic rules, 
in a special way) is very important. Woman should always be in 
‘abdest’.... Veiling is a kind of worship. Through veiling I 
maintain my purity, because men cannot look at my body and 
cannot be tempted toward sex. With the veil I feel I am pure, 
clean, and that way I also feel I am a devout Muslim”
There are very important themes in Mtige’s ideas. First, she indicates that the 
body is the place in where the Muslim woman can prove her Islamic faith and her 
devotion to ‘Allah’. By covering herself, she obeys the Islamic rules concerning the 
relationship between ‘body’ and faith. Bouhdiba’s comments on Islamic discourse 
are interesting here. According to him,“ How to look and how to be looked at are the 
object of a precise, meticulous apprenticeship that is an integral part, of the 
socialization of the Muslim, to be a Muslim is to control one’s gaze and to know how 
to protect one’s own intimacy from that of others”(1985: 37). Bouhdiba writes 
further;
“Islam is a constant attention paid to one’s own body. A Muslim 
upbringing as a training that makes one permanently aware of the 
functioning of the physiological life, eating, drinking, 
urinating...having sexual intercourse...All this is the object of 
meticulous prescriptions, of which we have provided only a few 
examples” (1985: 55)
As seen from these ideas, one important feature of the Islamic faith is that it 
requires continual attention to the body. Wearing the veil is one aspect of this 
process. As mentioned, there is a strong relationship between sexuality and veiling. 
Through wearing the veil, women feel protected from the male sexual drive. The 
veil declares that the sexuality of an Islamic woman is accessible only within the
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domestic sphere, inside the marriage relationship. The public sphere, primarily the 
sphere of men, presents many dangers and traps for women. As a result, women who 
enter this realm must hide their sexuality. Protection seems to be the biggest 
motivator behind the wearing the veil.'*
4.2.3 VEILING AND ALTERNATIVE WOMANHOOD:
The above mentioned points come from the Islamic and heterosexuality
discourses. In thinking that they are concealing their sexuality through veiling, the
*
women also assign that the sexually desired woman is always the one who wears an 
exposing mini skirt and make-up. In other words, they assume that desirable and 
sexually provocative women all follow the modern fashion trends. Islamic women 
assume that they become ‘desexualized’ through veiling. However, no matter what 
they wear they obviously remain as a woman, and, in my opinion, are still very 
feminine in their long fly-about overcoats and colored veils. For the veiled women, 
in the public sphere the aim is to exclude their sexuality, not their entire femininity.
These women criticize the ‘model of modern womanhood’, and endeavor to form 
their own alternative femininity. But what they are trying to construct is not so 
different from the existing ones. The reason for this is that veiled Islamic women 
experience their womanhood within the Turkish sociocultural structure, which is 
dominated by patriarchal and heterosexual discourses on gender relations. This 
means that the perception of sexuality, and the definition of ‘desired sexuality’ is
■* Fadwa El Guindi’s analysis of women who have veiled in Egypt indicates that women are 
veiling because they want to retain their respectability and untouchability while they are 
present in the public spaces. (El Guindi, 1981: 465-485)
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culturally determined. Also, the prevailing definitions of who is sexually desirable 
and who is not are products of gendered patterns of domination and submission.
In the next section, I will analyze how the veiled women experience their unique 
womanhood relative to their consumption of beauty products and female 
undergarments.
4.2.4. ‘ NATURAL IS BEAUTIFUL’.
Sociologists commonly look at consumption patterns in their attempts to define
the social position or ‘habituses’ of groups (Bourdieu, 1997). Owing to the size of
this study, I cannot provide an overall picture of the consumption patterns of veiled
women. However, my research did reveal some interesting choices with regard to
cosmetics and underwear. During the interviews, I asked whether the women bought
special underwear of any kind. Ayse, the chemist, told th a t:
“ We are women just like you. Some people think we are rural 
people who don’t know anything about modernity. But they are 
wrong. We are women just like them. I always place importance on 
the way I dress, the fact that we wear a veil does not mean we are 
not women. I like to buy underwear, especially the latest fashions, 
and I wear them for my husband. He never asks me why I buy 
them.”
In these words, Ayse conveys a certain amount of aggression toward ‘other’ 
women, her points are in line with those mentioned earlier. Like some of the other 
veiled subjects, she says she wears sexy underwear to please her husband. She speaks 
of how underwear in terms of sexuality, and makes the point that it arouses men. 
again, the woman’s body and her style choices are mostly considered with regard to 
the male partner. Within the domestic sphere this sexuality is not associated with
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danger. Home is the place where sexuality is legitimate, where sex can be
experienced freely. Nurcan expressed some similar ideas. According to her,
“...women should keep their bodies very clean. To me, a clean 
body is a beautiful one. I don’t use perfumes because I want my 
husband miss my body. Everyone’s body has unique smell. At 
resurrection, husbands and wives will find each other by smell...I 
don’t wear make-up because I think ‘Allah’ gave every woman a 
special beauty. Natural beauty is precious, make-up only gives 
women artificial beauty...But I do pay attention to my underwear. I 
like it, and my husband likes it too.”
The group’s opinions illustrate that veiled Islamic women disapprove of the
A
modern womanhood image. They are highly critical of the ways in which the body is 
portrayed in the name of beauty. Although they oppose this type of display in the 
public sphere, they do accentuate their own sexuality in some ways, particularly with 
underwear, for their husbands. They see their bodies as their husbands’ possession in 
the marriage relationship. Again, in this case, there is difference between what is 
sanctioned in public versus private life. In the community, the woman’s body is 
perceived as a temptation that threatens due to the uncontrollable male sex drive. 
Within the marriage, sexual expression is cherished and acceptable.
Nermin, the most vivacious and intellectual of the women interviewed, introduces
quite a different line of thinking. In her view, body shape is important to everyone,
not just women, but the body should not be worshipped. She explained:
“Some women pay all their attention to their bodies, their cloths, 
their make up. I think this is very destructive for women, because 
in doing this they become sexual objects, things whose only 
purpose is to be beautiful and attractive. Some men also want to 
see women only in a state of beauty. Men think that the only value 
of a woman is in her figure, or her beauty. Even my husband, a 
devout Muslim, has criticized me putting on extra weight. He wants 
me to have a beautiful attractive body. But I do not think so. If he
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loves me, he should love my soul, not my body”
Different from Nurcan and Nursen, Nermin condemns the idea that the woman’s
body is important solely in terms of satisfying the male sex drive. She has developed
the view that personality, not femininity, is important. Nermin reads a lot of books on
human psychology. She is very intellectual, and this separates her from the other
women interviewed. I believe that her criticism is the product of an intellectual mind.
Women who read more tend to think more critically. Along with these thoughts,
Nermin also explained her motive behind wearing the veil:
“ My veiling issue relates directly to my inner world. It is an 
action I have chosen with respect to my relationship with ‘Allah’. I 
feel very pure, devoted, and near to Allah when I serve him.
Veiling is one of the requirements expected of women.... Inner 
feelings and worlds guide individuals. I cannot live without the 
concept of Allah. This notion, and my effort to be as close to him 
as possible, motivates me in my life. You should understand my 
choice to wear the veil only within this context”
Again, her explanation reveals that Nermin’s ideas are very different from those 
of the other women. Her ‘tasavvuf thinking influences her ideas about the body, the 
self, and veiling.
In conclusion, the range of views held by these veiled women certifies that there 
are many reasons why the veil is worn, and that these are based on the wearer’s 
subjective experiences and ideas. However, while their motives may differ, the 
women all share the notion that, as a protective entity, the veil enables them to 
participate in extra-or nondomestic pursuits. In other words, the woman and her body 
are seen as belonging to the private sphere. Naturalness is preferred, but some of 
these women do use cosmetics, such as face creams and hydrating lotions, which 
contain natural materials. Their conception of beauty differs from hegemonic modern
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ideas. According to veiled women, beauty is not the woman who tries to shape her 
body unnaturally or treat her face cosmetically. Natural is beautiful in their eyes. In 
the public sphere, they criticize the womanhood model that fixates on the body, 
choosing to present themselves very simply and naturally in this realm. It is assumed 
that any attempt otherwise ‘unaffected state’ degrades women and makes them 
sexual objects.
However, in the domestic sphere these women do make efforts make themselves 
attractive to their husbands. They wear sexy underwear and cut their hair in 
fashionable styles. Of course, they do this on the assumption that men desire women 
who wear sexy clothes and have a nice figure. In other words, they view their bodies 
and their sexuality an instruments of power. Essentially, they use these to get the 
results they want in their marriage. Here, the veiled woman’s lawful body and lawful 
sexuality are used to make deals with her husband.
Wearing the veil may be directly related to these husband-wife negotiations. 
Through veiling, gender relations are set out in a formal and unique way. The 
‘womanhood model’ of the veiled Islamic woman determines the parameters of this 
relationship. I will analyze these domestic sphere gender relations in the sixth 
chapter. As I mentioned earlier, a point of view shared by all the veiled women I 
interviewed is that hiding their sexuality enables them to participate in the public 
sphere. In other words, the practice of veiling liberates them from men’s untamed, 
potentially explosive sexuality, and makes it possible to follow various pursuits in 
public life. The veil is the vehicle by which Islamic women engage in extradomestic
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pursuits. According to the subjective experiences of the women interviewed, the veil 
is a great equalizer; it has made it possible for women to work alongside men.
This rationalization works for them because of a major assumption: They believe 
that unveiled women are the desirable, sexually provocative ones, and that by veiling 
they become desexualized. I think this indicates that the veiled women’s subject 
position has many roots. It is influenced by economic class and by hegemonic 
discourses that cut across all the social boundaries. Also important in this are the 
patriarchal male sexual drive and women’s vulnerability discourses. Sexuality, 
according to these women, is separated into dominant and receiving male and 
submissive and giving female versions.
As Judith Butler writes, “...discrimination is always discrimination, binary 
opposition always serves the purpo.ses of hierarchy” (Butler: 1986, 134). All this 
supports my contention that to understand and challenge the oppression of veiled 
women, it is not sufficient to criticize Islamic discourse or political Islam alone. One 
must also question the above-mentioned psychosexual relationships and 
assumptions about sexuality in the domestic and private spheres, where these 
women’s lives unfold, and through which gender identity is created and recreated.
4.3 VEILING, PARTICIPATION AND ‘OTHERNESS’
As discussed above, veiled women believe that the veil differentiates Muslim 
women from others. They identify themselves with reference to ‘others’, and the
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definition of the ‘other’ changes with this context. Certainly, they otherize so-called 
modern looking women who wear provocative clothing and make-up. In wearing the 
veil, a woman declares her Islamic posture. In the public sphere, the veil says to 
others, “I am a chaste woman. Don’t bother me.” As discussed above, these women 
associate being veiled with being pure, honest, and devout Muslims. In other words, 
by presenting their bodies in a special way, they declare they are ‘different’ from 
other women. Wearing the veil allows them to enter the public sphere, and in their 
view, this mode of dressing provides them with respect and protection there. It does 
so because it signifies that they are of the Islamic standpoint, but, at the same time, 
the veil means that their sexuality is exclusive to, and possessed by, their husbands in 
the domestic sphere. Thus, on one level the veil is a vehicle of modesty and dignity 
relative to the husband. And in the public arena, the veil represents the border 
between the Islamic women and others.
Although, on one hand, the Islamic women’s specific physical public body is a
reflection of existing power relationships, this new female body also represents a
form of rebellion against the relationships and styles towards the dominant ones.
Hence, the body simultaneously represents a means of resistance and a power
struggle. According to Dallos and Dallos,
‘‘...just as there are different kinds of powers, there are different 
kinds of resistance; resistance is both a way of avoiding being 
controlled and influenced and a way of attempting to influence as 
well.... The kind of resistance attempted may depend on the kind of 
resource or power base that the individual has to base its resistance 
upon” (1998: 24)
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Veiled women are resisting to the ‘modern women outlook’ image by 
using their sources of power - Islamic discourse and their bodies. They wear the 
veil to resist the hegemonic modern woman image and the male sex drive. 
Veiling, as ‘outer wear’ can be seen as symbol of the women’s move outside the 
domestic sphere. The Islamist women’s notion that veiling conveys their 
desexualization in the public sphere represents one way they carry their private 
realm values to the public one. They constructs their relationships in the public 
sphere by using binary oppositions: ‘helal’(lawful) or ‘haram’ (unlawful). These 
opposites, which refer to spheres of social life and signify the rules of 
relationships with others, are constructed according to the Islamic meaning 
system. As Bouhdiba noted (1985: 89), the Islamic stance reflects specific kind of 
world meaning. The veiling issue can be understood only in reference to this 
meaning system. Peter Berger (1967: 70-85)stated that religions are functional in 
the construction of ‘nomos’. The Islamic message has such a nomos view, and 
this is established through a specific type of relationship between the sexes. In 
this specific relationship, there are two categories of women and men: lawful and 
unlawful ones. The veiling of women means the protection of their body from 
unlawful men whose sexual need is satisfied with a woman’s body. In this sense, 
they do not differ much from other women because it seems that the patriarchal 
heterosexual discourse is as effective as the Islamic one in constructing the 
meaning of the world, and gender relations.
Islamic women’s points of view on the sexuality of women and gender 
relations are formed from the articulation of Islamic discourse with other dominant 
discourses that prevail in the cultural setting. The subordination of women is a very
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complex, and, at the same time, multifaceted issue that cannot be evaluated only 
from the perspective of the Islamic discourse.
Moreover, the veil is not only a symbol of subordination. It is also the door 
through which the subordinated ones step to the outside, the public sphere. In other 
words, every woman is an active social agent who explains the life and relationships 
that surround her in a unique way. The difference with Islamic women lies in their 
different meaning system, which is shaped by the Islamic discourse and other 
patriarchal discourses. Women’s strategies of bargaining and negotiating with the 
hegemonic subordinative discourses are formulated at the border of these discourses, 
and use their jargon.^
In the next chapter; I will examine how veiled professional Islamic women 
express what ‘working’ means to them. I will also examine the mechanisms by 
which different discourses are articulated in order to construct the meaning of 
‘working’. I believe that women are experiencing gender relationships within the 
boundaries of these ‘meaning systems’, which are the maps by which the social 
agents find their way in social life and social relations.
 ^ The French feminist literature including Luice Iregaray (1985) and Julia Kristeva (1982) 
have been proposing reverse of it. They are having with essentialist standpoint proposes the 
deconstruction of womanhood with criticizing existence male oriented symbolism, language, 
sexuality...etc. The woman according to them, is constructed with relation to he subordinate 
situation against the men. So this distorted construction should be reversed. Women should 
constitute their own ways, values.
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CHAPTER V
THE WORKING EXPERIENCE OF VEILED WOMEN
In the mainstream feminist literature, it is deemed necessary to cut the chain of
traditional role stereotyping to empower women. This role stereotyping is
understood as the basically external acculturation of females into a system of beliefs*
and codes that were then assumed to orient their social behavior throughout their 
whole lifespan'. Therefore the problem of women’s emancipation was seen as a task 
of overcoming the basically psychological limitations of the concept of ‘self’ 
constructed during this process of early socialization (Markus, 1986). According to 
this point of view, women must break out of their traditional roles and go to public to 
empower and liberate themselves. It is assumed that public action - participation in 
economic activities, social activities- leads to the empowerment of women".
I Especially feminist social constructionist theorists have argued that personalities, roles are 
socially acquired. It is argued that processes should be deconstructed for the empowerment 
of women. Nancy Chodorow is the most significant contributor of this view. See 
(Chodorow, 1978) see also (Eisenstein, 1984) and (Elshtain, 1981)
"Especially ‘liberal feminism’ has assumed this point of view. But there are many problems 
in the assumptions of liberal feminism. At least because ‘the public’ is considered as the 
space of men and participation of women in this sphere is taken into account as a sufficient 
condition to their empowerment. The relationship within the domestic sphere is not taken 
into account by liberal feminists. See( Donnovan, 198.5) and also (Eisenstein ,1981).
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On the other hand, feminist theories that focus on the daily life experiences 
of women indicate that women’s lives are not shaped only by subordination or 
exploitation processes, but that strategies are developed to resist such male 
dominance systems and mechanisms (Kandiyoti, 1988: 274-90). These strategies are 
developed from within these power relationship and, in some part, function to 
recreate dominant culture over time. It is assumed that women are creating or 
reinforcing certain ways of seeing, thinking and acting. These ways are determined 
in relation to the dominant discourses or ideologies that shape women’s perceptions 
of the world. But women as social agents have a degree of independence that allows 
them to shape the dominant discourses that, in turn, determine gender roles and 
relationships. In other words, women make sense of their experiences by narrating 
themselves in a particular cultural context.
Therefore, the empowerment of women depends not only on their public 
participation. Empowerment and liberation can be acquired through the challenge of 
existing gender relations and gender roles, and by reconceptualizing women’s 
.selfhood within the power relationship.
The modernization theories’ premise that tradition, religiosity, and existing 
.subordination of women disappear with the advent of individualism, that is, 
participation in modernity, no longer holds. At least, clearly the case of Islamist 
women has disproved these theories’ assumptions about the universal and 
evolutionary model for women’s empowerment. Veiled Islamist women have a 
different experience with respect to how they justify working. Their Islamic 
standpoint is emphasized parallel to their work as professionals. They are Islamists
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From this point of view, in this chapter I will examine how the veiled women 
define their working experience. What does being professional mean to these 
women? How do the different discourses explain this experience? How do veiled 
women experience these different ‘subject positions’, in their everyday life with 
respect to their womanhood?
The women who are married, have professions, and who are veiled, were the 
subjects of the research. In this choice, my aim was not to deal with the relationship 
between modernity and Islam.'^ Rather, I wanted to explore the multisourced views of 
veiled women within their everyday life. I focused on the expression of different 
dialogues in their subject positions of veiled wom en.Clearly, dressing according to
as well as educated professional people.
"Nilüfer Göle has taken into account Islamic veiled women’s social participation within the 
relationships among modernity, religion and gender relations. According to her “...Islam 
does not stand against modernity; rather, it acts as a compass of life and as a means of 
management with modern society” (1996:138)
Ayes ANC’s (1981) research on the professionally working women has denoted very 
significant points to make comparisons between veiled professional women. According to 
her findings. In Turkey, women in the highest ranking professions are predominantly drawn 
from urban , professional or civil service backgrounds. According to Inc “the elite 
background of professional women is significant from two point of views. First, within the 
context of overarching class inequalities in developing countries, the ready availability of 
lower class women as domestics in private homes ‘emancipates’ upper class women to 
pursue professional careers. Secondly, in the face of deliberate state policies aimed at the 
rapid expansion of professional cadres, maintenance of elite recruitment patterns is only 
possible through the infusion of women. Thereby women from elite backgrounds are 
encouraged to enter the prestigious professions, restricting the options available to men from
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the rules of Islam, and legitimizing everyday life activities with reference to Islam 
means that, on one level, veiled women are affected by their religious discourse. So 
how are these discourses expressed in daily life strategies? The main goal of this 
chapter will be to answer of this question.
All the women I studied were working at salaried or gainful employment.
Seven of them started working after marriage, and five began working before they
were married. When they had children, most had to stop working for a period and
#
then pick up from where they left off. The interview process showed that their 
’reason of working’ and ‘the meaning of working’ were the women’s main themes. 
Although their explanations of their work and the way they discussed their jobs 
differed, it was possible to create a group portrait
For this project, I felt it would be wrong to distinguish professional working 
veiled women from other women’s groups based solely on their Islamic standpoint. 
These women are affected by current economic conditions, values, distribution of 
sources, as women in the other parts of society.(Giirbilek, 1992) Turkish society, 
which has encountered the power of money and new patterns of consumption, 
particularly since the 1980s, seeks new codes of behavior. Anarchic market 
individualism, which subverted the existing cultural and economic hierarchies in 
society, is an example of this claim.
manual or peasant backgrounds.” (1981: 193) However, the professionally working veiled 
women are not coming from the elite families. Rather , these women are the elite of their 
communities. This shift is directly in relation to the spreading of education facilities all over 
the country, the rising aspirations of families, and rapid social change and mobility.
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Today in Turkey, more female children are going to school than in previous 
times, and the literacy rate has risen (Gök, 1990: 181-199). Also, each day more and 
more women enter the registered and nonregistered sectors of the economy. The 
better education for all women has been brought about by their active participation in 
the public sector. The difference between veiled women and others is not that they 
alone are entering universities or achieving professional status. To understand the 
difference we need to look at these women’s perception of themselves and how 
they justify their working life through religion.
In other words, the difference is the effect of Islamic belief or expression on 
the organization and legitimization of the affairs of daily life. The effect of Islam as a 
religion permeates not only theological issues, but the regulation of social conduct 
and the way this is Justified. As Clifford Geertz (1968) has indicated If we want to 
know about Islam today, we must think of it more as conduct than as theology and 
doctrine.
5.1 VEILED WOMEN IN  PROFESSIONAL WORKS
Three of the women I studied were dentists, one was a civil engineer, one was 
a pharmacists, one was a pedagogue, one was a research assistant in the school of 
theology, and five were teachers in different levels of education.
One thing these women have in common is that they all moved to Bursa at
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some point in life, particularly after they were married. Their places of birth are 
generally mid-sized Anatolian cities. Another trait they share is that they all attended 
university in cities distant from their families- Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Balıkesir, and 
Çanakkale. In short, to this point in their lives, these women have moved to at least 
two different cities. In other words, the women in the research group come from 
groups where social movement is the norm.
Since the end of !960’s, the ‘migration’ from the country to the city has been 
a feature of life for thousands of people. Some veiled women in the research group 
represent the second generation of groups that participated in this migration process.
A look at the socioeconomic structure of those women’s families reveals 
some interesting facts. The women have a higher level of education than their 
parents. Only one of the women’s mothers had gotten a Faculty diploma, and the 
other’s level of education varied from primary to high school. One father, the spouse 
of the mother with the faculty education, had a diploma from military school and had 
reached the rank of colonel. The women typically labeled their mothers as 
‘housewives’ and the fathers were small-scale retailers and merchants, small- 
commodity producers, and blue-collar workers. With regard to the level of education 
achieved by other members of the family, these women were the only ones with a 
university education.
In short, while these women originated from lower or lower-middle class 
rural families, all of them are now middle-class or upper middle-class members of
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society. Moreover, these women’s families are part of an upwardly mobile social 
group that maintains it.self on the strength of local values. This means that they are 
traditional and religious, but are that they seek more social movement-more 
education, prestigious jobs for their children, an urban way of life.
Hülya’s father is a colonel, but all the other women’s families are traditionally 
religious, and all these women got their initial religious background from within the 
family environment. The women characterized their family’s religious beliefs as 
'traditional’ and ‘not original’. Many women criticized their mother’s stance on 
religion, saying that the Koran should not be read in such a way to trap or coerce 
others. Some of them also said that their mothers began to wear the veil after they 
did. In this way, the.se women have the distinction of being the first veiled woman in 
their families. It is significant that, in modeling themselves after other veiled women, 
these women looked up their friends, not to their family. These networks of Islamic 
women friends that form around the veiling issue are very important with respect to 
the formation of Islamic public opinion.
The conservative family background of these women was a decisive factor in 
their orientation toward Islam. However, although they come from traditional 
backgrounds, they criticize the traditional practices of Islam as well as the current 
understanding of religion. In other words, these women come from the lower-class 
but upwardly mobile social groups who practice Islam in its traditional forms. They 
have ended up being very different from their families: they have a much higher 
educational level, they are more radical and political in their attitude toward religion.
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Julie Peteet (1993:57) discusses the signifieance of the relationship between 
gender and class structures and the construction of cultural authenticity in Middle 
Eastern societies. According to her, in the division of cultural representation, lower- 
class women are testimonials to sacrifice and tradition, whereas middle and upper- 
class women represent progress.
The focus of this thesis are women who started with a lower class origin, but 
have ri.sen to middle or upper middle class positions in society. As a result of this 
move, they are under the pressure of modernism more than lower-class women have, 
at least in terms of their consumption styles.
Valentine Moghadam (1996: 6) states that the trajectories of patriarchy and 
development have been far from being linear. Many of the benefits of the 
development process have accrued to the elite or the middle classes, while the 
women and men of the working classes have seen jobs disappear and wages fall. 
Therefore, according to Moghadam, there is a need to redefinition of the concept of 
development.
“...the need for a new definition of development and 
alternative development strategies. A useful understanding of the 
objectives of development is contained in the concept of human 
development- the enlargement of people’s choices. Where people’s 
choices are narrowed or eliminated, this is distorted development or 
maldevelopment. Where development enhances people’s lives, life 
options, and choices, this is human development. This concept is 
especially pertinent to women, who historically have been the most 
disadvantaged in terms of autonomy and advancement. Education, 
employment, and good work conditions and remuneration are
and they are also more adapted to modern conditions and life styles.
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among the necessary conditions for autonomy and choice, and 
should be considered basic human entitlements” (1996: 6)
Moghadam also points to the significance of self-development in terms of 
gaining autonomy. This can only be realized when the power relationships that foster 
the inequalities are transformed. Therefore, strategies are needed not only to improve 
women’s access to economic, political, legal, and cultural resources, but ultimately to 
transform the institutions and relationships that su.stain inequalities. We should look 
at the differences between the interviewees and their families not only on the basis of 
education level or occupation, but in terms of their ability to develop these kinds of 
strategies.
All the veiled women I interviewed had taken a radical position at least once 
in their lives. All of the respondents except for Serap, the civil engineer, indicated 
that their university years were the time when they took Islam from a belief to a life 
practice. They told me they had taken part in demonstrations against banning the veil 
at universities. This type of participation in society and public affairs is a common 
feature of many veiled women.
Almost all the women in the research group considered themselves 
successful, and said their mothers encouraged them to study hard throughout their 
school life. Looking at their life stories, it seems that taking university entrance 
exams was considered a normal and desired extension of the high school education. 
Their families did not block or hinder their progress in any way. When they attended 
university away from home, their father’s accompanied them and got them settled
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into residence. Based on this brief group portrait, I will begin to analyze how veiled 
women integrate Islamic religion with their work life. The Islamic stance not only 
allows these women to have a fulfilling work life, but also makes them feel good 
about themselves in their position as representatives of a new type of woman in 
Turkish .society. Being at the same time a veiled woman, a Muslim woman, and a 
working woman is not a situation of conflict.
The basic reason for this lack of conflict is the meaning they attach to 
‘working’. In explaining their reasons for working, the women developed two 
aiguments. One that was common to all of them is the idea that, in a way, they are 
spreading the word of Islam ( ‘tebliğ’) through working. Second, they emphasized 
their distaste for the housework that is done at home without charge. In other words, 
the.se two views encompass the serving God on the one hand, and the individualistic 
approach, or exploration of personal talent through working, on the o ther.
5J .1  ‘TEBLIG ’: PASSING THE WORD OF ISLAM  THROUGH WORKING
The women in the research group view employment as a holy mission, and 
declare that they are carrying out this mission, and spreading the word of Islam 
(‘tebliğ’) as their primary function in life. Secondly, particularly the dentists 
underlined the idea that to serve people is to serve God. Thus, part of their 
motivation to work stems from the justification of work as having social significance. 
Müge, a history teacher, explained her reasons for working as follows:
“...If I go out in street and gather some people together, I 
cannot tell them of our religion and our past, but in school you can 
do it in front of a class of 50 people. Moreover, your job is to tell
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them and to pass on information. You will not find separatists or 
nonbelievers in my class. I am passing on our country’s inseparable 
integrity. And this is letting people know about Islam. Is there a 
more sacred job than this one?”
In expanding on her words “... our basic reason for working is to pass the 
word of Allah..”, Müge revealed more of her personality.
“The reason I work is not money. The government and 
foundations help the families of those who died to save the Turkish 
State. The issue is not simply getting ahead in life. What’s 
important is to live every moment. There are ‘Sehit’s wives who 
are not working, living on their husband’s salaries, but they are 
unhappy and they live in the past. They cry, moan and rebel against 
their situation. Being passive person is no good for me. What 
makes me feel unhappy is the feeling of uselessness. I always feel 
happy when I come home because I am doing a holy job.”
As seen these words, Müge is using both the personal and communitarian 
motives to justify passing on the word of Islam through her job. The meaning of the 
work, is politicized for the sake of the Islamic community and national unity. Like 
the other research subjects did, Müge is trying to ‘justify’ the fact that she works and 
what she does in her job.
Why do these women feel compelled to explain their working situation? Men 
do not have to do so; for them, working is considered a natural thing. But women, 
and, in this case, veiled Islamic women, feel a need to legitimize or justify their 
working situation. I believe that this is a strategy of coping and bargaining with the 
traditional code, which says that working outside the home is, in essence, not the job 
responsibility of women. To combat this challenge, women justify their working 
situation by holding up the codes and values of the dominant discourses in their life.
189
The Islamic women I studied used Islamic codes and provisions to explain their 
working status. It seems that being ‘professional’ allows them to somehow bargain 
with dominant dialogues, because they explain their jobs as being done for the sake 
of Islamism. Only professional middle or upper middle-class women would be able 
to enter into this kind of negotiation. As educated and professional women, they can 
challenge existing biased point of views about women working outside the home.
In the above paragraph, Miige’s comment, “Being a passive person is no 
good for me” contains her personal reason for working. Work is a means toward 
personal fulfillment for her. What .she means by ‘being passive’ is being a housewife.
Although she legitimizes work as a mission of spreading ‘the word of Allah’, 
Müge also conveys that working is a sort of movement in itself, a means of self 
improvement for women. She also talks of a hierarchical relationship between the 
active, working woman and those who are passive and unemployed The working 
woman is conceived as an active, useful contributor to society, while housewifery is 
.seen as passivity. A similar viewpoint was voiced by some of the other women. 
Fatma, a Turkish literature teacher, told of the time when she began to work.
“There’s nothing in our religion that tells women to stay at 
home. Our Allah told everybody to work, without any gender 
discrimination. Now women have a much larger role than ever 
before, because, many attacks have been made on our religion. We 
need to express ourselves better. There are roles for us to play 
when we are abroad. We must tell people about our religion. We 
have to tell them that our religion does not subordinate women 
them. This is a religion that treats women with great respect, and 
even gives men a mission to protect women. Only precious things 
deserve to be protected. That’s why I say that we are working for 
our religion not for ourselves. We endeavor to be admired women 
of our religion.”
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Here, Fatma depicts ‘working’ as a political mission. Like Müge, she portrays 
her job not as having a personal, but a political and communitarian meaning. She 
does this by explaining that there is a relation between working and Islam. In 
Fatma’s words, there are two basic connections between religion and work: First, she 
mentions the notion that God protects those who work, saying that this is part of the 
‘Islamic word’. The importance Islam places on working, and Prophet Mohammed’s 
charity for the working people was also mentioned by some of the other women. I 
believe there is a very important theme hidden here. When these women say “ I work 
because God likes the one who works”, they are careful to point out that this ‘work’ 
means working outside the home and being paid to do so. In other words, they are 
clarifying that women’s traditional responsibilities in the domestic sphere, like 
housework and childcare, do not fit in the ‘working’ category. In other words, when 
women use the idea of God’s protection of working people in expressing their 
reason for working, they consider being a housewife and other ‘no-charge’ efforts in 
the domestic sphere to be worthless, definitely not a ‘job’.
These women also promote the idea of work as serving Islam. Fatma stresses 
that Islam is under threat, and that there is a need to spread the Islamic word, explain 
the religion. She not only mentions Islam, but also the need to represent the ‘Islamic 
woman model’. Here she conveys her view of the superiority of veiled women over 
other women. What she says is that the purpose of women’s participation in working 
and public life is their political mission to represent this model woman for Islam.
It seems that the more veiled Islamic women enter the professional
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occupations, the more they become part of the Islamic movement in the name of 
defending their Islamic identities. This happens because they must justify their aim in 
working with reference to Islam and Islamic discourse. Also, in situations where they 
meet in the public sphere with others who, in their eyes, are hegemonic, they use 
Islamic ideas to try to justify their existence in this sphere. Nursen, one of the 
dcnti,sts, explains her reason for working as follows:
“...I went to school under very difficult conditions; marriage 
and kids. Now the kids are grown up...I thought of my healing of 
patients as a way of .serving Allah. When a patient comes to my 
office, healing that patient gives me peace and prosperity.” In a 
familiar theme, Nursen explains the motivation behind her working 
as serving God, and says that she started working “when her life 
was in order”.
But in addition to giving the common explanation that her working was for 
Islam, in talking about her life, she explains her reason for working as follows;
“I always thought about working. Plus, I had support from 
my family on this subject. I was even told to finish the ‘Commerce 
High School’ and become a civil .servant. But while I was going to 
university, I got worried about not finding a job. There was no 
employment for veiled women. De.spite this, I always wanted to 
work. Being a housewife always seemed boring to me. As I have 
seen with my mother and aunt, it’s really tiring and unpleasant. My 
one wish was to be a teacher. Sometimes I u.sed to think that if my 
financial situation was good then I wouldn’t work. But once I got 
sick and had to spend 15 days at home. This bored me terribly.
'Working is a savior for me. I am used to it now, and I cannot quit.
Nothing satisfies me but working, but in the future, after I have 
kids, I may quit the job until they are old enough to go to school.
The working conditions are really hard at the school.”
In this example, working is seen as a ‘savior’ that helps women to escape a 
dull life and traditional roles. 'Working is desirable not in terms of its mission for 
Islam, or due to a poor financial situation, but because of its contributions to Nursen 
as an individual. Again, being a hoiusewife is seen as worthless.
192
This idea develops as part of the ‘professional woman’ identity. The same
point of view does not hold for working-class veiled women. Being a professional
woman has contributed to their altered perception of housewife status. There is
tension here, because inherent in the Islamic standpoint are certain domestic
obligations. Separate from this, though, professional women have another branch to
their identity. In justifying working as serving Islam, helping people, and ‘passing
the word’, .social practices are legitimized through strictly religious themes.
*
The interviews emphasized the.se women’s perception that self-fulfillment 
and housework do not go hand-in-hand. They also revealed the bias that working as a 
professional makes a woman superior to another. The women all underlined that the 
life of a working woman should never be similar to their mothers’ , which was 
deemed ‘boring’ and ‘routine’.
This is a two-edges sword. The women criticize their mothers for not living 
according to all the requirements of the Islamic life, but they also view their 
mother’s ‘hoirsewife life’ as boring and routine. These two points of criticisms 
help define the veiled woman’s perspective.
These women differ from their mothers on two points: First, they adopt the 
radical Islamic posture and accept Islam as their guide for daily life. Second, they 
have a much higher education level. While the mother’s education level is limited to 
primary school, the daughter is a university graduate and working professional. None
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of the study group women’s mothers ever earned a salary. In criticizing their 
mothers, the subjects reveal some personal issues. They try to justify their daily life 
in the framework of Islamic belief, but are also looking to profit from the 
possibilities of modernity. At the same time, they condemn housewife status. In 
other words, veiled Islamic women are influenced by a new model of womanhood. In 
tliis new model, the Islamic faith and elements of modernity- high level education, 
professional employment- articulate with each other.
In general, these women come from social groups that have recently been 
introduced to the opportunities of public participation. They are in the midst of, and 
influenced by, this process of change. The veiled Islamic women organize their daily 
life according to the ‘life cycle of modernity’, but articulate this with their Islamic 
faith. Their faith works to justify everyday life activities that are elements of 
modernity. They explain their aim in working, or the motivation behind getting a job, 
in terms of Islamic principles. In es.sence, the women interviewed focus on the 
‘social significance of working’. They do this because it enables them to justify their 
paradoxical statuses of working woman in the public sphere, and wife and mother in 
domestic sphere. From another perspective, this angle allows the women to 
distinguish themselves from the other women.
The main theme behind this is the veiled women’s conception of the public 
sphere and working life as masculine territory. They, as women, must only enter this 
realm under special conditions, and see the need to spread the word of Islam as one 
such ‘special condition’. By doing this, they work for the sake of the Islamic
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community, and thus for humanity in general. Moreover, from this viewpoint the 
women can also fulfill the Islamic requirements of women in terms of the 
community- good mother and devoted wife. Thus, working fits well with the 
domestic responsibilities of serving and religious enlightening people- in essence, 
serving the community. In this sense, working is seen as a continuation of domestic 
duty.
However, these forms of justification are based on ‘ideas’. According to Max
*
Weber, it is not ideas, but interests, that guide social practices. In his study, Weber,
according to Swidler(I992), develops a powerful theory of religious change.
“...Weber’s starting point is deceptively simple: people pursue their 
interests. But among the weapons people use in their struggles are 
ideas...Weber’s studies show how ideas, created to serve group 
interests, come to define the very world within which interests can 
be formulated’’(Swidler, 1992: X)
With this in mind, I will examine why veiled professional working women are 
interested in being employed: Does employment offer a definite ‘personal 
experience’? What do they gain through working- money, status, respect, and/or 
power?
5.1.2. WHAT INTERESTS VEILED WOMEN ABOUT WORKING?
To sum up the previous section, in describing their basic reasons for 
working, the women I studied claim they are passing on the word of Islam and 
performing social missions. However, in talking about the work experince more in
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terms of daily experience, they say their jobs provide personal fulfillment and help 
them define their identity.
From this perspective, they consider housewifery and housework should not 
be the only target of the working professional woman. They stress that women who 
have a profession should exercise their talents outside the home, and should receive a 
salary for doing so. In other words, these women see the option of seeking 
employment outside of the domestic realm as a given. In their thinking ‘outside’ 
offers new possibilities. The public sphere is seen to offer many possibilities and 
satisfaction than the domestic one. It is also assumed that the woman’s status as a 
working person potentially affects her status, and her relationships in the domestic 
sphere.
In other words, these women follow some of the thinking promoted in 
modernization theories, whereby if a woman participates in social and economic life, 
she will be empowered by this. The condition they apply, however, is that it is not 
the ‘modern woman’ defined by these theories who takes this action, but a woman 
who embodies the influence of Islam. In other words, the condition for women 
working is that they carry values of the private sphere with them into the public 
sphere.
Esra, another of the dentists, voiced some interesting ideas about this:
“Our financial situation is not very good, but we do have 
some money, this means, we do not need my earn. Working has 
just become a habit for me. I have a profession. I didn’t work until 
my son was 9 months old. This makes rhe miss my job. Your
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profession becomes a part of you. You feel happy when you are 
working. Material things do not make big impressions. ...You just 
feel happy that you’re part of something. Moreover, you have 
become a dentist through very hard work- a lot of effort. Dentistry 
is really a difficult profession. Plus, conditions were tough at 
school for veiled girls. I struggled ...After finally getting that 
diploma, it wouldn’t be fair that I stay at home, wash dishes, and 
waste time. I have a maid in the house. She can do every 
housework to me.”
Esra makes the point that domestic work is worthless, and not something to 
which professional women aspire. Daily jobs around the house are seen extremely 
dull. Interestingly, in constantly linking these jobs to women, Esra conveys her 
acceptance of the traditional gender-ba.sed division of labor. Instead of choosing to 
change the role system at home and request that her husband share the housework, 
she .sees her maid as the only viable option to release her from these mundane jobs.
Nursen, another dentist, expresses a similar view in describing the effect of 
working has on forming women’s personalities.
“ I entered a society that I felt close to. I attended their 
courses. It was useful for me, and helped me improve myself. It 
helped me realize what I really wanted in life? Then I decided to be 
a dentist. Sometimes I couldn’t decide whether I wanted to work or 
not. There were even times I thought about not working at all. But 
later, as I said, you can get to places with that identity of dentists.
It is not right to stifle your talent by being a housewife after all this 
effort. There are many people waiting for your service. I thought all 
of the.se things, and ultimately decided to go work.”
Here, again, it is emphasized that roles for women that are limited to the 
domestic sphere somehow ‘dull’ them. Nursen also notes that women’s struggles in 
education should be continued in the working world as well. This notion is in line 
with sociological reality. We have seen young veiled women as the most active 
players in the fight for rights to continue receiving education while in Islamic dress.
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It follows that they will continue these struggles in the working world as well.“^
Guler told me that she believes having a life outside the household is good for 
not only for herself, but also for her children.
“ According to me, the woman who becomes just a good 
mother or wife is inadequate. She will fail at bringing up her child 
in the best way. If she is not working, she should apply herself to 
something else, learn something. If she is able, she should work.
For example, I don’t teach boy’s classes and I don’t want to. All 
our students are girls and this is a situation where I feel 
comfortable. I do not come in contact with any men at work, and 
this suits me.”
•
Guler’s words are important in that they talk about places women should and 
should not work. In implying that there is a suitable environment, and, hence an 
unsuitable one, for women’s work, she defines some of the limits to women’s 
participation in the public sphere. This definition is made with respect to 
relationships with men. In Guler’s terms, the appropriate environment is defined as 
one that includes no men.
The implicit theory behind this is the idea that the housewifery as the only
 ^ There are no statistics about the percentage of women who did not work after obtaining a 
university degree. But we can say that the reason of not studying not only stemmed from the 
women’s conditions. Ivy Papps study on the employers attitude towards the women as a 
cause of working or not working is very interesting one from this point of view. According 
to Papps “ ...just as there is a body of literature dealing with the effect of Islam on women’s 
attitudes to employment, there are some studies of the attitudes of employers to the 
employment of the women. ...The cultural attitudes with respect to the social interaction of 
men and women are more closely related to attitudes to working women” (1993,114). 
Therefore, the participation of the women into work force is not only related with religious 
ideology. But other factors, such as employer’s attitude, general cultural codes about the 
working of women, and the existence of sufficient employment possibilities are all related to
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role of the woman, is dull, and life outside the home offers women opportunities to 
be free and develop their talents. Moreover, Guler’s view drives home the notion 
that a woman should be exploring opportunities outside the house. Still, they should 
be doing so within certain borders- these being no contact with men at work, and to 
neglect of life at home. The difference between veiled women and others is their way 
of expressing and legitimizing the,se limits. The requirements of faith and its lifestyle 
must be validated through relationships in the public sphere, research has shown that, 
in the Islamic movement, the private sphere has absorbed the public sphere, and that 
the major division between public and private has disappeared. This situation hints of 
a radical change from the traditional organization of the public sphere. Now this 
realm is a place where the differences within are expres.sed, rather than one whose 
elements are all similar.(Alankus-Kural, 1997)
It is clear that the concepts of working and having a profession are major 
players in the identities of the women I studied. In terms of these identity building 
blocks of profession and working life, their only relationship with an Islamic voice is 
the legitimacy that comes from interpretations such as ‘Allah loves the working 
person; people should work’. Serap, the civil engineer, expresses this idea:
“As women, we have to know our rights in Islam. Our 
religion doesn’t say much about money or material things. But 
there are also other things. One must not be in contact with men, 
and must not neglect family life. You have work only with 
considering this point of view. You need to look at the Koran, and 
at what our Prophet said. For example, there is a story that one day 
our Prophet was walking about, and He passed by, but did not 
greet, a group of people who were sitting and talking about one 
person. Yet he talked to a Jewish man who was all sweaty from
these issues.
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working, the meaning behind this tale is that, to our Prophet, 
working and education were very important. By learning such 
things, we can more easily challenge those who tell us to stay at 
home. We have studied hard, and spent many sleepless nights, so 
why should we stay at home? The working woman can spread the 
word of her religion better than those who stay at home; this is 
what I do.”
Scrap’s comments reiterate some of the conditions that devout Islamic 
women must meet in order to have a working life. She portrays work as a natural 
desire, and conceptualizes it as a way to practice what her religion preaches. She sees 
working as a natural extension of education and as a modern demand. Yet she 
outlines the conditions under which women are allowed to work according to Islam. 
Again, we see that two different trains of thought are intermingled.
Many of the .subjects of this research see their working environment in which 
they can improve themselves. On the other hand, the people with whom, in which 
style, and places where women may work are defined by the word of Islam. Their 
faith also dictates the need for separation of the sexes. In other words, the rules for 
working women are set by certain values that are brought into the working part of 
their life. For women who wish to work or participate in the public sphere, this is 
only possible if they carry with them these values. It means that, the case for veiled 
women for the participation in public affairs is quite different. Their special values 
serve to define the public area conditions under which they can work. In a sense, they 
carve out a unique space for themselves. Thus, these women make it necessary to 
debate again what ‘public’ means.
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Although the women had a negative view of domestic work as a sole 
occupation, all were in favor of jobs that do not interfere with the connection 
between women, their children, and home. In particular, the older women were 
careful to highlight that roles at home were important to them. For example, Emel, a 
kindergarten teacher and the oldest woman in the research group claimed that her 
work was ideal for a woman because it allowed her to fulfill her roles at home:
“Our working hours are convenient. In winter, work ends 
after the afternoon ‘namaz’(specific worship in Islam. It is 
performed at five times a day). My children are of school age, but 
nothing has changed even though they are old,er now. The house is 
still clean, and we always have meals on the table at the proper 
times. When the time came that I realized I was Just sitting at 
home, I went to work. Everyone says that I brought up my children 
perfectly. Thank God for that; they are good children.”
Cleraly, Emel sees her children’s being well brought up and the house’s 
cleanliness as positives that boost her ‘status’. She conveys that one is only 
appreciated as a woman when she performs her roles at home in an acceptable way. 
In contrast to the other examples, where being a housewife was rated poorly, it seems 
that for other women this is a source of prestige. Different from all the other women, 
Emel explains the way she began working as follows:
“My husband was working with his brother. After a while, 
the work went sour and they decided to work separately. My 
husband couldn’t do it by himself Our children had already grown 
up and I was thinking that it was a pity that I had this education but 
was doing nothing with it. I was no different than my sister- in - 
law. There was a difference in the school stages our children were 
at, yes, but this wasn’t significant. I began to get bored at home.
We were attending the meetings of a religious community then. My 
husband was going to the men’s meetings and I was going to the 
women’s meetings, which were on Friday afternoons. I had some 
friends working there. I saw that when they were talking, they got 
much more respect than I did. When they are addressed they are all 
called ‘lawyer’, ‘pharmacist’ or ‘doctor’. The housewives all sit in 
silence.”
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Her words imply that working women have more status than housewives. In 
the previous paragraph, it was mentioned that duties at home must not be neglected 
and that success in these increased prestige, but the quote above indicates again that 
being a housewife is inadequate in the eyes of professional women. Literate and 
professional women must demonstrate their differences by working. Emel, like Esra, 
sees working women as having more status than others, and stresses that this status is 
not achieved with a diploma alone, but through working outside the home. It is 
necessary to have a working life, which comes from acquiring a profession through 
univeisity education. There is an important point here. Working women see 
themselves as different from other women in terms of their education, professional 
occupation, and working situation. They want to distinguish themselves from other 
women, these so called ‘housewives’. As well, they want to differentiate themselves 
from the Western looked self-focused women. What they want to embody is neither 
traditional housewife womanhood, nor the Western looked modern women.
In her study, Sherifa Zuhur (1992) has shown the effects of socioeconomic 
factors and idealized types of women in the developing of specific forms of Islamic 
femininity forms in contemporary Egypt.
“...During the processes of self-imaging, women reflect 
values and specific qualities of femininity that are similar to those 
of others in their milieu. Sets of moral values, life goals, and 
cultural orientations are transmitted to women through a variety of 
sources. Women choose consciously or unconsciously to adopt 
these values as part of the self-identificatory process.” (1992: 6)
The social relations network also has significant impact on women’s ideas and 
interests. Islamic women’s social networks have helped form these women’s 
perception of themselves and others. Moreover, the effect of Islamic discourse on
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women’s lives is realized through these networks, because society is produced, 
reproduced and transformed within these systems. In other words, the mechanisms of 
subordination of, and control over, these women are developed within the boundaries 
of social networks, as are the strategies for resistance to these mechanisms. The 
Islamic women’s social network influences the ideas and interests of its members. 
The women I interviewed demonstrate these points in their comments. Their 
discussion of the conditions of work required by Islam is an example. All the 
subjects agreed that having a job and performing that job benefits women on an 
emotional level, and that remaining unemployed as a housewife was a negative, 
stifling experience. Helping to prevent themselves from becoming too self-focused is 
Islam’s view that it is unacceptable to neglect female roles in the home. It is also 
believed that women’s job should be different from men’s so as not to interfere with 
the women’s duties at home.
Emel’s thoughts do not exactly follow this line, however:
“...I mean, without hampering the house, because work would 
not be a pleasure anymore if the home fire burned out. That fire 
should always be kept burning. And who will keep it burning? This 
is the reason women need to find appropriate jobs. Don’t get me 
wrong. Don’t say that women cannot manage those very 
demanding jobs. Women can do any job men can do. The woman 
can be a doctor or an engineer; she can be whatever she wants to 
be, but if a woman does these jobs she will be neglecting her home 
life. I tell my daughters these things. One of them wants to do 
medicine and the other wants to be a civil engineer. These are 
good goals, but they will have difficulties when they get married.
It’s a pity for their children too. But if they chose not to work, then 
I would be sad for the effort that they had invested to that point.
That’s why a person must make careful decisions about what to do 
with their life.”
Accent is put on working and on carrying out household and family 
responsibilities. For Emel, the facts that she is older, she delayed starting work, and.
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most important, her working environment involves no men, much like working at 
home seem to have influenced her opinions. We see that women who meet different 
types of people at work, and who work alongside men, tend to challenge some of 
these ideas, and have different opinions about the division of labor at home. This 
topic will be discussed in another chapter. In short, the women studied here see 
housework as stifling, and consider the working environment a place where they can 
improve themselves. Almost all of them agree that women’s jobs should not disrupt 
home life, while they believe women are capable of doing any type of work.
The reason for their view is that women have seen that working does not 
cause any deterioration in their life at home. Feride Acar’s (1990) research on veiled 
university student girls showed that, although veiled girls seem to accept the sexist 
discourse of the Islamic movement and the classic patriarchal system, they try to 
overcome these conflicts not by giving up the job but, by working in a more suitable 
job, and by using the fact that they are spreading the Islamic word to force their 
husbands to change the traditional roles and implement equal division of labor at 
home.
As a result, women’s working lives have meant changes in relationships and 
work sharing in the private realm. This has demanded revision of Islam’s stance on 
relationships between men and women. But we need to be clear here that what we 
refer to is their private relationships, and that the only accepted relationship between 
man and woman is that of marriage.
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In summary, the conditions under which devout Islamic women are allowed 
to work are idealized according to the rules of Islamic discourse. They involve 
separation of the sexes, limited contact with men, and uninterrupted devotion to 
domestic responsibility.
Safia Mohsen’s (1996) research on the working class women in Egypt is very 
illuminating in terms of women’s strategies with regard to their changing lives.
“ ...Egyptian working class women have shown a great deal 
of adaptability in dealing with the changing economic and social 
realities in Egyptian society, evidence indicates that they are 
somewhat disoriented by the changes occurring around them. It is 
one thing to maintain resiliency within the domestic sphere, and 
quite another to face upheavals in situations in which one has little 
training or sense of belonging . In Egypt and throughout the Middle 
East, there is a lag between the new roles impelled by current 
economic demands and the persistence of traditional values 
regarding women’s domestic re.sponsibilities”(1996: 71)
However, in contrast to this, with regard to fulfilling domestic responsibilities 
while working outside the home, the women I interviewed were under the pressure of 
religious faith rather than traditional values. They do their best to meet their domestic 
obligations, and justify working with the religious ‘obligation’ to serve the 
community. In truth, as women, they have personal interests about their working 
experience.
In other words, the reasoning behind the working experience of these women 
is framed by religion. However, as social agents, they enter a kind of bargaining or 
negotiation process with the traditional and religious dialogues. What they
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experience is a ‘womanhood’ that is an amalgamation of the ideal Islamic worldview 
and modern social practice. The major principles of this womanhood model are 
piety, modesty, and chastity. Therefore, all social practices, including the work 
experience and its limitations and rules, are built on these principles.
Even more, the experiences of the professional veiled woman within these 
borders in work and social activity has led to a réévaluation of the traditional 
concepts of piety, modesty and chastity. The stance of the Islamist movement is that 
what determines a woman’s modesty is not her social participation, but her ‘conduct’ 
and her relations with men. Hence, her social and economic participation itself is not 
ignored, but the major emphases are placed on regulating this activity with respect to 
man-woman relationships and fulfilling domestic responsibility.
How does working impact this regulation of domestic relations? How does 
the working status of veiled women affect their domestic life, in particular the 
husband-wife relationship? Does professional working status affect the domestic 
division of labor? The next chapter will address these questions.
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CHAPTER VI
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE
It is hard to draw a line between the public and private spheres, but, in 
general, the private sphere consists of the relationships of marriage, family, and 
friendship. In this side of life, intimate relationships are formed according to the 
individual’s wishes. However, these relationships still involve power struggles, and 
are influenced by the dominant discourses that prevail in the public sphere. The 
dominant discourses and ideologies of societal life permeate both the public and 
private realms, and the two spheres affect each other as well.
According to Nükhet Sirman (1990; 247-77), in order to understand the roles 
and statuses of women within a given society - which means in order to understand 
how the male dominant system works and how power relationships between the 
genders are formed within a given society - we must look at the ways in which given 
social relations and ideologies are understood and used by social agents. Every social 
structure has certain channels through which individuals can take action or .seek self 
fulfillment.* To be able to understand the real situations women face in a given 
society we must speculate from the ways women challenge or bargain with the 
existing system (Kandiyoti, 1988)
' Social structure and agent relationship is an active and interactional system. See (Giddens, 
1987), (Rubin and Rubin, 1995), and (Bourdieu, 1996), and also (Touraine, 1984)
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In addition, the position of women in society cannot be understood by 
considering only their roles in domestic sphere relationships. The meaning of 
womanhood and the power struggles in the private sphere are established within a 
larger context“. Veiled Islamic women, as social actors in a larger societal system, 
form their womanhood and relationship patterns in both spheres, with reference not 
only to Islamic discourse, but also with an eye to the existing dominant discourses on 
gender relations.
The political Islamic discourse that proposes the establishment of Islamic life 
has existed in Turkish society in the last decades. The major aim of dialogue is to 
project Islamic arguments and assertions in all spheres of life, including public 
relationships and marital ones. In this context, Islamism emphasizes the significance 
of family life. The family is considered a primary unit for ritual observance, as well 
as a place that influences religious education and transmits religious knowledge 
from one generation to the next. “It means that family serves as a locus for 
developing notions of tru.st, authority, and responsibility. In short, the family-and its 
primary expression in domestic space, the household-is frequently taken as a 
microcosm of the desired moral order.”( Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996. 83) This 
politically defined familial model requires a specific form of devoted relationship 
between spouses. This model conduct is emphasized not only for relationships 
within families, but for all types of social relationships.
For feminist arguments about the transivity between the public and private spheres. See
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In other words, the Islamic discourse calls for a new code that governs all the 
social agent’s daily activities, relationships, and behavioral patterns. Relationships in 
the private sphere are more deeply affected by this Islamic ethos, because it is 
assumed that the reproduction and transmission of Islamic discourse takes place in 
this part of life. In the Islamic schema, women evaluate the meaning of marriage, the 
relationships with spou.ses, and relations with children all according to the Islamic 
discourse. However, the social agents of Islamic discourse also reflect other ‘subject 
positions’ that are formed within modern capitalist society. Like the women in this 
study, some are not only Islamists, but are also professional working women. As 
such, they develop their meaning of marriage and shift their roles in the domestic 
division of labor in reference to their Islamic stance and their other subject positions.
Deniz Kanidyoti (1991a) as.serts that it is impossible to analyze the position 
and statuses of women in the Middle Eastern countries only within the context of 
Islam. She emphasizes the relationships between the Islamic discourse and the 
patriarchal system in terms of their common male dominant character.
According to Kandiyoti,
“...different systems of male dominance, and their internal 
variations according to class and ethnicity, exercise an influence 
that inflects and modifies the actual practice of Islam as well as the 
ideological constructions of what may be regarded as properly 
Islamic. Religious practice is necessarily influenced by the history 
of productive and reproductive relations between the genders, as 
reflected in the workings of different indigenous kinship systems. It 
may be, and has been argued, that the spread of Islam has expedited 
the demise of varied local systems in favor of a more uniformly 
patriarchal mode, with an emphasis on patrilineality and 
patrilocality, and which characteristic modes of control of female 
.sexuality and spatial mobility...Islam cut across these ideal types 
and extends well beyond them. Even though Islam brings its own
(Elshtain, 1981),  and (Landes, 1998).
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prescriptions to bear on gender relations in each context, it 
nonetheless achieves different accommodations with the diverse 
cultural complexes it encounters” (1991a:38).
In this chapter, I will draw on the above points to explain how, by articulating 
different discourses, veiled professional women formulate their meaning of marriage 
and define their roles in the domestic division of labor. I will also try to trace these 
women’s relationships with, and expectations of, their children. Specifically, I will 
fii st summarize the meaning of marriage in the original Islamic discourse, and will 
delve into the ‘marriage experience’ of the women I interviewed. Second, I will 
attempt to explain the strategies veiled women use to organize the domestic division 
of labor with their husbands. Last, I will concentrate on what the.se women expect 
from their children , and shed some light on the mother-child connection.
6.1 VEILED WOMEN IN  MARRIAGE
6.1.1 MARRIAGE IN ISLAM:
In Koranic terms, marriage is, in fact, a flexible arrangement arrived at by mutual 
consent, where women are expected to be ‘obedient’ but, in return, can expect to live 
in the style to which they had been accustomed before marriage. Marriage itself is 
negotiated in terms of a contract that is binding on both parties, and, for the 
consummation of marriage, the contract includes an obligatory payment, or ‘mehr’, 
from husband to wife (Nisa surah 4:4 and 4:24). Within marriage, not only are men 
expected to maintain their wives (4:34 and 2:236), but they must also treat them with
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kindness (2:238). Furthermore, they must pay an additional fee for mothers who 
agree to nurse their babies(2:233).
As an institution, marriage is praised and celibacy is generally seen as 
undesirable. In fact, marriage is one of the signs of the goodne.ss of Allah: ‘Among 
His signs is the fact that he has created spouses for you among yourselves so that you 
may console your selves with them. He has planted love and mercy between you; in 
that are signs for people who reflect’( Rum surah, 30:21). Thus, marriage is seen as a 
refuge of love and kindness for men and women, a'domain of mutual intimacy, 
comfort and protection, and women commentators tend to underline the importance 
of both partners in securing this haven of happiness (Afshar, 1995: 22).
In other words, marriage has not been ordained as a once and for all institution; it 
is embedded in a revocable contract. As mentioned, in the ideal Islamic marriage, 
women are paid a mehr. It is the woman herself who decides whether or not to 
consent to the marriage and receive the mehr (Afshar, 1993: 10). By this description, 
the Islamic marriage that is idealized in the original Koran is a flexible arrangement 
between consenting partners who can part when they please. “Although the Koran 
advises believers to seek reconciliation within marriage whenever possible (4:35; 
2:28), when such efforts fail it requires that Muslim men should make reasonable 
provisions for their divorced wives (2:3429, retain them in honor or allow them to go 
in kindness (2:229). There is no shame attached to divorce, and divorced men and 
women can meet and remarry (2:235)” (Afshar, 1993: 10) Also, in Islam, women 
who remain married and bear children achieve a high and respectable status, that of
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motherhood. Despite their differing interpretations of marital roles and duties, the 
proponents of Islam remain convinced that it is the recognition of the marital and 
reproductive obligations of women, and the earthly and heavenly rewards allocated 
to it, that makes Islam so very appreciated by many women the world over. It is a 
heavenly duty; Islam abhors celibacy and celebrates married life. It is not so much 
marriage as motherhood that is seen by the devout as the particular privilege of 
women. It is argued that there has been a divine division of labor, and that women 
have been made for domesticity and motherhood, and should adopt this role 
willingly.
According to Bouhdiba (1985), marriage has social meaning. He says in an 
Islamic message, “Nikah (Islamic wedding) involves a public acknowledgement, and 
therefore cannot be reduced simply to a justification of the sexual bond. Marriage is 
the act that gives a concrete form to the order of existence and gives sexuality a new 
significance. Nikah is coitus transcended... Nikah as an instigator of taboos and as a 
specific form of relation with the sacred through the sexual, sexual intercourse is one 
of the pillars of nikah. What is now understood is that the parallel between the sacral 
and the sexual is beyond question... Nikah is much a magical operation. It implies a 
veritable sacralization of man, who has become conscious of his body and of his soul 
and of the mystical links with nature and with God. Nikah, therefore, is the legal 
form of the sexual relation”(1985: 28) The above is an outline of the Islamic 
discourse on marriage. How does this discourse play out in the social agent’s 
everyday life? How do veiled professional married women think about and abide by 
the meaning of marriage in their everyday life?
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6.2 THE MEANING OF M ARRIAGE FOR VEILED PROFESSIONAL  
WOMEN:
6.2.1 ‘ISIAMIC MARRIAGE’ VERSUS‘STATE MARRIAGE’
In the interviews, 1 composed a text for each veiled woman that reflected her 
opinions and her knowledge of self. As I indicated in previous chapters, the 
interviews were done with a focus on the women’s * life stories and particularly 
important life events - education, marriage, starting work, etceteras. But when I 
leread these texts as all- encompassing meaningful systems, it became clear that 
many of the respondents talked about marriage more than anything else. I believe 
that the issues we tend to talk about are those that are most significant in our lives.
Of the .subjects of this study, eight (Nermin, Serap, Güler, Esra, Fatma (Biology 
teacher). Emel, Hülya, Müge) married a friend they had made during their university 
years or a person from another group connection. Only one of the women (Nünsen) 
married a blood relative, but she indicated that they had been not met before they fell 
in the love. The other three (Nurcan, Fatma (literature teacher), Ayse) had arranged
marriages.
All the women described their marriage as a Allah’s bidding - ‘kader’, or 
‘divine(ilahi) meeting’. In this, they emphasize the divine or mystical spirit beyond 
their marriage. The love that exists between spouses is seen as divine union that has
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been directed by the will of ‘Allah’. According to the women’s point of view, since 
‘Allah’ knows and controls everything that happens in the world, their marriage is 
his will. Those who entered arranged marriages stressed the significance of the 
Islamic standpoint in their choice.
Ayse, the pharmacist, who entered an arranged marriage, described the events 
leading up to this as follows:
“Our marriage was arranged. They said that there was a man who 
had a nice personality and held an Islamic point of view. He had 
always been true to his religious obligations *and duties. They had 
in mind for me because they knew that my way of life was Islamic 
as well. They arranged a meeting and I met him. Then we decided 
to marry.’’
Similarly, the literature teacher, Fatma, described how she and her 
husband married:
“My husband is religious, and we met because of his religious 
character. I always said that I would not marry with non religious 
one. Because I thought that I would not marry anyone who wasn’t 
religious because I thought that marriage would only right if the 
spouses were united religiously. My friend’s boyfriend arranged 
our meeting. We grew to like each other, and decided to marry”
These women’s views indicate the importance of religious attitude in the decision 
to marry. They chose men who had strong religious backgrounds, and whom they 
saw were carrying out their religious duties and obligations.
Müge explains her situation differently. She met her husband at work, and
describes the ‘divine union’ with her husband as follows:
“...I had started work at the account office. I always said that I must 
work so I wouldn’t be like my mother. I met with my husband, 
while I was working there. He was excellent. He was a policeman, 
and had a distinct and powerful Islamic standpoint. I was impressed
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with him. His personality was very different-perfect. He was 
always patient. He was a real Muslim. For a while we were 
friends. Then he explained how he felt about me, and we decided to 
marry as soon as possible after that. I have learned much from him. 
I have learned the meaning of being a real Muslim. I owe him a 
lot.”
Miige’s words say something different from the others. She underlines the 
significance of a divine meeting and ‘divine love’ with regard to marriage. Like her 
counterparts, slic stresses the importance of the Islamic standpoint in terms of 
selecting a spouse. Müge also attributes a special meaning to marriage, the passing of 
the Islamic point of view to new generations. In this sense, marriage is perceived as 
political, an instrument for the expansion of Islamic consciousness and the spread of 
Islamic ideas. Hiilya’s comments are little big different. To her, the meaning of 
marriage is in its divine spirit.
“ Marriage is the only association permitted between women and 
men. This is the only way. Other relationships are sinful and 
unlawful, illegitimate. We loved each other immediately. It was the 
love of ‘Allah’. I loved him, because he was religious, and he was 
on the path of Allah. He knew a lot about Islam and Islamic 
history. He impressed me. We married in our university years. My 
family didn’t accept my marriage. They opposed it. But we 
married... we married religiously. When we started to live together 
we had a religious ‘nikah’”
Hülya’s words convey this common conception of marriage as a divinely guided 
institution by which men and women must abide .The interesting point here again is 
the man’s religious standpoint. The man’s knowledge of religious issues seems to 
greatly influence these women’s decisions. Thus, religious knowledge is a form of 
power for the man, because the degree of knowledge affects the way women 
perceive the man.
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The other significant point of note in this account is the distinction between the 
religious marriage and the state marriage. All the respondents, including those who 
married university friends, indicated that they had a religious marriage ('imam 
nikahı') when they entered a intimate friendship with their husbands-to-be. But they 
all went on to say that this form of 'nikah' was not sufficient, that every woman 
should also have a 'state marriage'.
The way veiled women differentiate the legal from the religious marriage gives 
some clues about the bases on which they build their lives. The religious marriage 
belongs to spiritual sphere, but the state or legal marriage is deemed necessary with 
regard to material things of everyday life. It seems that women must have a religious 
‘nikah’ to abide by the will of Allah to obtain his permission to marry. However, the 
state marriage provides protection for women in case the marriage ends in divorce. In 
brief, there are two sides to married life- the material and the spiritual. The so-called 
‘state marriage’ is associated with the material side.
The primary school teacher, Fatma, talked about the state and religious marriage.
“ ...today, there are very few people who truly live Islam. As a 
re.sult, there are some disadvantages to having only a religious 
wedding, because if divorce occurs the woman will devastated 
financially. And today divorce is not the only important problem.
Men are being unfaithful. What can öne say about this? Allah gave 
people the power to live alone, but how are you going to care your 
child in this situation? Faith does not make you materially well off.
1 know a woman who lost everything when she and her husband 
divorced, because she didn’t have a state marriage. Her family and 
neighbors looked after her, but if she had had a state marriage, she 
would at least have gotten money from her husband for the sake of 
child. The state guarantees the woman a future. The religious 
marriage makes you wi.se in front of Allah. Through it, you get his 
permission to marry. In its essence, the religious marriage is more
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important to me, but with the state marriage I guaranteed my future 
and that of my child”.
These words clarify that each of these two rites has a different focus- material
needs versus spiritual ones. The state is seen as an institution that protects the rights
of women. All of the interviewed women insi,sted on the term ‘state’ in their
reference to legal marriage. In the context of marriage, this word has a very specific
meaning. It seems paradoxical that, in some cases, the same ‘state’ is criticized for
its restrictions with regard to the veiling issue. Where marriage is concerned, it is the
protector of women, shielding them from the inner weaknesses of the Islamic
discourse. The veiled Islamic women are rational social agents who watch their own
backs. Whenever their interest are subordinated by the Islamic discourse, they look
for other dialogues that would guarantee them more rights.'^ Similarly, Fatma, a
‘biology’ teacher at the lycee, explained her experience as follows;
“...the religious marriage is relevant to the individuals’ inner 
worlds. With the religious marriage you ask Allah’s permission. It 
is said that marriages that do not have a religious marriage are not 
true marriages. Allah did not see them happen, so his 
‘merhamet’(wise) is not a part of the marriage. We had two 
religious marriage. The first one was the real one. We had it when 
we were very young, in our university years. We were friends.
There were some closeness, some emotional sharing between us, 
so we decided to have a religious marriage. We had it in Balıkesir 
without our families’ permission. Then we had another one before 
our state marriage, and our families took part. We had the first one 
so we could be blesses by God...the state marriage does not give 
this kind of spiritual feeling. The state marriage only provides 
women with worldly affairs. For example, if a woman’s husband 
has state insurance, she is also entitled to this. This is what is
It is very arguable that How much right and protection does the modern Turkish state 
requires for the women. The divorce and the sharing of familial properties after the divorce 
is still highly arguable issue in Turkish parliament.
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needed in today’s world, so I think that the two of them(state and 
religious one) should be done together.”
There is a very important point here. Fatma says that her first religious marriage 
was .secret, a ceremony only attended by her and her husband. This is very different 
from the strict Islamic sense of marriage. As stated above, the Koran describes the 
Islamic marriage as declaration of the marriage before the community. But these 
women interpret in as receiving permission from Allah, and being blessed by him. 
Why do they see the religious marriage as receiving ‘Allah’s blessing’? The reason is 
in the Islamic understanding of sexuality and gender relations.
Another interesting point raised in the interviews was that the women see divorce 
as a threat. They see the benefit of the state marriage coming into play mainly in 
cases of marriage breakdown. Divorce seems to be a highly charged issue for these 
women. 1 was not able to identify the causes of this within the .scope of the thesis, but 
I suspect that the .source of the anxiety may be the traditional Islamic belief that a 
man may take four wives simultaneously.
This tension over divorce, and the weakness of the Islamic scripture regarding 
what happens in cases of divorce, seems to contradict the women’s conception of the 
way they were joined with their husbands. They generally described the latter as a 
‘divine’ and ‘mystic’ meeting. But how do thoughts of divorce fit with this ‘divine 
union’? The women seem to see their first meeting and marriage in reference to 
Islamic di.scourse, but view divorce as a phenomenon of modern relationships-part of 
the reality of everyday life.
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The veiled women conceptualize marriage and their particular style of 
marriage on the basis of two main articulating dialogues: Islamic divine rule and 
modern discourse. The way two people come together and the way they begin 
married life are conceptualized within the boundaries of the Islamic discourse. On 
the other hand, since the Islamic marriage does not protect women’s rights in cases 
of divorce, this threat causes them to look to the modern state and its convictions on 
the rights and protection of women. In the Islamic discourse, divorce is 
uncomplicated, and is seen primarily as a man’s right, but when the state’s civil code 
is applied, divorce is another matter. Women’s rights must be upheld. Again, we see 
veiled Islamic women negotiating the terms of the existing discourses in their best 
interests.
The women employ a similar strategy in their approach to the domestic division 
of labor. As professional working women, they play roles in the public sphere and 
these extra responsibilities demand that roles and duties at home be reshuffled. They 
use the Islamic discourse to get their husbands to share domestic responsibilities, and 
also use the argument that becoming a working woman means they must function in 
new ways- not ju.st within the family and the community, but also as part of the state 
and the economy.
As Mervat Hatem (1998) pointed out in her study of modernist and feminist 
discourses in 19'’' century Egypt, “... when women were offered or struggled for 
more public roles, these made no allowance for their continued- and perhaps
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enhanced- domestic responsibilities and nurturing roles, placing them under 
enormous strain” (1998: 73-89)
In the following sections, I will analyze the ways in which Islamic women are 
dealing with these strains.
6.2.2. WHAT DOES MARRIAGE M EAN TO VEILED PROFESSIONAL 
WOMEN?
For the Islamic women, I interviewed, the meaning of marriage is defined 
according to the Islamic discourse on marriage, here, marriage is seen as a 
requirement of Islam, because it is through the ‘nikah’ and the contract of marriage 
that man and wife become legally and reproductively connected to each other.
According to Bouhdiba,
“The muhsana is the person who, by virtue of legal marriage is 
exclusively reserved to his or her spouse. Any sexual relation 
outside marriage or concubine is reprehensible. Premarital relations 
are condemned. Nevertheless this kind of sin is quite minimal 
beside that committed by a married man with a woman who may 
have a husband. ... Nikah creates ihsan. Hence the very special 
importance attached to it by Islamic tradition, which distinguishes 
between marriage (nikah) and coitus. However we should not lose 
sight of the strictly sociological sense of nikah. It involves a vow, a 
public acknowledgement, and therefore cannot be reduced simply 
to a legitimization of the sexual bond. Marriage is the act that gives 
a concrete form to the other of existence and gives sexuality a new 
significance. Nikah is coitus tran.scended.”(1985: 15)
From this perspective, marriage is functional aspects of the Islamic discourse on 
sexuality. They guarantee the continuation of the Islamic model on the way the man- 
woman union. The interviewed veiled women formulate their meaning of marriage
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by considering these points of view. Accordingly, the marriage is seen as a basic 
institution that promotes harmony in society.
According to Em el, who is a child psychologist, marriage is sacred, and, as such, 
should be protected.
“...Today, .some women criticize the family and its functions. They 
say that women are oppressed. I think that this theme of 
oppression and subordination should not hold for the marriage 
relationship, because that is a sacred place required by ‘Allah’.
Women are protected in marriage, not oppressed. The family is 
where new genci ations are rai.sed. This is the most important thing.
As mothers, we are rearing our children in the family. As women, 
we have a very important duty. I support the view that everyone 
should marry”
Emel uses the words ‘marriage’ and ‘family’ as virtually one and the same. She 
also attributes a political mission to family and marriage in terms of rising new 
generations that will maintain an Islamic view of the world. In this point of view, the 
institutions of marriage and family are significant not so much on an individual level, 
but for the sake of society and community. The social function of marriage seems to 
be more important than roles that relate to the individual.
Esra, one of the dentists, expresses this, saying:
“Family is the basis of society. Without it society would not work, 
because the family sets out the rules for relations between men and 
women. Though marriage, women and men come to belong to each 
other. I think that every man should marry at the age of 25, 
because once they marry, their position of potential danger to 
society is controlled. The man’s need for sex is different from the 
woman’s. Marriage takes the danger a.spect out of this sexuality.”
These ideas are striking in the way that they assign two main functions to
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marriage and family: First, control and regulation of men’s sexuality, and second, 
the production and reproduction of new generations. This reproduction refers to 
biological reproduction on one hand, and to social and cultural reproduction on the 
other. In my opinion, this view points women as objects whose role is to ensure the 
community’s goodness, and to guarantee men’s wellbeing by satisfying their sexual 
needs. In other words, it is assumed that women exist for men and for children, not 
simply as valued beings in themselves..
Fatma, the literature teacher, expressed different notions:
“Marriage is the mystic union of two people under the will of God.
It is the institution in which man and woman explore each other, 
share everything, and find happiness. The family well-being 
depends solely on mutual respect between husband and wife. This 
respect entails respect for personality, and respect for work. I think 
that respect between spouses is more important than love. Only 
under these conditions can new generations be raised w ell.’’
Through her ideas, Fatma promotes a different view of marriage. The 
‘sharing’ feature of modern marriages appears to be the most important theme for 
her. She also underlines ‘happiness’ as a very important aspect. All the women I 
interviewed married husbands that had their same social background and status, thus 
the union did not translate into higher social status. However, it is significant that 
they feel that marriage improves their worth in the eyes of Allah. They hold this 
view because marriage is seen as sacred, and women are viewed as carrying out their 
most important roles in the community. As active units of marriage and family.
It short, it is clear that the veiled Islamic women I interviewed see marriage 
mostly in terms of its social functions. They consider the reproduction function of
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family to be the most significant one. Family and marriage are considered as one. 
Some of the women also emphasized the individualistic pleasures of marriage. If the 
veiled Islamic women look at married life in these ways, the next question is how do 
they experience gender relations within marriage. Specifically, and with respect to 
their work situation, how do these couples reach agreement on the domestic division 
of labor? The women derive their meaning of marriage from a consideration of its 
role in terms of the community, and the roles of mother and wife are considered 
basic to the marriage institution. So, how do the professional women manage these 
roles in concert with then work life outside the homeT I will focus on this issue in 
the next part of the thesis, and will also explore the que.stion of how real-life 
experience has demanded change in the idealized Islamic discourse and stereotypes.
6.3 THE HUSBAND-WIFE RELATIONSHIP
Veiled women’s real-life experiences may not match the Islamic ideals. As active 
social agents, they develop strategies to accommodate or resist existing systems. As 
we have said, the professional working situation means new roles for women, and 
this new status accompanies them to the domestic sphere. Working women’s 
expectations of their husbands are often different with regard to sharing domestic 
re.sponsibilities.“* participation in social activities and women’s seminars has raised
■' The research that is conducted among the working class women in Istanbul has shown that 
the working position of women may cause the reformulating of division of labor and 
reformulating of power relations among them. .In her study Bolak has tried to explore the 
conjugal power relations in working class households in Istanbul Bolak has indicated the
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the veiled women’s level of consciousness. This has led some to change their 
perception of the spousal relationship, and has altered their expectations of their 
husbands.
Many of the women I interviewed indicated that they were regular participants 
in such activities during their university days. Some said they continue to attend 
these types of gatherings, particularly Koran reading and interpretation groups and 
seminars. All the women made the point that their participation in these activities had 
raised their Islamic consciousness. They also said that women at siich gatherings 
discuss their life experiences at home and in the public sphere. It is evident that, 
through these activities, the women formulate their specific version of ‘public 
opinion’ on everyday political and social issues. The subjects of this thesis said they 
also talked about their relationships and experiences with their husbands at such 
event. Overall, these gatherings are places where the women formulate strategies and 
resistance mechanisms based on the Islamic discourse and on their daily experiences.
I believe these meetings function as producers of Islamic knowledge from the 
female point of view. This function, which involves reinterpretation of Koranic text, 
empowers women in the sense that they develop bargaining tools and modes of 
resisting the Islamic stance on relationships.
However, this was not the only dynamic the study subjects described. Some of the
different forms in which women’s contribution to the family budget translates into intra­
household relations, particularly around issues subject to negotiation and the process of 
negotiation between husband and wife. See Hale Bolak , “ Some Propositions on the 
Conceptualization of Men and Women Relationship in Family” (1990:235-47).
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interviewees mentioned the hierarchical structure that developed at these meetings. 
They pointed out that some women spoke more and took more of a leading role than 
others. Who were those that spoke most? Some of the research subjects said the 
outspoken ones were mostly the wives of men who were leading figures in the 
Islamic ‘cemaat’s (ccommunities). Others said that the most prominent women were 
lho.se who were most cultivated in Islamic issues as well as other subjects.
During the interviews, all of the respondents discussed their relationships with 
their husbands in far more depth than any other issue.· They concentrated on two 
particular themes-sharing of domestic responsibilities and di.sagreements. the 
following di,scussion will centre on the.se topics.
6.3.1 SHARING OF DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITIES:
Veiled professional women interpret the world and run their daily activities from 
the Islamic point of view. They also justify their actions and roles using this 
discourse. However, as Julia Kristeva notes, discourse is not only the basis upon 
which unequal power relationships are built, and within which mechanisms of 
oppression and subordination are validated. There is also opposing dialogue, 
criticism and a call for change in existing power relationships, change that challenges 
inequality. (Moi, 1989)
This change in the existing discourses becomes possible when aspects of 
the Islamic discour.se are combined with aspects of other discourses. On the one
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hand, from their conscious Islamic standpoint, Islamic women ask how they should 
live according to Islamic principles/^ On the other, they adopt their lives to the 
modern system. Inherent in this process are a reexamination of the Islamic discourse 
and its concept of ‘womanhood’, which takes on a new meaning.
The veiled Islamic women consider Islam a ‘metanarrative’(Saktanber, 1995), 
and that they play out the Islamic ideology in their daily lives. This means they 
make Islam their way of life within the boundaries of modern capitalist society 
(Saktanber, 1995). As a result, their life process is neifher an authentic Islamic one, 
nor a modern capitalist one. It is a hybrid one.^ How do these women experience this
 ^This question is taken into account by Anthony Giddens in the context of Anglo-American 
societies at the late modern times. See (Giddens, 1991)
For the evaluation of hybridization concept, the globalization arguments should be taken 
into account. Because hybridization is evaluated as the main parameter of the globalization. 
“... at the general level hybridity concerns the mixture of phenomena which are held to be 
different, separate; hybridization then refers to a cross-category process. ...Hybridization is a 
factor in the reorganization of social spaces structural hybridization, or the emergence of 
new practices of social co-operation and competition, and cultural hybridization, or new 
translocal cultural expressions , are interdependent. New forms of co-operation require and 
evoke new cultural imaginaries....the hybridization perspective releases reflection and 
engagement from the boundaries of nation, community, ethnicity, or class.” Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse (1995) has argued about hybridity as meaningful only as a critique of essentialism . 
So for the veiled women’s subject positions in which they use an essentialist Islamic 
discourse as a guide for their everyday life justification, may not be conceptualized as a 
hybrid form. But at least for their multi sourced subject positions , the hybrid concept can be 
used. (1995: 45-69). Moreover, it can be asserted that the veiled Islamic women had been 
trying to construct their identities with using local codes both in the global forms. In 
Robertson’s (1992) words this is a process of relativization. “that term is meant to indicate 
the ways in which , as globalization proceeds, challenges are increasingly presented to the 
stability of particular perspectives on , and .collective and individual participation in, the
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process? According to interview data, it seems that veiled Islamic women and 
‘other’ women in their extended families accept similar domestic responsibilities. 
This means that instead of criticizing or changing the division of labor to which they 
are accustomed. The women preferred to find their solutions within their current 
system.. In her research on professional Turkish women, Ayse Öncü found that any 
problems relative to these women’s domestic duties are usually solved by hiring 
women from outside the home. According to Öncü: “Rapid urban rural migration and 
scarcity of factory employment result in a large pool of unskilled female labor in the 
large cities, which upper class women are able to exploit. Professional and marital 
roles become compatible because a)domestic labor is available at prices that can be 
afforded by upper and upper middle class families and b) although most families are 
nuclear and neolocal, the extended family network can be relied upon for child 
rearing tasks.’’ (1981: 185)
A similar support mechanism works for professional veiled women, but, this 
solution yields no real change in the way husband and wives assign tasks in the 
home. Still, it should be said that, in some cases, the traditional division of labor is 
being challenged, and these husbands are expected to role-share and perform 
nontraditional domestic jobs.
The expectations from their husbands have risen for other reasons as well. The 
view of marriage not so much as an emotional tie but as a ‘divine union’ assumes 
that if life guided by Islam then the woman must assume her assigned position in 
this system. This actually protects women, because, according to them, this is only
overall globalization process.” (Robertson, 1992). For an interesting study about the local
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possible when men heed the Islam-based rights of women. The interviewed women 
emphasize these points in justifying their demand for more equal sharing of domestic 
re.sponsibilities with their husbands.
Fatma, the literature teacher, explained her view on this issue, saying that she 
demanded more from her husband in terms of domestic work.
“My husband does housework if he wants. It depends on his 
willingness. Sometimes he thinks, T am a man-I cannot do 
housework.’ We talked about everything before marriage. He said,
T won’t do housework.’ I did not accept this, and told him he 
should do as much as po.ssible. But I don’t think this is a reason for 
divorce. It causes some problems, that’s all. For instance, when I 
come home on Saturdays, I want to see that my husband has 
cooked and cleaned the house, because he is at home Saturdays and 
I am working. When I see the house dirty and work waiting for 
me, I become angry, but when he does the housework I am very 
happy. He sometimes sweeps the house and washes the balconies.
He doesn’t think of this as his duty or obligation. He does it 
whenever he wants. I want him to share the housework with me all 
the time. I think that however your marriage starts, it tends to 
continue that way.... I was living with my friends before I got 
married. Once I married, all these responsibilities fell on me. I 
found it very boring and difficult...! think that men don’t share 
housework because they learn this when they are young. They 
grow up with the messages, ‘You are a man. You are privileged.
You should not do housework.’ But if I have a son, I will raise him 
with the message that you should do your housework - it is your 
duty. I want my husband to be helpful, sensible, and to share 
housework.”
Fatma touches on many significant issues here. She asks that her husband 
share the housework. She also mentions the connection between the socialization 
process and adult social roles, criticizing the current ‘male’ model that does not 
share domestic jobs with the woman. It seems that Fatma’s heavy work schedule has
global relation in Turkish context see (Çınar, 1997: 23-41).
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caused her to reexamine the division of labor at home. Since she works longer hours 
than her husband, she demands more sharing, sensibility, and tolerance from him. 
Clearly, she has developed her opinions using modern discourse, and they are in 
tune with the realities of everyday life.
Güler, a history teacher, takes a similar line on this subject.
“ I haven’t had any problems with my husband because we talked 
about everything before we decided to marry. He said ‘You are the 
woman of my dreams. You are everything that I want in a 
woman.’ He did not demand other things from me. He accepts me 
as I am, and always supports me . He doesn’t say, ‘You should do 
this thing’, or ‘Don’t do that thing’. I have always felt very free.
We always agree, and he always shares housework with me. My 
working schedule requires this kind of sharing. He is tolerant and 
helpful. I feel indebted to him.”
These two cases indicate that heavy work schedule is positively correlated 
with questioning the division of labor in the home. It seems that hardworking 
women ask more from their husbands with regard to domestic efforts. In contrast, the 
women who work flexible hours seemed to put no such demands on their partners.
For instance, Emel, who began to work once her children were 
grown, stated:
“I didn’t give up any of my housework responsibilities when I 
started my working life. I want it this way because I think that the 
woman should carry out her household duties perfectly. I go to 
work at nine a.m. and return at four p.m. Also, I have daughters, 
and they help me with the housework. My husband has never 
helped me with this, and I have never asked this of him.”
Again, this accounts supports the contention that working schedule influences 
whether or not husbands are asked to help around the house. In addition, the women 
who have other women helping them - family members or paid maids - also do not
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demand that their partners do any of the housework. Women whose incomes exceed 
their husband’s have the option of employing other women. In other words, the 
upper-middle class veiled professional women are able to, and do, hire other women 
to do their domestic jobs. Those who have family help close by tend to take 
advantage of this. Neither system ‘rocks the traditional boat’ of labor division at 
home, these women do not have the need to shift the existing system. It is the 
material needs of everyday life that cause one to reevaluate these roles and 
relationships. Esra talked about her situation, saying;
“ I hire a woman to help with housework, so there is no problem 
with this issue. I had some problems when the children were small. 
They were waking up very early in the morning, and that was really 
difficult for me. But at these days I have help, so I don’t need to 
ask my husband for any. Sometimes he helps me, but that depends 
whether he wants to or not. I think that the husbands of working 
women should help their wives, because, in my opinion, life is a 
group effort. Husband and wife should be in full agreement. They 
should support each other.”
Esra explains that she solves her housework problems by employing other
women. In doing so, she does not raise the sharing question with her mate. She
thanks him for occasionally helping with some of the work. Further, she even
complains about her husband’s relaxed attitude toward her:
“My husband is very flexible. He does not interfere me, and I 
complain a lot about this. For example, he does not object when our 
child misbehaves. Sometimes he can be very soft. He never gets 
angry with our child. We sometimes disagree about these issues...
Also, I am very free. He never asks me where I am going? I always 
arrange my day as I wish. Sometimes I complain about this too. I 
don’t think his attitude stems form his faith. It’s just part of his 
personality. He is very sensitive, empathetic, and helpful”
Esra speaks of her discontent with her husband’s laid-back approach. She views
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this as a character flaw on his part, which says to me that her views reflect the code 
of patriarchal thinking. This mode of thought holds that, in general, husbands should 
control their wives. If this is not the case, there must be a problem.
Some of the interviewed women indicated the importance of being protected 
under the rules of ‘Islamic marriage’. In doing so, they define the husbands’ role in 
the household by interpreting Islamic discourse in a certain updated way. In other 
words, in superimposing Islam on social practice, the domestic division of labor for 
working women is established by articulating religious discourse with a more 
modern system. The study subjects stressed that it is not possible to translate Islam 
into social practice without women’s efforts. Thus, we need to analyze the elements 
involved in these efforts, and discover how these women incorporate Islam into 
daily life in modern capitalist society.
The interview results showed that women who had arranged marriages demanded 
more help from their husbands around the house. In these marriages, the women 
were using Islamic discourse as a lever, and because of the nature of the marriage, 
this tactic was very effective. These women use the Islamic discourse on gender 
relationships, in particular, when asking their husbands to take more of an active 
role. They point out that Islam assigns women many rights, including the right to 
work, the right to not do housework, and even the right not to nurse babies. They 
also remind their partners that, according to Islam, men are supposed to protect 
women, that they are the ‘kavvam’ (protector, defender) of women, the man should 
attend to the woman’s well being, and this can be accomplished only by supporting
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the woman in every aspect of her life. The argument is that when a man supports his 
wife and helps her with housework, this is a way of protecting her.
Nurcan’s situation is a good example. She says,
“My husband is very helpful. He cooks delicious soups and meals.
He comes home earlier than me, so he cares for our children as 
well.” This is how Nurcan explains her real-life situation. Then 
she adds that this arrangement is supported by the Islamic point of 
view. In other words, she justifies the sharing of duties using 
Islamic point of view. “ Islam gives women certain rights. Women 
in Islam are very sensible, smart. They should be protected. The 
man should do everything he can to protect the woman. He must 
share the housework, and, if the woman is working, the man 
should do more housework. For instance* our ‘efendi’ Hz. 
Muhammad, has done his works by himself in the household. 
Sometimes I tell my husband this. Also we have read some books 
about women’s rights in Islam and Islamic marriage, and we are 
trying to be respectful of each other. Our God told men that 
women were entrusted to their care, and they should protect women 
as much as possible. Islam assigns specific duties to men and 
women. If you perform these duties there is no problem.... Women 
are important in Islam, so they should be protected.”
Nurcan is justifying her husband’s helping in the home by reworking the
Islamic discourse on the protection of women. She uses this as support when she asks
that he participate more in housework and childcare.
Fatma (a biology teacher) had some similar opinions:
“The is.sue of women’s rights is very popular today. Some 
feminists who do not know Islam insist on women’s rights.
Feminists are all single because men don’t like aggressive women.
We Islamic women know our rights in Islam. We demand only 
these rights, no more. It is true that the man who lives Islam 
protects his wife....I think rationally. My husband works longer 
hours than me. He is an engineer, and he comes home very tired. I 
get home before him, so does it make any sense for me to wait for 
him to do the sweeping and cooking? I don’t think these issues 
should be problems between partners. I do all the housework, and 
my husband appreciates me for it. We are happy”
232
Fatma offers a striking demonstration of how ‘feminists’ are ‘etherized’ 
by many veiled Islamic women. She relates the scope of the women’s rights issue 
directly to the Islamic point of view. In this context, such rights include the rights to 
work and to share housework with other women. More importantly, the Islamic 
notion of the man’s superiority over the woman, and his obligation to protect 
women, are also seen as a form of rights for women - the right to protection. On a 
different topic, Nursen, a dentist, explained how the Islamic worldview affects 
spousal relations:
“When we got married, we were in agreement on some issues. He 
promised to support me through every stage of my life. I have won 
the university exam, and he promised to give me permission to 
attend. By giving that permission he supported me. He supports me 
with the housework as well. He never does it himself, but always 
provides money to hire help. He never says that housework is my 
responsibility. He knows the rights of Islamic women prevent you 
from being forced to do housework. My mother-in- law had helped 
me take care of the children, and did housework and cooking too. I 
really appreciate this, and am very indebted to her for that support.
I came to be who I am today with her help, and through the wishes 
of my Allah. My husband’s Islamic faith influences him in a very 
good way. He is always patient, helpful, sensible. He respects my 
rights because he knows they are the will of Allah”.
Here, Nursen thanks her husband and Allah for the opportunity to attend 
university. She does not see this as a right because her ability to go to university 
requires her husband’s approval. She feels fortunate to be given the opportunity. 
Nünsen has the ambition and desire to go to university, but she must frame her 
situation in the context of the Islamic viewpoint, and be thankful for the permission 
to chase her dreams.
The change of women’s lives brought by modern capitalist society has caused 
them to set their sights on new roles and responsibilities outside the domestic realm.
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However, their traditional roles as wives and mothers continue to be important. As a 
result, professional veiled women develop strategies to cope with their tasks in the 
domestic sphere and the public one.
For veiled Islamist women, this is more complicated, because within the 
Islamic discourse the functions of mother and wife are considered women’s primary 
responsibilities. Professional veiled women have developed their strategies by 
partially reinventing Islamic discourse. To get their husbands to help more around 
the house, they maneuver them on the principle that Women should be protected, a 
principle that is at the base of the Islamic worldview in terms of segregation of the 
sexes. This process of levering toward change proves that discourses and ideologies 
are not .stable entities, but are always shifting and changing. Social actors instigate 
these shifts as they lobby for change based on their needs in everyday life.
Parvin Paidar(1996), in her study on feminism and Islam in Iran, has 
identifies the motive behind women’s appeal to ideal Islam to strengthen their 
position in familial and societal life. According to her, in post revolutionary Iran, 
“Islamist feminists out to create a vision of the ‘Ideal Islamic society’ and the role of 
women in it. The idealization of the future Islamic society entailed a critique of the 
past and the present. The Islamist feminist theory of women’s oppression and 
liberation was constructed in opposition to ‘traditional Islam’.The failures of 
traditional Islam were seen as rooted in male-dominated culture and distorted 
interpretations of Islamic laws.” (1996, 60)
234
In this case, veiled professional women use idealized Islamic beliefs about 
women to regulate and their own everyday life in modern capitalist society. Their 
gender identity is formed in this multisource environment. As Nancy Chodorow 
(1995) writes, “...gender is an ongoing emotional creation and intrapsychic 
interpretation, of cultural meanings and of bodily, emotional, and self-other 
experience, all mediated by conscious and unconscious fantasy...Anyone’s 
emotionally and linguistically constructed gender, the personally animated gendered 
self and world she inhabits, is a continuously invoked and reshaped project involving 
self, identity, body imagery...” (1995: 540) Interestingly, this highlights the fact that 
the veiled Islamic women’s gender identity is not stable either, and, logically, nor are 
their coded gender roles.
The major difference between the gender identity of the interviewed veiled 
women and that of other women is the effect of Islamic beliefs and affirmations on 
its construction. In short, these translate into the justification of everyday life 
practices. In my opinion, this mode of justification is what distinguishes Islamic 
women from others. Their vision of life, both as the big picture and as engaging in 
everyday activities, is based on the Islamic belief system. These women have found 
unique ways to justify and legitimize what they do on a daily and whole-life basis 
through Islamic discourse.
Another interesting attitude that was common among most of the women 
interviewed was that regarding the control over, and division of earnings. Many of 
the respondents expressed the opinion that the money they earn belongs to them 
alone. Again they assert that, according to Islam, men have no given right to a 
woman’s income. However, although they state this Islamic view that their money is
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their own , they go on to explain that they spend their income on the basic needs of 
family and children. One of the women (biology teacher Fatma) stated that she spent 
her money on herself, but this was an unusual case where the husband earned much 
more than the other’s husbands.
Fatma (biology teacher) described her situation as follows;
“ I am not working for money. My husband does not need my 
money. I only spend my money on my child or on myself. Our 
religion is the one that protects women the most In Islam, a 
woman’s money belongs to her. She need only give it to a man if 
she wants to. My husband knows this. Anyway, he earns much 
more than I do. I earn money for myself, and my husband gives me 
money as well. Our material situation is very good. I am always 
grateful to Allah for that.”
In contrast, biology teacher Fatma expresses some different views:
“ Life is very expensive today. It is not possible to survive without 
two incomes. But I do not work only for money. But I spend my 
money on our house and pay some of the basic expenses, like rent, 
telephone, and water, electric bills. We do not separate our money. 
We think of the money as ours, and we spend it as we need.”
The above examples illustrate two different financial pictures. Comparison of the 
two shows how wealthy women can use Islam-based principles to justify their 
spendings. We also see that a family’s economic situation governs how much Islamic 
discourse penetrates their everyday financial life. If the economic level is high, 
women justify spending money on themselves by referring to Islamic principles. In 
the account above, Fatma contorts these principles to legitimize her spending on 
herself. She is better off than the other respondents, so she has developed strategies 
linked to Islam that allow her to buy herself things and accumulate her own money.
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In summary, veiled, professional women develop some schemes to cope with 
their required roles and duties in the domestic sphere. These strategies involve 
reworking some of the elements of Islamic discourse, which is a combination of the 
original Islamic text (the Koran) and 'fiqh' texts (interpretation o f the Koran). 
Working outside the home as a professional entails new responsibilities and roles for 
the.se women, still, as followers of Islam, their primary roles are in the domestic 
sphere: reproduction of Islam over generations, as a mothers and devoted wives.
How do professional women juggle these roles? They have to make new 
arrangements in the home. In some cases, a relative helps with housework and 
childcare. In others, the work is shared with husbands in families who are less 
affluent, or is done by hired women in wealthier households. It is striking that two of 
the women employ the Islamic discourse on women’s rights to legitimize their 
situation. These are examples where Islam, as a religion, is used by the subject - is 
transformed into living practice and articulated with her social roles.
In this part of the thesis, we have .seen how the subjects’ ‘working woman’ status 
affects the channels through which Islam flows in daily life. The women’s life 
experiences represent a constant state of flux- from embracing modern opportunities 
to justifying their new ambitions through Islamic principles. This is what 
differentiates veiled Islamic women from other women subjects.
6.4 CO NFLIC T W ITH  HUSBANDS:
The womanhood experienced by veiled Islamic women is one that encompasses
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the elements of Islam as well as modernity. My aim is to identify these elements by 
looking at relationships in the private sphere. In this section, I will concentrate on 
tension and conflict within the marital relationship. The women I interviewed 
reported that their most significant clashes concerned their husband’s casual attitude 
toward Islamic worship. The second key area of conflict involved parenting issues.
6.4.1 RELIGIOUS KNOW LEDGE AND W ORSHIP A S  SO U RCES OF POW ER:
Men and women each draw on different power ‘sources within the marriage 
relationship. For professional working women, it seems that Islamic knowledge and 
regular worship give them a certain degree of control in marriage. Some of the 
interviewed women indicated that they criticized their partner’s casual attitude 
toward worship. It seems that devout Islamic women tend to engage in regular 
worship and read about Islam continuously, whereas many of the men are somewhat 
more relaxed in their approach to their faith.
The pharmacist Ayse described some of her discord with her husband as follows:
“He is not a true Muslim. You can't be a Muslim by simply saying,
'I am a Muslim’. Your actions must bear out your faith. My 
husband is a very angry person. Every night tells me about people 
at his work. According to him, they are all terrible. I tell him, ‘you 
should be more tolerant. Our religion demands this. I think that If 
he really felt Islamic he might not behave this way. He is always 
angry, judging. I tell him that a Muslim man should be patient”
Here, Ayse shows that she has adopted a certain position in reference to Islam. In 
her mind, Islam is an ‘ethic’ that dictates how one should behave toward others. As 
noted above, it seems that, women are more devoted to Islamic principles than men.
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In this case, Ayse criticizes her husband for not complying with the ‘Islamic
personality model’. Taking a slightly wider view of this picture, one can see that this
so-called ethic gives Islamic women some power in their relationships with their
husbands. By requiring that individuals be patient and tolerant, the Islamic standpoint
gives the woman the right to object when her husband is annoyed or impatient with
her. In this way, the Islamic discourse demands a more respectful relationship
between husband and wife. Also, this issue of being respectful of others applies in all
l elationships, not just marital ones. Nermin, a Koran course teacher who is now an
assistant in a Theology Faculty, expresses coneerns similar to Ayse’s:
“In university, he read more and did more research on Islam, but 
these days he doesn’t read or investigate Islam at all. I think that his 
friends have influenced him. In our university years, we acted 
together as Islamists, but starting work brought new 
responsibilities. He has changed. I feel I am more knowledgeable 
than him about the Islamic faith, and about other issues. I always 
remind him that he should perform his duties of worship regularly.’’
Nermin disapproves of her partner’s attitude toward religion. Her advanced 
religious knowledge becomes a source of power for her, one that allows her to 
criticize and judge her husband. In other words, this knowledge becomes a sort of 
bargaining tool in controlling what goes on in relationships at home. More tolerance 
and patience is demanded of husbands through the use of historical religious 
anecdotes and stories.
The above cases involve marriages in which both spouses are religious. Serap, 
who, under the influence of friends, became Islamized after marriage, has a 
nonreligious husband. She describes her major conflict with her husband as follows:
“ Does any woman not have problems?. We live at the mercy of
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Allah. Our main issue is my religious orientation. I discovered the 
greatness of Islam through my friends I met at the ‘vakıf. He 
tells me that I changed after we got married. He always judges me 
for my worship. He says, ' you don't treat me like you do your 
faith'. He is not a religious man. He fasts only during Ramazan.
He drinks alcohol. We fight a lot.”
Serap’s religious orientation has caused a lot of discord in her marriage. The 
various forms of worship, particularly “namaz”, take time. For example, “namaz” 
requires that the body be cleaned in a special way through “abdest” . It appears that 
her husband is Jealous of the time and attention she gives to practicing her faith.
This issue of the attention paid to religiosity by women is common source of 
marital conflict. Women tend to be more devout worshipers in terms of carrying out 
their faithful duties and obligations. In general, they are also inclined to adhere to 
ideologies more closely. The veiled Islamic women I interviewed told me that 
performing their acts of faith regularly and their greater knowledge of Islamic issues 
had given them higher status than other Islamic women. Religious knowledge and 
consistent devotion to faith are instruments of power for Islamic women within their 
marriages.
6.4.2.RAISING  CHILDREN:
The other main area of dispute between the interviewed women and their partners 
is that of parenting and children. All the women said they wanted to raise their 
children as devout .'Muslims. Certainly, the future of Islam depends on the attitude of 
the new generation toward the faith. This means that the domestic sphere -that is.
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family- has a very significant function in “reproducing” the Islamic way of life. How 
are these children raised?
Some of the subjects explained that their husbands were not involved with
bringing up the children, and that the women shouldered this responsibility entirely.
Ayse, the pharmacist, de.scribed her situation as follows:
“I am the one who always takes care of the children. I help them 
with their homework. I want them to be true Muslims- to think like 
a Muslim, behave like a Muslim. This is the way they'll become 
true Muslims. They should be tolerant, full of compassion. Their 
career choice is not important to me. They dan choose whatever 
they like. I just want them to attend university and be trained 
towards some sort of career. But my husband pressures them to go 
into engineering. He says engineering is the best career, and that it 
pays better than others. I do not like money, but he does. So, there 
are problems around this issue. Also, I want them to marry a true 
Muslim woman, and I ’d prefer one who is veiled. If she saw 
similar to me, I would probably really like her.”
Her opinions show that Ayse equates a being a "true Muslim" with being a good 
human being. Her aim is to raise her children with the Islamic ethic. Therefore, she 
politicizes, in a sense, motherhood role. Again, women tend to be more devout 
followers of Islam in terms of daily life activities. As such, for the sake of the Islamic 
community, these mothers want to pass on their unique “Islamic ethos” to the 
younger generation. Women play a more significant role than men in this process. 
Their traditional role as wife and mother is integrated with the “political” Islamic 
discourse that says women’s role in the domestic sphere is to reproduce the Islamic 
way of life. Thus, veiled professional women have added this role of “tebliğ” (or 
spreading the word of Islam) to their list or responsibilities in the public sphere. In 
this way, they justify the fact their “working” status.
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Fatma, the biology teacher, said that her husband offers his input on how to bring 
up their children?
“It is very difficult to raise a child today. TV. and the kids’ friends have a lot of 
impact on what they learn. We, as teachers, try to impart not only knowledge, but 
training them too. I sometimes argue with my husband about how our children 
should be brought up. He tells me that I am too tolerant with them, but I do not think 
so. In my opinion, no one can learn when there is shouting. I want them to be a 
successful, and strong. But my husband wants them ta  be quiet and submissive... I 
do not treat my children any differently based on their sex. I am bringing up my 
daughter the same way I do my son. There is no difference. I anticipate that they will 
be successful and earn university degrees. But I think that girls should choose careers 
that suit them, for instance, teaching, dentistry or pharmacy. ”
All of the interviewed women have aspirations for their children’s future that are 
not specific to gender. However, they do divide careers into two categories, as 
suitable or unsuitable for women. These mothers are trying to pass the Islamic faith 
on to their children, but at the same time they expect them to be successful and have 
a career. They want them to marry devout Muslims as well.
The women’s expectations of their children are in tune with the change in 
values that Turkey has witnessed, particularly in the last two decades. Young men 
and young women;are expected to go further in education and develop more career 
paths than ever before, the type of social mobility that Turkey has experienced has
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influenced these expectations. Interestingly, it seems that parents expect not so much 
an impressive income, but a move up the ladder in terms of family status as an 
offshoot of their children’s success. The aim is to occupy an impressive position in 
the hierarchy of Turkish society, to become members of the “elite”, not capitalists. 
This desire is in line with their heritage as members of the new upwardly social 
clas.ses. They expect their offspring to have prestigious careers.
In brief, the experiences of these interviewed women speak of the ways in 
which the combined efforts of professional life and everyday life have demanded the 
revision on relationships in the private sphere. As working women, they need either 
sharing of, or help with, domestic duties. As devout Islamic women, it is their duty to 
fulfil their domestic responsibilities to perfection. To solve this dilemma, they either 
formulate strategies that will lever their husbands into helping more around the 
liouse, or get assistance from hired women or supportive family members.
These strategies differ according to each woman’s economic class and career. 
The more affluent woman prefers to hire another woman to help her with 
domestic tasks. The woman who is less well off tends to ask a family member to 
help her with housework or childcare. Regarding the husband’s involvement, 
Islamic point of view comes into play. The need to arrange daily life around the 
working situation is justified and legitimized by highlightening religious 
principles on conjugal relations and the protection of women. In this way, some 
husbands are mobilized to help their wives with childcare and housework on the 
basis of Islamic point of view The demand is a necessity of everyday life as a
243
working women, but its style and justification is Islamic in nature. In addition to 
those that need convincing, some men have also started helping of their own 
accord.
The women’s Islamic beliefs and their Islamic identity in the conjugal 
relationship engender the strong opinion that a wife should respect her husband. 
However, still maintaining this respectfulness and modesty, the Islamic point of view 
also gives women powerful cards to play against their husbands with respect to 
domestic division of labor.
In short, the gender identities and gender roles of Islamic women are formed with 
reference to their various “subject positions” and the demands of these positions. 
Being a professional one means that a woman has made certain inroads in 
challenging existing male dominance systems. However, the interesting thing is that 
many of the strategies employed in this process have their roots in Islamic point of 
view, which is, in its essence, patriarchal and subordinative in its stance on women. 
Ultimately, the rules and limits of women’s participation in the public realm are a 
revised version of this Islamic point of view. In the next chapter, I will analyze this 
point in detail.
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CHAPTER VII
RULES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Veiled, professional women represent a different model of womanhood in the 
public sphere. This difference comes not only from their social practices, but from the 
way they justify these. As actors in social life and of Islamic discourse, the veiled 
women’s psyche is comprised of many different subject positions, or stances, and their 
unique identity is molded from this multisourced array. These women play a dual role 
for political Islam. On one side, they represent the Islamic point of view in the public 
sphere and perform the duty of ‘tebliğ’. On the other, as mothers and wives in the 
domestic sphere, they reproduce the Islamic community. They are working, but, at the 
same time, they are the caretakers of their religious community. The identity of the 
veiled professional women springs from the diverse foundation of this double-duty.
As pointed out earlier, these women bring their private sphere values to the 
public sphere. They enter the public realm with an Islamic standpoint. In fact, this 
“privatization” of the public sphere is an important in terms of Islamic point of view, 
because Islam, with its own belief system regarding the world and human relations, 
requires that these relations and beliefs be validated in all spheres of life(Bouhdiba, 
1985). As explained, the womanhood of veiled Islamic women contains components of 
both Islam and modernity. In the previous chapters, I have delved into the mechanisms 
by which this womanhood model is constructed - the articulation of various subject 
positions. These women step onto the public sphere with their distinct womanhood 
model, yet they also challenge, and offer an alternative to existing models of 
womanhood.
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This unique model of participation could, in the long run, change the face 
of the hegemonic model of public sphere in Turkey, as I have discussed in the first 
chapter. The potential for, and likelihood of, this transformation depends heavily on the 
state’s politics toward social and religious differences. This issue, the possibility of a 
l adical democratic transformation in the public sphere, is the subject of detailed theses. 
Within the scope of this .study, I will try to identify the ‘rules’ of participation that the 
professional, veiled women propose.
7. /  D ISTIN C TIO N  BETW EEN  PUBLIC AND  P R IVA TE IN  TH E LITE R A TU R E
As mentioned earlier, it is hard to draw a line between the private sphere 
and the public one. The question of this distinction has been deliberated for centuries,
. r.
and has always been a central feature of liberal political discourse. Classic and 
contemporary texts of political philosophy have debated the understandings of public 
and private with regard to how politics, economics, and domestic life fit together in 
human society (Ackelsberg and Shanley, 1996: 213) In fact, the two spheres have 
always been defined, and have taken on political meaning, in relationship to another.
Aristotle, in defining the public (or political) arena as the realm where free 
and equal citizens engage in striving together toward the common good, distinguished it 
from the private domain, which, he argued, was characterized by relationships of 
inequality, dependence, and concern for meeting the necessities of life (Ackelsberg and 
Shanley, 1996: 213). Aristotle equated the public and political to each other. This was a 
common view until the Marxist and feminist points of view were voiced.
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The early liberal theorists all retained a distinction between the public and 
private domains, but they shifted their focus of attention in significant ways. In addition 
to addressing public and political roles and responsibilities, they attempted to define a 
sphere of privacy as a way of delimiting the power of the state. The source of this 
privacy was considered to be the rights of individuals. The classical liberal view of 
public-private distinction lies in certain assumptions about the ‘natural rights’ of human 
beings. Political philosophers developed the idea that certain natural rights or natural 
laws, known through the exercise of reason which exist a priori. They thus established 
one of the most important moral ideas of the modern“ world: that each individual has 
certain inherent or ‘natural’ rights (Koker, 1992). This view also included the 
presumption that the rational world is superior to, and must control, the nonrational, 
and held that order must be imposed upon the nonordered, the marginal, the other 
world. The theory is that the primacy of human reason, and of its right to rule all other 
aspects of reality, led to male chauvinism. Josephine Donnovan (1985; 33) said that: 
“...inherent in the vaunting of human (male) reason is the idea that rational beings are 
the lords of certainty and have the right to impose their ‘reason’ on all who lack it- 
women, non human creatures, and the earth itself.”
In Western society through the 17"’ and IS'" centuries, the assumption that 
women belonged in the home as wives and mothers was virtually universal. By the 18"’ 
century and particularly in the 19'"’ historical circumstances, notably the industrial 
revolution, separated the workplace from the home, isolating women in the domestic 
sphere. With mechanized factories and the decline of cottage industries the public world 
of work split off from the private world of the home as never before, such tendencies, 
too reinforced the Enlightenment identification of rationalism with the public sphere.
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and non rational and the moral with the private sphere and with women.' The 
presumption that women belong in the family under the aegis of their husband was 
central to male liberal theorists, even those like John Locke, who espoused, at least 
theoretically, natural rights for all people. Locke’s Second Treatise of Government 
(1690) is considered the gospel of natural rights doctrine.“ However, unfortunately, 
Locke did not mean ‘man’ in the generic sense, but in the specific sense of the male of 
the creatures. Accordingly, in Locke’s and subsequent liberal theorist’s views, those 
who formed a social contract for the protection of their lives, their fortunes, and their 
property, were the male heads of households. Mbreover, Locke presumed that 
‘rationality’.^
The classical liberals centered mostly on the state. Taking individual 
freedom as their point of departure, liberals focused on protecting individuals against 
the arbitrary exercise of power, a threat they perceived as emanating primarily from the 
state. From this perspective, the public came to be understood both as the socially 
constructed realm of power and domination, and as the site for the exercise of political 
freedom. In contrast, it was taken to be an unconstructed realm of natural freedom, free 
from relations of power and domination properly understood. Along with this division
'For the effects of industrial revolution on the social life of the Western society see, Eric 
(Hobsbawm, 1989), (Polanyi, 1988) and (Giddens,1991), ( Sennett, 1992).
"John Locke in his book Second Treatises o f Government has written about the natural 
rights of man. According to him the major natural rights of man are ; the right to life; the 
right to freedom; the right to property . For an in depth analysis of Locke’s and also 
Hobbes’s point of views about the natural rights, and their evaluation for a recreation of 
Liberal point of view of possessive individualism see ( Macpherson, 1989)
’For the critique of the male perspective of political theory see, (Phillips, 1994) and 
(Pateman, 1991)
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went the assertion that (Ackelsberg and Shanley, 1996: 215) politics had to do with 
relations between relative equals in the artificially constructed public realm, and that 
insofar as relations of inequality appeared in the private realm, they were natural in 
origin and, therefore, irrelevant to politics.
These definitions led other theorists to explore two sets of issues: what 
constituted public and private, and where the line between them ought to be drawn. The 
classical theorist’s assumptions about the private and public distinction proposed that 
relationships within the so-called private realm - relatio’nships of economic activities, of 
intimacy, and of domesticity - were not about power. As a result, the private realm was 
taken to include everything that was not political -  that is, economic relationships, 
friendship and voluntary associations, and domestic and familial relationships.
However, theorists, especially Marxists ones, began to recognize that 
relationships o f power and dominance did exist in the so-called free market, and that 
economic relations affected political ones.The Marxists criticized the liberals for 
limiting their analysis of power to the realm of politics, and insisted that the public, the 
realm where the analysis of power is appropriate, be extended to include economic - and 
especially market- relationships (Ackelsberg and Shanley, 1996: 215).
Separate from these ideas, feminist theory has also criticized and challenged 
the traditional understanding of the distinction between public and private. Feminists 
(Landes, 1998; Calhoun 1992; Meehan, 1995) have mainly disputed the view of the 
public sphere as the sphere of “rationality”, “universality”, “equality” and “justice”, 
while the private is considered the sphere of emotions, caring, responsibility, and
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privacy. This dualism is also prevalent in Cartesian thought. Feminists disputed this 
Cartesian duality and the classical liberal distinction of public and private from the 
woman’s point of view. ^
The principal features of the Cartesian myth were the separation of mind 
and body, the subordination of body to mind, and the associated dominance of cognitive 
rationalization. “I think, therefore I am” became the crucial slogan of the Cartesian 
social world and this Cartesian ideology set in motion a whole process of rationalization 
of Western cultures (Turner, 1996: 10). This body-mind dualism also corresponds to the 
nature-culture division, which, historically, is the* main principle behind the 
subordination of w o m en .A s  a result of their reproductive role in human societies, 
women have been associated with nature rather than culture, and hence, have a “pre- 
social” or “sub social” status. The universality o f women’s subordinate status in society 
is explained by the universality of women’s reproductive functions. The subordination
The feminist studies that are challenging the western political thought due to its male 
biased perspective on women and men relationship make significant contributions to the 
literature. In her fascinating study Pateman has criticized the classical liberal social 
contract theories with respect to their neglecting of power relations at the private sphere. 
She has indicated that in this social contract theories, the public sphere and political activity 
was equated to the male activities. In this perspectives the woman and all of her activities 
were outside the sphere of politics. She has asserted that in this theories women were 
excluded not from the boundaries of the state , but from the boundaries of the society too. 
Women were corresponded to the sphere of irrationality, reproduction, at the domestic 
sphere. So she was excluded from the rights of men, property, power, liberty. (Pateman, 
1988)
^Anthropologist Michelde Rosaldo argued on the basis of cross cultural research that the 
degree to which women are subjected to the authority of men in a given society is correlated 
with the degree to which the public/domestic dichotomy is stressed. According to her in 
every society there is a trend to dichotomize public and private with corresponding of this 
dichotomization to the men women distinction. See (Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974).
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of women is not essentially a consequence of physiology, but of the cultural
interpretation of female reproductivity as signifying an unbreakable link with nature
(Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974:20) The distinction between nature and culture is, of
course, itself a cultural product. It is a type of classification scheme that allocates
women to an inferior natural category, and men to a superior social category (Turner
1996: 126). The result of this association with nature is that men are considered
liberated from natural functions in order to occupy themselves with higher status
activities, namely the creation of a cultural, symbolic environment (Ortner, 1998: 27).
*
In this division of labor, men create enduring symbols, while women 
reproduce perishable bodies. The social roles of women come, as s consequence, to be 
seen as inferior to the social roles performed by men. Additionally, according to Sherry 
B.Ortner (1998: 28), women are allocated and trained into a psychic structure- 
“maternal instincts”, “affection” and “emotions”- which is sharply opposed to the 
psychic space of men- “reason”, “reasonableness” and “reliability”. This dichotomy 
between reason and desire is then associated with a further dichotomy between public 
and private space, such that women occupy the domestic world of private emotions and 
affections. Therefore the women are naturally subordinates of men.
In short, feminists have explored the ways this distinction obscures the 
exercise of power within the so-called private realm, masks the maleness of the public 
realm, and ignores the ways the public-private distinction itself is a social construction 
that reflects the exercise of power and the allocation of resources in both realms. 
According to some feminists (Dietz, 1991), it is impossible to distinguish clearly and 
permanently public from private. Not only is the meaning of each understood, in part, in
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contrast to the other, but each category also contains aspects of the other.
In brief, in the mainstream political theory, the public sphere is assumed to 
exist sui generis, independent of private sexual relations and domestic life. The structure 
of relations between the .sexes is ignored, and sexual relations stand as the paradigm of 
all that is private or nonpolitical (Pateman, 1989:3). However, in this understandings, 
the meanings of ‘private’ and ‘public’ are mutually interdependent. The ‘public’ cannot 
be comprehended in isolation, as it rests on a particular conception of the private, and 
vice versa. In this evaluation, women, womanhood, and women’s bodies represent the 
pi ivate. They represent all that is excluded from the public sphere.
“In the patriarchal construction of the difference between 
masculinity and femininity, women lack the capacities necessary 
for political life. ‘The disorder of women’ means that they pose a 
threat to political order and so must be excluded from the public 
world. Men possess the capacities required for citizenship, in 
particular they are able to use their reason to sublimate their 
passions, develop a sense of justice and so uphold the universal, 
civil law’’ (Pateman, 1989:3-8)
Taking a different angle, the new perspectives on the public sphere 
encompass the above mentioned arguments and also widen the limits of participation. 
According to the classical liberal point of view, public participation is only possible 
with being rational and universal, because the public sphere is considered the sphere of 
rational political action. The problematic concept is the term ‘political’ in this context, 
because this is considered to fall within the boundaries of being a male. As a result, the 
latest views in the literature discuss the public sphere not within the boundaries of a 
limited participatiori of peoples but as a major element of “participatory democracy”, or 
so-called “radical democracy”.
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Liberal democracy has traditionally considered individuals as its main 
foundation, but this outlook ignores the social and communiterian bonds that unify these 
individuals. As a result, people have represented arguments for radical democracy, 
notions that fill the gaps in liberal democracy.
These new perspectives redefined the public sphere, and Jurgen Habermas’s 
ideas were most influential in these new definitions.Habermas related the birth genesis 
of the bourgeoisie’s public sphere to changes in the social organization and 
communication networks of early modern territorial states. These included the growth 
of urbanism, capitalist commerce and stock markets, new systems for news and mail, 
and, finally, state administrations for taxation. Consequently, he said, civil society come 
into existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority. To the well-worn 
view of the privatization of economic production, Habermas adds a strong appreciation 
for the role performed by a new set of cultural institutions that flourished in urban 
centers, including coffee houses, clubs, reading and language societies, and concert 
halls. He charted the way in which state authorities first made use of the press as a 
vehicle for addressing its promulgation to the public, and he identified the crucial 
position of a new stratum of the bourgeoisie within the educated, literate public of late 
1 7 "’ and 18"' century society (Meehan 1998; Calhoun 1992).
In Habermas’ view, the bourgeois public sphere is conceived as a sphere of 
private people coming together as a public through the historically unprecedented public 
use of their reason. This informal association of private persons mediated between, on 
the one hand civil society (the economy sphere of commodity exchange and social
7.2 A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
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labor) and the family and on the other hand , the state (the realm of the state and the 
court). The bourgeois public sphere consists of both a literary/cultural and political 
public sphere. Habermas addresses the process whereby culture was constituted as an 
object for discussion and packaged for purchase. At the same time, he insists that the 
literary public sphere functioned as a precursor to the public sphere operative in the 
political domain (Landes, 1995: 95).
In addition, Habermas rejects the Greek model of a citizenry acting in common 
to administer the law and to ensure the community ’s military survival. Instead, he 
considers the specificity of the modern public debate to protect a commercial economy. 
In contrast to the older res publica, he deems the bourgeois public sphere to be site for 
the political regulation of civil society, and credits it with a willingness to challenge the 
established authority of the monarch. The structural division between the public sphere 
on one side, and the market and the family on the other, meant that a whole range of 
concerns came to be labeled as private, and treated as improper subjects for public 
debate.
Seyla Benhabib (1998: 65-100) analyzed some of these ideas. She notes that 
Habermas has analyzed the development of modern societies in light of the extension of 
the sphere of public participation, that Habermas considered participation in a different 
way. According to him, the meaning of participation has changed with the rise of 
modern society. The exclusive focus on political participation has shifted toward a 
much more inclusive concept of discursive will formation. Participation is not seen as 
an activity that is only and most truly possible in a narrowly defined political realm, but 
as an activity that can be realized in the social and cultural spheres as well. This 
understanding of participation yields a novel conception of public space. Public space is
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not understood agonistically, as a space of competition for acclaim and immortality 
among a political elite; it is viewed democratically, as the creation of procedures 
whereby those affected by general social norms and by collective political decisions can 
have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption (Benhabib, 1998).
This concept of the public is also different from the liberal one, for, although 
Habermas and liberal thinkers believe that legitimization in a democratic society can 
only result from public dialogue, in the Habermasian model this dialogue does not 
stand under the constraint of neutrality, but is jifdged according to the criteria 
represented by the idea of a practical discourse. The public sphere comes into existence 
whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action 
engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity. In effect, there may be as many 
“publics” as there are controversial general debates about the validity of norms. 
Democratization in contemporary societies can be viewed as the increase and growth of 
autonomous public spheres among participants. The most important theme in 
Habermas’s public sphere arguments is that of participation. He insists that there must 
be participation in, and discussion of, conflicts and debates, and explains how public 
communication is established through these discussions. Habermas also redefined the 
term political in the context of his understanding of democracy. According to him, 
politics is action that consists of discussion and negotiation. Through this, collective 
identities and individualistic identities become aware of their interdependence (Keyman, 
1998: 200). Therefore, according to Habermas, a public space is the space between 
state and society. If is the sphere of civil society. It is the sphere of transivity between 
state and society. It is the site where existing power relationships are discussed and 
challenged outside the state sphere. Thus, politics not encompass only state and
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political parties, but is an activity in which everyone can participate and assert her or his 
ideas, within certain agreed-upon limits.
Some feminists have criticized the Habermasian public sphere concept. They 
hold that the arguments assume there is a clear division between the public and private 
spheres, and they see potential danger in that marginalized social groups seem to be left 
out of negotiations. In addition, they view Habermas’s public sphere concept as a 
patriarchal one, on both factual and theoretic levels.Meehan 1997: 88)
From another angle, Hannah Arendt concentrates on the ethical character of 
political activity, and proposes a public space that is built on discussion and negotiation, 
as in the Habermasian model. But Arendt’s notion does not focus so much on the theme 
of participation as Habermas did. She argues that three realms of activity characterize 
the human condition, and labels these as labor, work, and action (Arendt, 1994). She 
stresses the significance of action as the expression of human freedom and dignity, the 
realization of each individual’s unique personality. Labor corresponds to the cyclical 
processes of birth, growth, and decay. It is defined primarily by necessity and takes 
place largely in the family, the private domain or household. On the other hand, work 
is characterized by a self-conscious fabrication and construction, and may involve 
collective activity that realizes important creative aspects of human personality. Since 
work is a necessity, it does not provide opportunities for people to express their 
individual freedom. Thus, according to Dietz (1991: 109), Arent distinguishes between 
the public and private spheres on the bases of necessities in life and the realization of 
self. In this context· the private is the sphere that is necessary for human existence, and 
the public arena is the space in which human freedom is fully realized. Ackersberg and 
Shanley (1996: 216) said: “In this formulation, Arendt provides an important link
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between earlier liberals and more radical participatory democrats insofar as what she 
defines as public, or the realm of action, is also the realm of democratic politics. At the 
same time, her claim that the realm of necessity (and significantly of economic 
inequality) has no place in politics links her to a more conservative tradition”
Arendt’s public sphere concept seems very elitist. It is not easy to 
participate in her version of the public sphere. By her definition, this would require the 
ability to realize freedom. Some feminists (Dietz, 1991: 106) have criticized Arendt 
based on her neglect of women’s responsibilities in th*e domestic sphere. They charge 
that she devalues women’s labor in this realm.Their view is that, because of her neglect 
of the significance of labor and work in the formation of power relationships, Arendt 
accepts the classical division between the public and private, and does not consider 
women’s participation. Comparing to two, Habermas’s public sphere model, with its 
attention to participation, promises more to marginal groups than Arendt’s model.
Chantal Mouffe (1993; 24), a leading Postmarxist, has also argued for the 
potential of radical democracy based on participation, but she has another view of the 
citizenship concept and the significance of participation. According to her, we are in a 
conjuncture where the incapacity of liberalism to apprehend the political could have 
very serious consequences. “So, a new voice has been making itself heard; it is no 
longer democracy that is the target of critique, but liberalism that is held responsible, 
because of its deep seated individualism, for the destruction of community values and 
the progressive deterioration of public life”(1993: 24).
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Mouffe developed the idea of a radical democratic citizenship. In this case, 
citizenship as not just one identity among others, as in liberalism , or the dominant 
identity that overrides all others, as in civic republicanism. It is an articulating principle 
that affects the different subject positions of the social agent, while allowing for a 
plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty. She redefines 
the concept of citizenship and forms different boundaries for the public versus private 
distinction.
“Liberalism has contributed to the formulation of the notion of 
universal citizenship, ba,sed on the a,ssertion that all individuals are 
born free and equal, but it has also reduced citizenship to a mere 
legal status, indicating the rights that the individual holds against 
the state. Notions of public spiritedness, civic activity and political 
participation in a community of equals are alien to most liberal 
thinkers. Besides, the public realm of modern citizenship was 
con.structed in a universalistic and rationalistic manner that 
precluded the recognition of division and antagonism and that 
relegated to the private all particularity and difference, the 
distinction public/private, central as it was for the assertion o f 
individual liberty, acted therefore as a powerful principle of 
exclusions. Indeed, through the identification between the private 
and the domestic, it played an important role in the subordination 
of women, recently, several feminists and other critics of liberalism 
have been looking to the civic republican tradition for a different, 
more active conception of citizenship that emphasizes the value of 
political participation and the notion of a common good, prior and 
independent of individual desires and interests... the problems with 
the liberal construction of the public/private distinction would not 
be solved by discarding it, but only by formulating it in a more 
adequate way. Moreover, the centrality of the notion of rights for a 
modern conception of the citizen should be acknowledged, even 
though these must be complemented by a more active sense of 
political participation and of belonging to a political 
community”(Mouffe, 1993: 108).
In this sense, the public sphere is not only a communicative sphere in which 
distinct identities cbme together to negotiate and discuss, but is also it is the sphere 
that makes it possible for differences to exist together, without the assertions of 
e.s.sentialist demands. Consensus is not expected. Rather, conflict and negotiation among
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the social groups make up the foundation of this public sphere.
In Turkey today, there is an immediate need to bring such a public sphere 
into existence. However, in order for this occur, one basic requirement must be met: 
All the various social groups must be free to speak their views and represent themselves 
without interference. The state, the hegemonic player in the public sphere, must 
relinquish its control over the rules of participation. The main obstacle in Turkey is 
state domination over all social groups. Participation of these groups in the public 
sphere is presently under the thumb of state ideology.
This being said, veiled Islamic women, a marginalized group 
that presents itself in a style that dominant state ideology deems unacceptable, have 
stepped boldly into the social, economic, and political facets of the public sphere. In this 
sense, as social subjects they represent a potential challenge to the homogeneous make­
up of this sphere. However, in this chapter, I will discuss the “rules of participation” for 
veiled Islamic women in the public sphere. I will try to interpret their participation 
styles. I will also examine the challenge they represent for the relatively homogeneous 
public sphere in Turkey.
7.3 PU BLIC PARTICIPATIO N OF VEILED, PRO FESSIO NAL,
M ARRIED  WOMEN:
In earlier chapters, I looked at the dynamics of the Islamic womanhood 
model in terms of-'articulating subject positions. I have stated that professional veiled 
women are challenging, and also, reproducing, existing power relationships between the 
genders using various strategies. These strategies originate in Islamic discourse. These
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women’s participation in the public sphere through working or social activities calls 
for similar strategies. Obviously, they are unique within this sphere, they enter wearing 
their distinct and symbolic style of dress, the “veil”. Also, they must comply with 
certain rules and limits to participation relative to their distinct womanhood model.
These rules and limits define some of the differences between veiled women 
and other women. In participating in the public sphere, they create a new “publicity”( or 
new public face). In this context, by public sphere I refer to a place where private 
peoples and their differences come together and interact. The professional working 
veiled women create this new publicity becau.se they bring their uniqueness with them 
in their participation, and carve out .separate space for themselves on the basis of their 
differences. However, they can only exist in this sphere if the state, the dominant entity, 
permits. Also, they must, at the same time, obey the rules and limits of participation 
dictated by Islamic discourse.
The interviews showed that all the subjects had joined in some form of 
social activity with other veiled women in at least one period of their lives. The women 
said that, particularly in their university years, they had joined groups for Koran reading 
and interpretation, interpretation of religious base texts such as “Risale-i Nur” (the text 
that is written by Saidi Nursi, the founder of the Nurculuk), and interpretation of 
“fiqh”(Islamic law) books., interpretation of fiqh books. Some o f these groups met on 
Fridays (the holy day for Muslims), and a number of study subjects said that they were 
still attending such meetings weekly. Some of the women talked of gatherings 
organized by women from the women’s wings of various “tarikats”, and in these cases 
the husbands were members of the same “tarikat’’. During these religious-based social
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activities, the women discuss and challenge Islamic issues. Their aim is to re-produce 
or Islamic knowledge from the woman’s point of view. Such efforts are very significant, 
because at these meetings the women contribute to the knowledge production process, 
and also criticize the male viewpoint to some degree. The women also said that they talk 
about their life experiences at these gatherings, that they discuss the details of their 
relationships with their husbands, children, relatives, neighbors, and others. Islamic 
knowledge is considered the path that guides these relationships, but the interesting 
question here is to which Islamic knowledge do they refer exactly? It is clear that these 
women are reinterpreting the hegemonic Islamic discourse in a way that benefits them 
most. They must challenge this hegemonic di.scourse in order to justify their life 
experiences and goals. In addition to religious issues and relationships, the women also 
said that these meetings serve as forums for talk on daily events in the popular media, 
experiences at work, issues surrounding wearing the veil at work, and other topics.
These gatherings allow the veiled women to create their own specific 
version of “public opinion’’. These are consciousness-raising events, at which the 
women develop lines of resistance and gather power and support on issues that they 
struggle with in their lives. The women’s Islamic identity grows stronger through the 
sharing of life experiences as Islamic women. Thus, the emphasis is not only on being a 
woman, but an “Islamic woman”.
Some of the women told me that they talked about their experiences of 
being a veiled woman in a modern society, and that they were formulating some 
common strategies fo resist some of the pressures they were feeling in their world. Esra, 
one of the dentists, described her experiences at these meetings.
“ We read books on interpretation of the Koran, such as Cemal
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Yıldırım’s book entitled ‘Koran interpretation in the light of this 
century’ This is a very good book. We read some passages and 
then discuss them. Also, we talk about daily issues, about our 
husbands and children. Some friends talk about their problems 
with their husbands. We listen, and offer our ideas. We share our 
problems and we relax together. We also discuss social issues. I 
do ‘vak ıf studies as well. I have an obligation there. Our vakıf has 
a primary school, and there are some meetings there too. We 
organize aid services for children, and put on shows for poor 
students. My husband attends this vakıf as well. We are acting 
together. We enjoy such social activities.”
As Esra’s description shows, the veiled women’s meetings are social 
activities. In addition to the participation aspect, the women’s Islamic identity is 
solidified when they come together, and they also form general opinion on social 
relations. In Turkey, Islamism is performed as a social bond and forms a base of social 
solidarity for believers. The Islamist vakifs and communities take action as companies 
that foster social solidarity, and provide education, housing , and clothing for needy 
people.^’
In another community perspective, it is also significant that the majority of 
the women take part in meetings or vakıf functions where their husbands are also 
members. In other words, the vakıf or Islamic community that the woman attends is 
cho.sen with re.spect to the husband’s choice. This means that the husbands know a lot 
about their wives' social activities and friends. Being a member of the same ‘tarikat’ as 
one's husband benefits these women in that their friends are wives of their husband's 
friends. They all know each other. This large relationship network gives husbands 
confidence in their wives' friend relationship. This translates into women being able to 
participate in all meetings.Because of their Islamic character and this closed
 ^For the evaluation of this view see( Mardin,I994) and (Ayata, 1996)
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communication system, husbands tend not to interfere with their wife’s social lives. 
They virtually always know where their wives are, and with whom they are spending 
their time.
Fatma spoke on this issue:
“ ...My husband isn't interested in my friends. He knows all of 
them. I tell him where I'm going and with whom. He only has 
problems when I am meeting friends he doesn't know. He says he 
believes in me. I tell him a lot about my friends- about our 
activities and our discussions. And I know about his friends too. I 
don't like some of his friends, he never goes out with them. We try 
to build relationships with people who are like us, so there is no 
problem.”
As Fatma's account indicates, the husbands want to know about their 
wives' friends In other words, they want to monitor their wive's social activities to 
make sure they remain within proper limits. Since the friends are known, and they are 
Muslim ones, the Islamic standpoint is not a threat, and husbands take comfort in 
knowing that their wives' relationships are all with other devout Islamic women.
Also interesting is that the interviewed veiled women said that their main 
daily-life relationships were with friends rather than relatives.They said their best 
friends were from the same "vakıf, or same "community, "(cemaat), and their husbands 
knew these women. They also noted that they tended to get together with friends not at 
coffee houses or pastry shops, but in their homes or at "vakifs". All these elements point 
to the Islamic identity as a unifying base for these friendships, and for this large social 
network. The friendship goes hand-in-hand with being a member of the Islamic 
community. The regular meetings that are organized around these communities have 
two functions. First, they are a foundation for the production of ‘knowledge’, which is 
essentially a guide to everyday life in capitalist modern society. This knowledge is
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accumulated by articulating of views, the women challenge male dominance in the 
Islamic knowledge production process, and ensure that their voice is heard. Second, 
these meetings may empower women against the Islamic discourse in terms of the 
sharing of life experiences and the formulating of strategies to cope with the realities of 
everyday life.
The interviewed women told me that they are altering the existing 
discourse, e.specially with regard to the rules of Islamic marriage and divorce. Again, 
the most charged issue seems to be the potential for a man to take four wives. In 
discussing this and other issues, the women tend to reach general consensus and form an 
opinion as a group. Esra recounted an excellent example of this dynamic:
“We had a friend who had a happy marriage, but her husband 
liked another woman who was a lot younger than her. He wanted 
to marry this woman without divorcing our friend. They were real 
Islamists, an example of the true Muslim family, but our friend 
wouldn’t tolerate sharing her husband with another woman. She 
talked to us about this. We, as a meeting group, discussed this 
issue, and we tried to support her, because she was depressed. On 
the one hand, there were the Islamic rules that permit her husband’s 
second marriage, but, on the other, were her emotions. I think that 
this is the most critical moment a woman’s life. Some of our 
friends said she had to accept this situation, but she didn’t. She got 
divorced. She took the children, and she tried to make a new life....
I think she did the right thing. If I were her I would do the same. In 
today’s world it’s impossible to accept a second woman in the 
home. I wouldn’t tolerate it either.”
Esra was one of the most political women in the research group, and her words 
tell us a lot. She underlines how the Islamic women’s community meetings have the 
potential to empower women in terms of supporting each other and building resistance 
strategies. As mentioned, the women talk about everyday life experiences at these 
gatherings, particularly with regard to gender relations and their implications. Sharing
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their experiences allows them to form group opinions, which can then be fit to real-life 
experience. In essence, sharing and discussion of experiences leads to the development 
of ‘models’ for future similar encounters. This “model-making” process applies not 
only for gender relations, but also for other areas of life. Also, working veiled women, 
who tend to be more outspoken than others, can have significant influence on the 
models created for others in the group. Overall, these meetings of veiled Islamic 
women involve more than just religious meaning. More importantly, they are very 
significant in a sociological sense. The Islamist identity of the veiled Islamic women 
increase at these gatherings, but the women also adapt and challenge the hegemonic 
discourse. They do so by updating Islamic knowledge and opinion based on the realities 
of their everyday life. In other words, these meetings attempt implicitly to answer the 
questions how should we respond to various strains o f Islamic and modern discourses. 
More clearly, if Islam is being politicized, these meetings are where this is occurring 
because this is where the women form collective opinions and decide how Islam should 
be incorporated into everyday life.
In Esra’s story about her friend, the modern theme of not sharing the 
husband with other women is used to reject the Islamic principle about men having four 
simultaneous principles. Here, the marriage relationship is viewed not in the idealized 
Islamic way but in the modern way, because these women are members of a social 
structure that has been influenced by modernity for at least 200 years.’ ‘Modernity’, as a 
transformation process, requires the changing of ideas, perceptions, and ways of 
thinking. The intimate relationship between man and woman undergoes this change as 
well. The interviewed women’s concept of marriage and the spousal relationship comes
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from articulating two subject positions: the veiled Islamic woman and the modern 
professional woman. Interestingly, we also see that familiar control mechanisms are in 
place at these meetings. The veiled Islamic women regulate each other through 
mechanisms ba.sed on obeying Islamic rules.A woman’s status ilses if others in the 
group see her as pure or truly Islamic. However, it is clear that the criteria for who is a 
true Islamic woman differ according to trends in each community. Appropriate behavior 
and relationships with others are used to identify the devout Muslim, and this form of 
control is common to all the women’s groups.
As social agents, Islamic women are protectors and creators of the social 
sphere in which they live their lives. They represent a new face in the public sphere, and 
their special Islam based meetings constitute one of the many differences that they bring 
to this realm. Their ‘new face’-publicity- in the public sphere is governed by certain 
rules which originate in the Islamic belief system.* Differences between women and 
men, and the physical spatial separation of the two sexes are at the root of this system. 
In the section below, I will analyze how veiled professional working women 
conceptualize and deal with the.se issues.
’ For the experience of modernization in Turkish context see, (Lewis, 1968), (Berkes,1964).
 ^ ‘Islam’ has an exclusive meaning system. This meaning system is associated with 
sexuality . “...everything in Islam revolves around the question of meaning , perceived both 
as an urge towards the erotic and as spiritual aspiration. “ (Bouhdiba, 1985:249) Also as a 
religion it requires the organization of life in the boundary of sacred. For an elaboration of 
the way that religious men/women constructs their world with reference to sacred see.
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7.3. J D IFFEREN C ES B E TW E E N  W OM EN AND MEN:
Professional veiled women’s presence in the public sphere presents a 
challenge the existing models of womanhood and the typical male-female relationship. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the main theme here concerns the heterosexual and 
Islamic sexuality discourses, in which women’s sexuality is considered provocative ·· 
temptation to men - and thus must be controlled for the sake of the community. On this 
basis, the veiling issue originates with the need to protect both women and men.
The issue of protection goes beyond the veiling question. The veiled women’s 
general assumption is that any place external to the home environment -public space- is 
the territory of men. For women to take part in this sphere they must develop strategies 
that protect themselves from men. However, what is unique to the veiled women is not 
their assumption that the public realm is man’s territory, but the specific way they 
choose to participate in this sphere. They have formed a distinct model of womanhood, 
in which the differences between women and men are viewed in a particular way. 
Analysis of the interviews shows that the subjects commonly referred to men in their 
attempts to identify themselves. Especially on the issue of sexuality, the women 
underlined differences between men and women. In general, they talked about the two 
sexes as being naturally opposite to each other. What are the implications or 
repercussions of this mode of differentiation in everyday social life? We can get some 
idea of this form of the points the women made during their interviews.
Esra , 'a dentist, talked about the difference between men and 
women as follows:
(Eliade, 1992).
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“1 think that women and men should have different careers. 
Looking at it realistically, this point is clear. Whenever I work for 
more than 3 hours I feel very tired. I don’t have enough energy for 
my children. I try but I just can’t be lively enough. It is 
physiological. I do not feel good unless I take a nap for over an 
hour. If I don’t this, I can’t give proper time and energy to my 
children. I get irritated with them, and tend to get very angry, tired. 
This is why I think that women should have jobs that don’t require 
physical strength. For example, being a doctor is not suitable for 
women. As a dentist, I am always tired. I haven’t got any time for 
myself, or for my children.”
Esra sees careers in terms of their suitability for men and women. She 
emphasizes the significance of the physiological differences between the sexes. 
Moreover, she explains her view that careers that are good for women allow their 
primary responsibility to be domestic. According to Esra, women should work, but at 
jobs that are less tiring, because there are also the duties in the private sphere to 
consider. Similar to these ideas, Emel underlined the importance of performing 
domestic responsibilities for the sake of marriage and family life.
According to her:
“ The woman should work, but she must not neglect her 
domestic responsibilities because if the fire of the family goes out 
there is no value or pleasure in working. Who keeps the fire 
burning? The woman, of course, so women should have suitable 
jobs and careers. Don’t misunderstand me. I am not saying that 
women can’t do these jobs. I say that a woman can do whatever a 
man can do. She can be a doctor, or an engineer. Whatever she 
wants to do, she can do. But, if women open themselves more to 
the outside, the family and marriage can become eroded.”
Emel’s opinions are intriguing in that she emphasizes the woman’s dilemma 
of outside versus inside the home. She implies that outside is really not primarily 
women’s territory. Like Esra, she conveys her acceptance of a more traditional division 
of labor between man and women, with the man’s main pursuit being his career and the 
woman’s primary role being in the private.sphere. How, and by which mechanisms the
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traditional patriarchal and heterosexuality discourse on gender relations affects these 
women’s participation in the public sphere.
Nurcan, a primary school teacher, described women’s move into the public 
realm in terms of their behaving like men. She talked about the differences between the 
sexes as follows:
“Women and men have similar rights. Whatever the man has as a 
right to, so does the woman. But I say that a woman should not 
forget her womanhood in what she does in the public sphere. I said 
that I wouldn’t work with men. At my work we have men friends, 
but we do not have more relationships with them. If you look at 
woman who studies with men, you can easily see that she acts like 
a man. These women who work with men also behave like men.
They shout, become free with their behavior, and try to be like 
men. They yell, and try to dominate others.”
Nurcan sums up men’s behavior as an effort to dominate others and gain 
authority. Moreover, her words ‘being free’ are very telling in this context, as they 
reveal the assumption that men have more freedom than women. She says that women 
who interact with men become like them, but here the expression ‘being free’ takes on 
a negative connotation. Nurcan does not criticize men, but condemns women who 
behave like men because these men -like behaviors are seen as artificial. It is interesting 
to note that Nurcan’s opinions also reflect her real-life experience. Being a primary 
school teacher, she has both male and female colleagues at her workplace. She told me 
there had been arguments is the staff room about the veiling issue, and that some of her 
woman colleagues had opposed this more strongly and violently than the male ones. 
Thus, it seems that this experience may have influenced Nurcan’s point of view on this 
issue.
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However, this stance was not common to all the interviewed women. A 
person’s notion of norms and what actually occurs in life are often two different things. 
Nermin provided the best example of this. She explained that women and men are 
naturally and basically different from each other -in respect to their "fitrats" 
(ontological being)- and reasoned that, because of this, their careers should also differ. 
However, in real life Nermin has fought hard to become an assistant in a theology 
faculty. She ultimately succeeded. Nermin talked about the difference between men and 
women as follows;
“I think that the aptitudes of women and me*n differ. Women are 
capable of doing the same work that men do, but women are more 
emotional, weak, and sensitive than men. This comes from our holy 
book, but this strength is artificial one. Women are weaker because 
of their sensitivity and sliminess. Men are naturally stronger 
because, according to the Koran, they should protect women. They 
are the ‘protectors’- kavvam- but I don’t see this as inequality of 
the sexes. Women should be emotional and sensitive. Men should 
be strong and powerful. This is nature’s rule of complementarity.
So women’s careers should not affect this balance. Women should 
remain women, and men should remain men. Women should only 
pursue careers that permit this.”
Nermin sees men and women as complementary to each other, and states 
that each sex should follow careers that are in line with this notion. In other words, the 
sexual division of labor in terms of career choice is required on the Islamic path. Their 
ideas about the relationship between men and women in the workplace can also be 
traced to some of the veiled women’s life experiences, those who interact with men at 
work tended to hold more flexible notions of the man-woman relationship than their 
counterparts who do not work alongside men. The dentists Nursen and Hülya illustrate 
this point. Nursen töld me that she never accepts male patients, and that, in this way, 
her work environment mimics home. In essence, she conveys that she feels more 
comfortable and safe in places where men are not present. Nursen said:
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“I think that men and women should have different jobs. They 
shouldn’t work together. I don’t look after male patients. I accept 
only women and children. I think that my patients like this situation 
too. My women patients feel safe in my clinic... I think that 
women and men are basically and naturally different.Because of 
this difference, the sexes can affect each other more easily. As a 
result, I feel secure as a result of my decision not to look after men 
patients. My husband also more comfortable with this, so he 
doesn’t have a problem with my working.”
Clearly, wearing the veil and physical segregation of sexes are not the only 
issues on these women’s minds. Some of the parameters of gender relations, 
particularly the husband-wife relationship, are also irnportant. An important aspect of 
Nursen’s strategy of not accepting male patients is that this makes her husband feel 
secure, and this translates into her husband’s acceptance of her work life. This 
encompasses aspects of both the patriarchal point of view and the Islamic one. So, not 
only religious motivation is behind Nursen’s decision to accept only women patients. 
Her preference is based on the articulation of two basic systems: patriarchal codes that 
function in the organization of everyday life, and Islamic assertions about men and 
women.
In contrast, Scrap, who is a civil engineer and works with male colleagues, 
holds different views about the relationships of women and men in the workplace. She 
attempts to justify her interaction with male colleagues using familial codes. These 
codes hold that, in relationships with relatives, the man does not pose any danger to he 
woman. This strategy allows Scrap to feel comfortable in her working situation. She 
defines her relations with work friends not as modern colleague relationships, but as 
brotherly relationships based on family codes where the issue of sexuality is 
controlled. This familial codes make male colleagues sexually non dangerous for
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women. It is assumed that while the friendship based colleague relationship can involve 
sexual desire, traditional familial codes, such as that which governs the brother-sister 
connection, neutralize this potential. Scrap described the way she thinks about this
issue;
“ I work with men, but we have a brother-sister relationship. 
They know that I am a married woman with children, so they 
control their behavior toward me. Some of my friends say that 
women and men should not work together for long because this can 
lead to closeness and the possibility of a relationship. But I don’t 
agree. If a woman controls her relationships and conduct around 
men, men will be too afraid to come near hers.”
There are patriarchal codes behind these words. It is assumed that the 
conduct and social status of women signify the degree of respect or disrespect they 
deserve. The codes that women’s relationships with men should be conducted on one of 
two levels, in a relationship with a family member, or in marriage. The typical 
friendship or colleague relationship is not accepted because in these dynamics the 
woman is independent of men, unlike the sister or the wife. In these latter relationships, 
the woman’s behavior is considered appropriate. The majority of the interviewed 
women justified their relations with men using these same familial codes, a system that 
allows them to feel secure. From a broader perspective, this way of justifying actions 
helps determine the limits of women’s participation in the public sphere. Also referring 
to these familial codes, Müge mentioned the significance of a woman’s status as 
married or widowed in terms of relations with men:
“In the staff room, we all discuss issues with our friends, but I 
see these men as brothers. We all know our limits. I protect myself 
very well, and always know my limits. I am a widow now, so 
everybody'is watching me. They want to see me make a mistake, 
but this won’t happen because I am in good control of my 
relationships. Because of this, it doesn’t matter to me what people 
say. I see all my male friends as brothers”.
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Again, the theme of ‘protection’ underlies Miige’s arguments, and this was 
common to all of the respondents. Why do women want to be protected, or to protect 
themselves? From whom do they need to be protected? The answer is that they want 
men to protect them from men. The crux of the issue is not the men themselves, but the 
social control mechanisms that require the segregation of sexes and the regulation of 
women’s conduct with respect to this segregation. Interestingly, these mechanisms are 
derived not only from religious discourse, but from traditional codes as well. When the 
honor and modesty of men are defined according to the conduct and bodily 
representation of women, men and women together impose these types of social 
controls on women.
Ba.sed on the assumption that the public sphere is essentially men’s 
territory, and is a place where the modesty of women is scrutinized, women need to be 
both protected and controlled in this sphere. The forms of protection and control vary. 
On one hand, the veil acts as a type of protection for some women. On the other, the 
coding of men in the public sphere as brothers is basically a control mechanism.
Kandiyoti (1991b) discussed women’s strategies in a different context. 
According to her, during the early years of the modernization process in Turkey, 
women’s entrance into the public sphere was justified under a new identity that was 
desexualized and had a male image. Durakbasa (1998) has a similar account;
“...the Kemalist women who became active in the public domain, 
which typically meant to work within a predominantly male 
bureaucratic structure, had to present a ‘suitable’ body image, a 
new femininity that was somehow connected to the image of male 
body. This meant that transgression and transcendence of 
traditional feminine roles in certain instances and subjection to the
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almost ‘formal’ control of their bodies by men in other 
instances”(Durakbasal998: 148).
Yesim Arat (1985; 355-366), who has done similar research, also noted that 
(he women of this period who took on public responsibilities were pressured to behave 
respectfully toward men and to hide their sexual identity.
The veiled women of today also experience pressure, but this does not
originate with men. They have applied this pressure themselves, based on their
«
acceptance of patriarchal and Islamic codes which deem the public sphere man’s 
territory. To manage this situation, veiled professional working women have adopted 
their own specific womanhood that regulates their sexuality in relationships in the male 
world of public affairs. This new womanhood not only controls sexuality, but also 
outlines a new form of conduct toward others with respect to being Islamist. Within this 
new womanhood, veiled women demand a respectful and limited relationship with men. 
They need this as protection from social stigmatization, and as a means of preventing 
their husband’s discontent concerning their working situations and status.
Kandiyoti’s (1991a: 36-37) views highlight this point:
“When classic patriarchy enters a crisis, many women may 
continue to pressure men to live up their obligations and will not, 
except under the most extreme circumstances, compromise the bias 
for their claims by stepping out of line and losing their 
respectability. ... The response of some women who have to work 
for wages in this context may be an intensification of traditional 
modesty markers, such as veiling. Often, through no choice of their 
own, they are working outside the home and are thus ‘exposed’; 
they must now use every symbolic means at their disposal to 
signify that they continue to be worthy of protection.”
The veiled professional women I interviewed do not all fit with Kandiyoti’s 
words on aspirations about working, but they were concerned with the issue of
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remaining “worthy of protection” in the public sphere. These women follow Islamic 
patriarchal codes and assumptions in formulating their strategy for maintaining this 
protection, but this does not mean they are the passive conveyors of ideologies or 
cultures. Rather, their strategies actually put them on paths that challenge the existing 
dominance systems.
The schemes that the veiled women have devised give us some clues about the 
systems of male dominance in which they live. Because Kandiyoti said: “...a usefiil 
point of entry for the identification of different systems of male dominance may be 
found through analyses of women’s strategies in dealing with them”(1991a:27)
Although professional working veiled women have come up with coping 
strategies for survival and success within male-dominated systems, the systems are 
experienced and internalized by these women. Their presence in the public sphere is 
supported by the strategies of wearing the veil, and their unique womanhood that is 
legitimized from the Islamic standpoint. However, as mentioned above, they are not 
merely passive communicators of ideologies. They negotiate and bargain, subtly 
molding these ideologies for their own benefit.
Thus, Islamic veiled women are active social agents who manage themselves 
within existing structures by bargaining for change.^ The veiled women I interviewed
The term patriarchal bargaining is used by Kanidyoti to refer the women’s strategies to 
cope with male dominance systems. The forms of this bargaining shows differences with 
respect to class, caste, and ethnicity. These patriarchal bargains exert a powerful influence 
on the shaping of women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the nature of gender 
ideology in different contexts. See (Kandiyoti, 1988 : 274-90.
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perceive the world around them through the eyes of Islamic discourse and male 
dominance systems. Their views about on politics and women reflect that they are 
surrounded by male dominance systems but are also aware of the outside world, and 
they have developed ways of improving their lot in these systems through bargaining, 
their social agency and life experience hold the potential to empower them.
Aral (1990:108) discussed similar findings in her work on the growing 
participation and recruitment of young women in the Islamic movement in Turkey. She 
talked of the possibilities that participation in the Islamic movement raised for women 
through reading the Islamic magazine, ‘Women and Family’. The majority of the 
writers and readership of this publication were all female. Despite its conservative 
outlook, Arat argued that ,in the long run, the magazine could open up new 
opportunities and generate secular sources of power for both its readers and writers. For 
example, she stated that the magazine’s emphasis on the concept of the individual 
rights in its defense of women’s right to wear headscarves, and on the opportunity for 
the magazine’s writers to work outside the home and claim their independence, 
raised conflict that might prompt women to question the restrictive male dominance 
systems in which they live.
Similar expectations could be suggested for the subjects of this research, 
because they have had to accommodate conflicting belief systems in organizing their 
everyday life. Being both working women and devout Muslims, they must justify and 
legitimize their way of life, and also conduct their social relationships within the 
boundaries of subject positions that are based on modern and Islamic standpoints. Gilles 
Kepel has summarized this process neatly, saying, “...the aim was no longer to 
modernize Islam but to Islamize modernity” (1994: 17)
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7.3.2 THE M EANING  OF PO LITICS AN D  PO LITIC AL PARTICIPATIO N:
As the above theoretical perspectives indicate, politics is considered very 
important in terms of enabling a group’s participation in the public realm. Although 
there is no consensus on what exactly the term “politics” means, in general it is 
considered to refer to some form of representative democracy. However, as explained 
earlier, the radical democracy arguments have placed special importance on the concept 
of participation, and give new meaning to the terms politics and participation. In these 
terms, politics is understood to be an activity of negotiation and discussion. From 
Habermas’ and Arendt’s points of view, participation is the basis of political activity. 
In this context, participation is not understood as the voting, political party membership, 
but is seen in a much larger frame, as participation in decisions and policy making. 
Thus, the exclusive focus on political participation is shifted toward a much more 
inclusive concept of discursive will formation (Benhabib, 1998: 81).
At this level, participation is not seen as an activity that is only and mostly truly 
possible in a narrowly defined political realm, but as an activity that can be realized in 
the social and cultural spheres as well. There is a correlation between this type of 
understanding of participation and a novel conception of the public sphere. In this 
context, public space is not understood as a space of competition for acclaim and 
immortality among a political elite, but is viewed democratically, as the creation of 
procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and by collective political 
decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption. (Benhabib 
1998:82-85)
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The interviews showed that the veiled women support the idea of 
participation, but not under the contemporary meaning of political participation, which 
involves being a parliamentary member, a party leader, or a minister. Because these 
roles are not seen as suitable for women, the veiled women do not agree with this type 
of activity. However they stressed the importance of silent participation, or duty of 
‘tebliğ’ (spreading the word of Islam), as this is deemed more suited to women’s basic 
and natural being.
In this section I will look at how professional working veiled women see the 
issue of political participation, and why they see it this way. I will also ask what the 
implications of their assessment may be.
The women said that they view political activity as a bad practice that is 
carried out by men. Some of them pointed to the basic natural differences between men 
and women, and others emphasized personality variations or ethical gender differences 
as the reason behind this disagreeable activity.
Nurcan voiced her point of view on this issue, saying;
“I think that if a woman can do the job, she should be able to enter 
to politics. ‘Hz. Ayse’ was a woman of politics. But in every 
society around the world, you see that women tend to keep their 
distance from politics. This is not encouraged by Islam. Any 
successful woman should be allowed to do anything, but politics is 
a man’s world. It involves lies, bribery, and hypocritical behavior.
These are not the characteristics of women. Women are more 
emotional, so politics doesn’t suit them. I don’t aspire to enter 
politics. Men are more suited to it.”
Müge expressed some similar ideas, saying she did not think women were
suited to the masculine style used in politics.
“Politics is very tough. Some of them do just fine, but others 
become laughing stocks. Not every woman could handle this. A
278
woman who enters politics has to be very powerful and strong, 
because that is the sphere of men and their rules apply. We watch it 
on TV. Everyone just tries to bring each other down. No thanks are 
given to those who do good things. This isn’t fair, and there is a lot 
of hypocritical behavior. Women are more compassionate, more 
emotional, so they can easily be destroyed in politics.”
In other words, political action is considered the man’s realm. Interestingly,
these women see men’s behavior as opposite to that of women, they label male behavior
as “bad” , and valueless. The veiled women commonly use the male-female difference
to explain social processes and relations. In their view, the main difference is not a basic
or natural one, but an ethical one. According to them, women and men live by different
ethics. The women’s is the ethic of caring, responsibility, and ju s t ic e .S ti l l ,  there was
no mention of challenging the existing male political structure on the basis of women’s
values. On the whole, these women opt for a form of participation based on the Islamic
“tebliğ”. Some did voice different opinions, however. Fatma, the literature teacher, had
some interesting ideas. She emphasized the differences in the ways of men and women.
“There are differences between women. Women who enter politics 
become heartless, and show no compassion. An example is Ayseli 
Goksoy. Then there are some who are more compassionate, who 
understand women’s problems, such as Tansu Çiller. I think that 
women who have children are more compassionate. But the 
majority of women who enter politics are not married and don’t 
have children. According to me , women who have children should 
enter in Parliament. So there will not any problem. Imagine that 
what is speaking at the place that everybody is woman and has a 
child? Of course children’s problems would be discussed. I think 
that, in Turkey, women have two main problems. One relates to 
children, and the other concerns health. Women speak about these 
issues, but what do men talk about? They talk about money, 
power, bribery. What do women talk about? Children, school.
This kind of differentiation between men and women is also taken into account by some 
‘essentialist’ feminists. Also some of them have emphasized the reconstruction of politics 
with using women’s values as recognition and care. According to this point of view women 
should criticize the universalists neo-Kantian moral philosophies. For an in-depth analysis of 
this point of views see, (Gilligan. 1982). (Benhabib, 1998)
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hospitals, aid. So there will be no problem. The martyr’s life 
becomes us well.”
Fatma criticizes Turkish politics. She proposes that women should take 
seats in Parliament in order to get community problems solved. In her opinions, she 
pairs women with domestic responsibilities. She demands that these issues be moved to 
the top of the agenda. There are two main points here. She speaks of women bringing 
domestic issues to the public sphere, and also assumes that because political figures are 
more aware of these daily issues, they will be dealt with appropriately. Fatma invites 
politics to tackle down -to-earth problems. In this way, she condemns the existing 
political system with respect to its male-dominant character, its ethics, and the shallow 
and materialistic issues at its center. Of the opposite opinion. Güler, a history teacher, 
said she thought women should stay away from politics, and should focus on their 
“tebliğ” duty. Güler stated:
“ I don’t appreciate political participation. I know that the great 
Said-i Nursi was against politics too because when you enter to 
politics you start to see good people as bad, and bad people as 
good. It divides society. There are more important things than 
politics. For instance , you can impart your knowledge to students.
You can pass on religious knowledge. This way you get more 
pleasure out of what you do. Politics destroy people by highlighting 
their weaknesses.”
Here, Güler emphasizes the significance of “tebliğ”, and underlines her 
appreciation of the roles of women in education. Emel also expressed and interesting 
view of women and politics. She told that:
“Women can do everything. I think that women are more stable 
than men, so any woman who wants to enter politics can do the job 
perfectly well. But at what price? The price is the deterioration of 
family life. Politics is full-time work. You would always be busy. I 
think that work problems should not be brought home. Women 
shouldn’t be too ambitious. This may bring success, but it makes
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for unhappiness...Now some women’s groups are demanding that 
half of Parliament be made up of women. What will happen to 
these women’s families? In this situation, nobody will have 
children. They won’t marry. What will society be like if there are 
no families or children?”
Again, Emel has set limits for women’s public participation.These limits
are set with respect to women’s domestic responsibilities. The family role is considered
something that is done for society’s sake. She finds politics inappropriate for women
based on the assumption that the more women participate, the more family and marriage
will be eroded. As mentioned earlier, Emel was the oldest of the respondents, and is a
1»
kindergarten teacher.
Fatma, the biology teacher, took a very different stance from the others:
“ I think that women should enter politics. Today, women have a 
place in every type of occupation. Why not politics? I think that 
women have shown what they can do through working. They have 
shown that they are as intelligent as men. ...Sometimes my friends 
and I talk about these issues. We are of the opinion that, in today’s 
conditions, women may even go to war as well because technology 
and science, women were left out of many things. Everything 
required physical strength, so men did everything. But today the 
conditions are different”
Unlike the other women, Fatma does not point to the basic, natural 
differences between the sexes, but considers the social division of labor as the line that 
separates men and women.
In brief, the veiled women expressed a variety of similar and contrasting 
opinions on the issue of politics and women’s participation in that realm. The 
interviewed subjects differ in terms of age, social class, and occupation, so it is not 
possible to talk about a homogeneous “veiled women” opinion on this topic. Their ideas 
and life experiences have engendered differences in viewpoint that go beyond the
281
characteristic of being a veiled Islamic woman.
However, their differences do provide clues about these women’s 
womanhood experience. Their views on politics reflect that they have internalized 
many of the assumptions of existing male dominance systems. These internalized 
notions form the basis for their generalized differentiation between the sexes in terms 
of existence differences and the ethical ones. They see the world around them in 
reference to this man-woman dichotomy, and their point of view stems from their 
subjective view of self that is formed in reference to male-dominant systems. Clearly, 
their participation in the public sphere is limited by these perceptions and belief 
systems.
Veiled professional working women experience a unique sense of 
womanhood in the public sphere. The intricate articulation of their different subject 
positions as working women and as devout Islamists has produced this new form. Their 
concept of public participation involves the working experience as well as other Islamic 
women’s group activities, including meetings, conferences, panels, and discussion 
sessions.
The limits and mode of their participation seem to be determined in 
reference to idealized gender relations. Within these relationships, the women accept 
and legitimize the current sexist division of labor on the basis of man-woman 
differences. Although acceptance of male dominance systems is the path that veiled 
Islamic women haVe taken in becoming active in the public sphere, it is inaccurate to 
consider them passive messengers for these systems. In fact, the women have used and 
adapted the principles in these systems in order to gain power as a group.
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The veiled women’s expansive social network and their regularly organized 
meetings should be thought of as the central places for this empowerment. It is here 
that the women discuss their experiences of “re-producing” Islamic knowledge. It is 
here that they formulate strategies for resistance and solidify their Islamic identity. It is 
here that they produce their collective opinions on public affairs and daily issues. In 
terms of this opinion-producing function, the Islamic women’s activities can be 
considered the basis for their new “publicity” (or public face) in society." This image 
lias been formed based on the way they differ from m*en, and from other categories of 
women. In some respects, this new publicity challenges male-based Islamic discourse as 
well as other models of womanhood.
The interviewed veiled women consider the public sphere to be essentially male 
territory, because men’s values dominate in this realm. In the rhetoric of veiled Islamic 
women, women, womanhood and women’s bodies represent the private, thus they 
should be protected during life in the public sphere. Again, there are two important
" Habermas has evaluated the public sphere as a space in which the opinion is produced. 
With using Habermas’s ideas we can evaluate Islamic women’s this activities as a 
‘publicity’. According to Habermas, the public sphere came into existence when private 
persons joined together to exercise their reason in a public fashion. Public opinion is the end 
product of all the dialogues between discoursing individuals, each one of whom is capable of 
reflexive self-questioning and successful at internalizing the rules of rational discourse. 
Habermas agree on the potential of words and discourse to generate power. (Benhabib, 
1998:99). But it should be considered that Habermas talks about the public sphere that has 
existed at the Anglo-American context, and his conceptualization refer to public sphere in 
which all of the social groups have a voice. But, Islamic women’s publicity reflected only 
the voice of Islamic women and do not rnatter the general norms of public sphere. So in 
some respects it can not fit into Habermas’s definition.
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points here: On the one hand, the private sphere’s values are carried to the public sphere 
through the protection of womanhood. On the other, the public-private distinction is 
accepted and the public sphere is assumed to be the realm of men. The wearing of the 
veil and women’s control over their relations with men reflect the Islamic standpoint, 
the demands of faith, and, at the same time, function as a strategy that allow women’s 
participation in the public sphere.
The women try to cut paths that provide them more opportunities for public 
participation. Paradoxically, in creating these paths they justify and legitimize their 
activities based on the dominant discourses, since, as a “true” Muslims, they must 
protect their Islamic identity as well.
The goal is to achieve greater participation but remain a true Muslim, through 
presenting a womanhood required by Islam. In other words, veiled women are 
“Islamizing” modernity. They hybridize their local authentic Islamic identities with 
global demands, such as working, mobilization, and participation. They adopt subject 
positions that are rooted in their being conscious Islamists as well as professional 
working women in Turkey. They want to work, but work in jobs that do not require 
interaction with men. They want to work, but not neglect their domestic responsibilities. 
They want more participation, but not in positions that require they challenge the 
existing division of labor between genders. As a result, on the whole, they are not active 
“political” participants. They want to motivate their families to bring them higher social 
status, but not at the expense of neglecting the Islamic standpoint. In short, veiled 
Islamic women are the one group of professional women in Turkish society who have 
chosen the Islamic discourse as dominant, and that uses this as their guide to social
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relationships and to the world around them. Therefore, what differentiates these women 
from others is not their life practices, but the unique way they justify and legitimize 
these experiences.
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CONCLUSION
How does professional, married, veiled Islamic women's working status 
affect their gender relations, specifically ‘womanhood experiences’. The major aim of 
this thesis is to address this question through researching their everyday life 
experiences.‘Womanhood’ is an ongoing process in which gender relations, gender 
identities and cultural codes and meanings are produced, reproduced or transformed 
in a daily life experience. Accordingly, two main features of professionally working 
veiled women stand out in their womanhood experience: On one hand, they are 
followers of Islam and their Islamic faith shapes the ways they justify their life 
activities. On the other hand, they are active social agents who have working life 
within the boundaries of Turkish modern capitalist society. These apparently clashing 
realities indicate how their identity as a group is built on numerous, often opposing 
points of view.
First, I discussed the changing face of the public sphere in Turkey with 
respect to the participation of professional veiled women. Second, I looked at the 
“womanhood experiences” of professional, married, veiled women in terms of their 
social agency and modes of legitimacies through their life choices. These two 
dynamics directly relate to each other. These women’s contributions to the debate 
over the expansion of the public sphere in Turkish society can only be understood
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through examining and understanding their ways of participation, and the ways they 
validate on their “new role.” The ways these women perceive and define themselves 
are directly linked to their Islamic faith, which demands a unique focus on modesty 
and on spatial segregation of the sexes. Their perceptions of themselves and their 
identity have also grown from the competition between attitudes of modernization and 
Islamism. As a consequence of these varied inputs, professional, veiled, Islamic 
women are social actors, but at the same time, because of their Islamic stance, are 
political actors in contemporary Turkey. Through veiled women, the Islamic 
movement has gained representation in Turkey’s public sphere. With the rise of the 
Islamic movement, faith, male-female relations - all part of the domain of the intimate, 
the private -  have become foci of religious resistance against the dominant forms of 
secular and modern styles.
In this context, the veiled women are the most important Islamic actors 
with respect to bringing private sphere relations and values into the public sphere. The 
professionally working veiled women has transmitted images of educated, urban, and 
militant Muslim women to the public realm, and has ensured that their political 
activity gets major headlines. Islamic women have attained legitimacy and recognition 
through higher education and employment as well.
These women are in a problematic position. The more public visibility 
they get, and the more they come in conflict with traditions and interpretations that 
prescribe maternal and marital duties as their primary moral obligations, the further 
they are pushed to create new definitions of self They are as social actors, not only
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political representators, but have a reflexive action in which they continuously develop 
life strategies and through them they resist or bargaining with the existing discourses, 
or negotiating with them. Islamic women, especially professionals, must continuously 
redraw the borders of their identity based on a harmonious combination of modernity 
and Islam in every tough issue. The professional Islamic woman’s everyday life 
experiences differ from those of their unemployed Islamic counterparts. As a 
consequence of their modern subject positions as professionals, they come face-to- 
face with hegemonic dialogue on a whole spectrum of issues. For this reason we have 
seen university students and working veiled women fighting the ban on veiling at 
public institutions. In their activism, they have resisted the “modern” social norm and 
demanded society’s respect for their Islam identity. On the other side of the coin, as 
women succeed in education and go on to play significant roles in the public sphere, 
they naturally become more independent and, put distance between themselves and 
their expected roles as devoted wife and mother.
Professional Islamic women are far more than passive communicators of 
an Islamic point of view. They are active social agents. In today’s modern capitalist 
societal order, individuals have many social positions and positions of status that 
affect their social agency. In other words, individuals have different subject positions 
(Mouffe: 1991). They construct their identities, carry out social actions, and build 
social relationships with respect to these overlapping or conflicting platforms of 
opinion. Social identities are not stable. Rather, they are always in a process of 
renewal. As such, it is impossible to discuss the role and place of women in the 
Islamic movement without evaluating the ways they define and perceive themselves.
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Being contemporary Islamists, professional, married, veiled women, with 
their different subject positions, employ unique strategies for substantiating what they 
do with their lives. They are professional as well as devout Islamic women. As such, 
their identities and their definitions of self are formed at a crossroads of differing 
discourses. In Turkish society, professional veiled Islamic women are not affected 
only by their Islamic stance. They are also influenced by the roles they play in the 
public sphere - working, social, and political activities. It is in this realm that they gain 
public recognition, expand themselves on a personal level, and also come into conflict 
with the traditions or interpretations that point to maternal and marital duties as their 
primary moral obligations. The pressures from these opposing directions have pushed 
these women toward new definitions of self, have forced them to form an identity that 
leconciles their different subject positions. They are Islamic women who legitimize 
and rationalize their “modern”-based activities and relationships in reference to 
Islamic discourse.
Under pressure from demands of their “modern” roles and status, they 
have found ways to resist the hegemonic Islamic discourse through a sort of 
bargaining process, but they always remain faithful to its essence. The problem is that, 
although their resistance on some levels appears radical, its equivocal relationship 
with Islamic discourse does not promise much for them in the way of true liberation. 
Many of these women’s daily life strategies are formulated on the basis of reproducing 
existing patriarchal, male-dominant discourses. Also, the main theme of the Islamic 
faith -  “Allah is everywhere at all times, and He controls all in the world” - seems to 
deeply influence the way they view everyday life activities.
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The status of being a professional working woman also affects the way 
these women perceive themselves and their relationships with their husbands. Their 
status outside the home, as teacher, dentist, pharmacist, etceteras, influences their 
relationships in the domestic sphere. They all say that their sole basis for working is 
not to earn money, but to perform the sacred duty of “tebliğ” (spreading the word of 
Islam). Interestingly, they never discuss “money” as a concept. Everything is viewed 
in terms of immaterial or ideal purposes, and this seems to originate with the Islamic 
faith. From another perspective, they are interested in adapting themselves to the 
current system, but still take the stance promoted by the Islam. Much of the way they 
give meaning to their public activities and relationships is by resisting modern or 
capitalist rules. However, they seek the opportunities in the public realm, and also 
legitimize their presence there in relation to their Islamic standpoint. They base the 
rationale for their participation on Islamic discourse, which sets out specific rules 
about given categories of women and gender relations.
However, their experiences of speak of the ways in which the combined 
efforts of professional life and everyday life have demanded the revision of 
relationships in the private sphere. As working women, they need either sharing of, or 
help with, domestic duties. As devout Islamic women, it is their duty to fulfil their 
domestic responsibilities to perfection. To solve this dilemma, they either formulate 
strategies that will lever their husbands into helping more around the house, or get 
assistance from hired women or supportive family members. These strategies differ 
according to each woman’s economic class and career. The more affluent woman 
prefers to hire another woman to help her with domestic tasks. The woman who is
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less well off tends to ask a family member to help her with housework or childcare. 
Regarding the husband’s involvement, Islamic point of view comes into play. The 
need to arrange daily life around the working situation is legitimized by highlightening 
religious principles on conjugal relations and the protection of women. In this way, 
some husbands are mobilized to help their wives with childcare and housework on the 
basis of Islamic point of view. The demand is a necessity of everyday life as a working 
women, but its style and legitimization is Islamic in nature. However, it is clear that 
the strategies and legitimization styles of Islamic women show differences with 
respect to their social class position. The social class position is very significant at the 
daily practicing of Islamic discourse. The Islamic discourse is transformed into living 
social practice in the social conditions of women. The necessities of everyday life in 
relation to the social condition of women, the socio-structural environment of Turkish 
capitalist society, and the women’s social agent position have an effect on the daily 
practicing of Islamic discourse.
For instance, the women’s Islamic beliefs and their Islamic identity in the 
conjugal relationship engender the strong opinion that a wife should respect her 
husband. However, still maintaining this respectfulness and modesty, the Islamic point 
of view also gives women powerful cards to play against their husbands with respect 
to domestic division of labor. In short, the gender identities and gender roles of 
Islamic women are formed with reference to their various “subject positions” and the 
demands of these positions. Being a professional one means that a woman has made 
certain inroads in challenging existing male dominance systems. However, the 
interesting thing is that many of the strategies employed in this process have their
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roots in Islamic point of view, which is, in its essence, patriarchal and subordinative in 
its stance on women. On the other hand, the rules and limits of women’s participation 
in the public realm are a revised version of this Islamic point of view. In other words, 
the reasoning behind the working experience of these women is framed by religion. 
But, the life practices at these working experience affects the reproducing of these 
Islamic framework.
As social agents, they enter a kind of bargaining or negotiation process with 
the traditional and religious dialogues. What they experience is a ‘womanhood’ that is 
an amalgamation of the ideal Islamic worldview and modern social practice. The 
major principles of this womanhood model are piety, modesty, and chastity. 
Therefore, all social practices, including the work experience and its limitations and 
l ilies, are built on these principles.
Even more, the experiences of the professional veiled woman within these 
borders in work and social activity has led to a réévaluation of the traditional concepts 
of piety, modesty and chastity. The stance of the Islamist movement is that what 
determines a woman’s modesty is not her social participation, but her ‘conduct’ and 
her relations with men. Hence, her social and economic participation itself is not 
ignored, but the major emphases are placed on regulating this activity with respect to 
man-woman relationships and fulfilling domestic responsibility. In this context, 
wearing a veil is a specific style of dressing that represents a conscious choice. As 
such, it is directly related to the formation of body image and self-identity. Veiling 
designates a specific kind of womanhood and a specific set of gender relations. The
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Islamic faith demands that body image and social relationships be regulated with 
respect to the belief that ‘Allah’ is everywhere, all the time, controlling everything. In 
this light, by wearing the veil for their faith, women endorse and maintain a type of 
‘moral code’ that determines a specific set of gender relations.
This means that, by wearing the veil, a woman exercises control over her 
own behavior. This control is borne out both in gender relations and in relationships 
with others. On the other hand, through wearing the veil, women feel protected from 
the male sexual drive. The veil declares that the sexuality of an Islamic women is 
accessible only within the domestic sphere, inside the marriage relationship. As a 
result, women who enter this realm must hide their sexuality. Protection seems to be 
the biggest motivator behind the wearing the veil. They think that, they are concealing 
their .sexuality through veiling, they also assign that the sexually desired woman is 
always the one who wears exposing mini-skirt and make-up. In other words, they 
assume that desirable and sexually provocative women all follow the modern fashion 
trends. So, Islamic women assume that they become desexualized through veiling. In 
this context, wearing the veil allows them to enter the public sphere, and in their view, 
this mode of dressing provides them with respect and protection there. It does so 
because it signifies that they are of the Islamic standpoint, but, at the same time, the 
veil means that their sexuality is exclusive to, and possessed by, their husbands in the 
domestic sphere. Thus, on one level the veil is a vehicle of modesty and dignity 
relative to the husband. And in the public arena, the veil represents the border 
between the Islamic women and others.
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Veiled professional working women experience a unique sense of 
womanhood in the public sphere. The intricate articulation of their different subject 
positions as working women and as devout Islamists has produced this new form. 
Their concept of public participation involves the working experience as well as other 
Islamic women’s group activities, including meetings, conferences, panels, and 
discussion se.ssions.
The limits and mode of their participation seem to be determined in 
reference to idealized gender relations. Within these relationships, the women accept 
and legitimize the current sexist division of labor on the basis of man-woman 
differences. Although acceptance of male dominance systems is the path that veiled 
Islamic women have taken in becoming active in the public sphere, it is inaccurate to 
consider them passive messengers for these systems. In fact, the women have used 
and adapted the principles in these systems in order to gain power as a group.
The veiled women’s expansive social network and their regularly organized 
meetings should be thought of as the centers for this empowerment. It is here that the 
women discuss their experiences of “re-producing” Islamic knowledge. It is here that 
they formulate strategies for resistance and solidify their Islamic identity. It is here 
that they produce their collective opinions on public affairs and daily issues. In terms 
of this opinion-producing function, the Islamic women’s activities can be considered 
the basis for their new “publicity” (or public face) in society. This image has been 
formed based on the way they differ from men, and from other categories of women. 
In some respects, this new publicity challenges male-based Islamic discourse as well
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as other models of womanhood.
However, ironically, the interviewed veiled women consider the public sphere 
to be essentially male territory, because men’s values dominate in this realm. In the 
rhetoric of veiled Islamic women, women, womanhood and women’s bodies 
represent the private, thus they should be protected during life in the public sphere. 
Again, there are two important points here: On one hand, the private sphere’s values 
are carried to the public sphere through the protection of womanhood. On the other, 
the public-private distinction is accepted and the public sphere is assumed to be the 
realm of men. The wearing of the veil and women’s control over their relations with 
men reflect the Islamic standpoint, the demands of faith, and, at the same time, 
function as a strategy that allow women’s participation in the public sphere.
The women try to cut paths that provide them more opportunities for public 
participation. Paradoxically, in creating these paths they legitimize their activities 
based on the dominant discourses. The goal is to achieve greater participation but 
remain a true Muslim, through presenting a womanhood required by Islam. In other 
words, veiled women are “Islamizing” modernity. They hybridize their Islamic based 
values with so called modern demands, such as working, mobilization, and 
participation. They adopt subject positions that are rooted in their being conscious 
Islamists as well as professional working women in Turkey. They want to work, but 
do Jobs that do not require interaction with men. They want to work, but not neglect 
their domestic responsibilities. They want more pai ticipation, but not in positions that
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require the challenging of the existing division of labor between genders. As a result, 
on the whole, they are not only active “political” participants. They want to motivate 
their families to bring them higher social status, but not at the expense of neglecting 
the Islamic standpoint. Veiled professional women have not developed an 
anticonsumerist ethic. Rather, they have a tendency to consume in ways similar to 
other social actors in Turkish society. The development of consumerism, and 
enhancement in the power of money in Turkish society has touched these women as 
well. Some of the commodities they consume may differ from those used by other 
“less traditional” groups, but they still consume goods and services produced by 
modern capitalist schemes. The subjects of this thesis grew up in lower-class rural 
areas, but today they belong to the middle or upper-middle class. They also aspire to 
further movement up the social ladder. They want their children, male and female, to 
have university education and prestigious careers, but they also want them to retain 
their true Islamic identity.
Veiled Islamic women are the one group of professional women in Turkish 
society that has chosen the Islamic discourse as being dominant, and that uses this as 
their guide to social relationships and to the world around them. Therefore, what 
differentiates these women from others is their life experiences, and the unique way 
they legitimize these experiences.
In other words, embracing both the modern and Islamic angles, these 
women present a different womanhood model, a “new face” in the public sphere. 
The patriarchal heterosexuality discourse and the Islamic discourse on sexuality are
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reproduced as part of this distinct womanhood, but there is also a covert tension, a 
paradox, in this mode of empowerment through Islamism. In many ways, these 
women discard traditional life roles, for example by making their personal life a 
matter of choice and pursuing a professional career, yet they acquiesce by embodying 
and passing on the Islamic way of life, Islamic morality, and Islamic community.
These women’s efforts bring the Islamic discourse to life practice, but the 
effects of this discourse on daily life, and the way it is transformed into life activities 
is directly linked to the woman’s class position. In other words, the material needs of 
everyday existence influence the way that Islamic discourse permeates life. The veiled 
women showed definite differences in terms of the way they incorporated Islam in 
their lives, and this was in accord with their class positions. However, even in the face 
of such differences, there was a strong common vein throughout -  a constant state of 
flux, from embracing modern opportunities to justifying their new ambitions through 
Islamic principles. This is what differentiates veiled Islamic women from other women 
subjects.
The only way to understand the effects of religion on believers is to 
examine how they incorporate their religion into their lives. Analyzing religion - in this 
case Islam - at a textual level does not give much information about its effect on 
believers’ daily routines. Islam is transmitted into systems of living through the 
everyday activities of individuals, through the strategies they use to adapt and meet 
the needs of everyday life. For the women in this study, these strategies involve 
“advantageous interpretation” of Islamic discoiirse as legitimization for things done
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every day. But, as mentioned, because these strategies serve to reproduce the Islamic 
patriarchal discourse and follow the traditional principles of gender relations, they do 
not promise much empowerment for these women, at least for the short run. On one 
level, their wish is to escape the traditional life cycle, but they do this through a 
limiting, restrictive discourse. There is some degree of criticism of existing gender 
relations, but their devised way for adapting a new style is more restrictive compared 
to the rules for other women in society. For instance, veiling is a requirement of their 
faith, but this faith necessitates the protection of women. This echoes and reproduces 
the principles of the heterosexual discourse on the sexuality of men and women. 
These women’s departure point is similar to the feminists’, but their solution and 
alternative is more limiting. Building a different way of life and a whole different 
scheme for validating this lifestyle is no easy task. Also, the reality usually does not 
measure up to the ideal. In other words, in its translation into living social practice, 
Islam cannot remain in its original ideological discursive form as professional Islamic 
women formulate their strategies to resist, accept, and manage both religious and 
secular dominant discourses. They reorder and put these dominant discourses into 
new context through the medium of their social action that is shaped by the multi 
sourced subject positions of the individuals and the objective probabilities of the 
society (Bourdieu, 1991). However, it should be kept in mind that Islamic women 
have taken their social action in the context of Islamic faith. They want to move up 
the social ladder, give their children more opportunities, but, in doing so, interpret all 
things good and bad as the will of “Allah.” This explains why they use so many 
“should” and “must” in discussing their points of view. They are doing everything 
possible to be the ideal woman of Islamic discourse.
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In sum, the major contribution of this thesis is its elucidation of the some 
of the resistance or negotiating strategies these women have formulated to reconcile 
and manage their often-conflicting subject positions. The additional roles and status 
they acquire outside the domestic sphere influence the ways they incorporate Islam 
into their lives. Professional working status has affected these women’s perception of 
gender roles, relations and their marital relationships. They juggle these different 
subject positions by coming up with strategies molded from both modern and 
religious discourse themes.
Their contribution to the expansion of the public sphere in Turkish society 
seems limited because, although many of these strategies take a critical stance against 
the modern womanhood model, they also continue to reproduce gender relations that 
function in male-dominant patriarchal systems while participating in this sphere. This 
thesis also makes the point that veiled Islamic women are not a homogeneous group. 
Social class is particularly influential in the way veiled women integrate their religion 
with social practice. The social class of the interviewed women has affected their 
way of using Islamic discourse in their daily lives.
In conclusion, in adding to our knowledge about “who the professionally 
working veiled Islamic women are,” where they “come from,” and the strategies they 
have developed in order to carve out their new niche in contemporary Turkey, this
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thesis has also highlighted important topics that need further study. One such subject 
is the relationship between social class and life practices of veiled professional women. 
The influence of their extensive social network on the formulation of life strategies 
also deserves more in-depth investigation. Another subject that would shed more light 
on veiled women’s life practices is the issue of differences that stem from membership 
in different Islamic “cemaat’s,” or religious communities. This appears to be a key 
issue with regard to how individuals and families incorporate Islam in their lives.
Finally, I would like to reiterate that the participation of women as active 
social subjects has been made possible through the criticism of subordinative 
discourses and the struggle for equality between men and women in terms of 
opportunity, occupation, and rights. The legitimization of everyday life through the 
different usage of these subordinative discourses can not open a “door” to 
empowerment. It stays as a little window. Because, empowerment can acquired 
through the challenging of existing gender relations and gender roles, and by 
reconceptualizing women selfhood within the power relationship. But, having seen a 
glimpse of the light for once, brings with it struggle to reach its entirety Professional, 
married, veiled women need time to reach this door, but the key of the door is in their 
hands.
300
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1986. Veiled Sentim ents. Berkeley; University of California 
Press.
............................... 1998. Rem akine Women, Feminism and Modernity in the
Middle East. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Afkhami, Mahnaz. 1995. Faith and Freedom W om en’s H um an Riehts in the 
Muslim World. New York: Syracuse University Press.
Afshar, Haleh.(ed) 1997 .Women, State, and Ideoloev Studies From Africa  
and Asia .Albany: State University of N.Y. Press.
........................ (ed.) 1993. Women in the Middle East London and N.Y.;
MacMillan.
................................  1995. “Why fundamentalism? Iranian women and Their
Support for Islam”, Women a Cultural Review, 6 (1), Summer 1995: 18-34.
Ahmed, Leila. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam  .New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press.
Aktas, Cihan. 1988. Sistem İçinde Kadın, Istanbul: Beyan.
Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993. Islams and Modernities .London and N.Y: Verso.
Arat, Yeşim. 1996 “On Gender and Citizenship in Turkey” Middle East 
Report. March 1996:28-30.
........................  1985. “Obstacles to Political Careers: Perceptions of Turkish
Women”, International Political Science Review (6); 355-366.
301
Arat, Zehra. (ed.) 1998. Deconstructine ^Images o f  the Turkish W om an’ 
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Arslan, Hüsamettin. 1991. Emstemik Cemaat İstanbul: Paradigma.
................................  1999. “Bilim, Bilimsel Bilgi ve Yktidar” Doöu B a t\ , 2(7):
55-81.
Ates, Süleyman. 1995. Kuran-v Kerim Tefsiri. İstanbul: Milliyet.
Ayata, Sencer 1993. “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional 
framework” in Eralp Atilla, Muharrem Ttinay and Birol Yetilada (eds) The 
Political and Socio-Economic Transformation o f  Turkey , N.Y: Praeger Pub.
........................  1996. “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in
Turkey” , Middle East J o u rn a l. 50(1).
Azzam, Maha. 1996. “Gender and The Politics of Religion in the Middle Esat” 
in Mai Yamani (ed.) Feminism and Islam Leeal and Literary Perspectives, 
U.K.: Ithaca Press.
Badran, Margot. 1995. Feminists. Islam and Nation Gender and the M aking  
o f  Modern Egypt New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Baron, Beth. 1996. “A Field matures. Recent Literature on Women in The 
Middle East” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.32, No.3, July 1996, pp. 172-186.
.......................  1994. The W omen’s Awakenin2 in E e w t Culture, Society, and
the Press,New  Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Barrett, Michel and Ann Phillips.(eds). 1992 Destabilizin2 Theory . Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
302
Beck, Louis and Nikki Keddie. (eds.). 1991. Women in Middle Eastern 
History: Shiftine Boundaries in Sex and Gender New Haven and London; 
Yale University Press.
Beckford, James and Thomas, Luckmann. 1989. The C haneine Face o f  
Relision  ,London: Sage Pub.
Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork. 1997. (eds.) Political Islam  London: I.B. Tauris.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1998a. “Feminist Moral Theory Revisited” in Ann Phillips 
(ed.). Feminism and Politics, Oxford; Oxford University Press.
............................. 1998b. “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, The Liberal
Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas”, in Joan Landes (ed.). Feminism, The Public 
and The Private, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
............................. 1996. “From Identity Politics to Social feminism: A Plea for
the Nineties” in D. Trend (ed.) Radical Democracy. New York and London: 
Routledge.
Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell (eds.). 1987. Feminism  A s Critique 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction o f  
Reality, Allen Lane.
Çaha, Ömer. 1994. Sivil Kadyn. Ankara: Vadi.
Berik, Günseli. 1998. “The Social Condition of Women in Turkey in the 
Eighties and in the Migration Process” in New Perspectives on Turkey , 3:1 
(Fall 1998): 97-107
303
Berkes, Niyazi. 1984. Teokrasi ve Laiklik  ,İstanbul: Adam.
........................  1964. The Development o f  Secularism in Turkey ,Montreal:
McGill University Press.
Berktay, Fatmagül. 1995. “Middle Eastern Women, Islamic Ideology, and Some 
Thoughts on the Turkish Case” Kadın Araştırmaları Dereisi. No.3, 1995
Bouhdiba, Abdelwahab. 1985. Sexuality in Islam  London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1997. Distinction, A  Social Critique o f the Jiid£ement o f  
Taste London and N.Y; Routledge.
........................... 1977. Outline o f  a Theory o f  Practice , Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Bowen, D.L and E.A.Early.(eds). 1993. Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle 
East Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Butler, Judith and Joan W Scott (eds.). 1992. Feminists Theorise the Political 
N.Y. and London: Routledge.
Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Reli2ions in the Modern World. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press.
Çakır Ruşen. 1991. Ayet ve Slosan  ,Istanbul: Metis. 
..........................1994 Ne Teriat Ne Demokrasi. İstanbul: Metis.
304
Calhoun, Craig, (ed.). 1992. Habermas and the Public Sphere
Massauchusettes: The MIT Press.
Çaha, Ömer. 1994. Sivil Kadın. Ankara: Vadi.
Çalışlar, Oral. \99Q.İslam ’da Kadın ve Cinsellik. İstanbul: Afa.
Chodorow, Nancy J. 1995. “Gender As A Personal and Cultural Construction” 
Signs, Spring 1995, Vol20, No.31: 516-543.
.................................. 1978. The Reproduction o f Mothering Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Cindoglu, Dilek and Gtilnur Muradoglu. "Muhasebe ve Finans Dalında Bilim 
Kadınlarının Is ve Aile Rolleri ile Basetme Stratejileri" (ed)Hasan Coşkun, 
Akadem ik Yasamda Kadın: Turk ve Alman Üniversitelerinde Kadın 
Kariyerlerinin Karşılaştırılması, Türk Alman Kültür isleri Pub. No:9, Ankara, 
1996.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. Black Feminist Thought. Boston: Unwyn-Hyman.
Cornell, Drucilla and Adam Thurschwell. 1987. “Feminism, Negativity, 
Intetsubjectivity” in Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell, (eds.),Feminism As  
Critique, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.
Demir, Hülya. 1998. İslamcı Kadının Aynadaki Sureti. İstanbul: Sul Pub.
Dietz, Mary. 1991. “Hannah Arendt and Feminist Politics” in Carole Pateman 
and M.D. Shanley (eds.) Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory. 
Pennsylvania: Pensylvania State University Press.
305
Durkheim Emile. 1995. The Elementary Forms o f  Reli2ious Life  N.Y and
London: The Free Press.
Durakbasa, Ayse. 1998. “Kemalism as Identity Politics in Turkey” in Zehra Arat 
(ed.) Deconstnictins ‘Im ases o f  Turkish W om en’. New York: St.Martin’s 
Press.
Eickelman F.Dale and James Piscatori (eds.). 1996. M uslim Politics Princeton 
and New Jensey: Princeton University Press.
Eliade, Mircae. 1990. Kutsal ve Din D m , Istanbul: Gece, trans by. Mehmet Ali 
Kılıçbay.
Eilias.Norbert. 1978. The History o f  Manners: The Civilizins Process, N.Y.:
Pantheon Books.
Elshtain, Jean. 1981. Public Man, Private Woman Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Esim Simel, Dilek Cindoglu. "Women's Organizations in 1990's Turkey: 
Predicatements and Prospects", Middle Eastern Studies , January 1999. Vol35, 
N o.l, pp.178-188.
Esposito, John L. 1984. Islam and Politics Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press.
............................ 1992. The Islamic Threat M yth or Reality? N.Y. and Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
............................... 1997. Political Islam, Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform ?.
London: Lynne Rienner Pub.
Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, (eds.). 1995. Global 
Modernities,London: Sage Pub.
306
Fernea Elisabeth (ed.). 1985. Women and the Family in the Middle East, New 
Voices o f  Chanee, A ustin : University of Texas Press.
Gaonkar Parameshwar Dilip. 1999. “On Alternative Modernities” Public 
Culture 11(19) 1999: 1-18
Geertz Clifford. 1968. Islam Observed, California: california University Press.
Gellner, Ernst. 1992. Reason and Culture, The Historic Role o f  Rationality 
and Rationalism  Oxford: Blackwell.
Gerda, Lerner. 1986. The Creation o f  Patriarchy. N.Y. and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The Constitution o f  Society, Cambridge: Polity Press.
................................ 1991. Modernity and S e lf  /¿fgnftfv.Cambridge: Polity Press
................................ 1976. New Rules o f  Socioloeical M ethod  London:
Hutchinson.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a D ifferent Voice, London and New York: Routledge.
Gluck Berger Sherna and Daphne Patai (eds.).1991. W om en’s Words The 
Feminist Practice o f  Oral History New York and London: Routledge.
307
Göle, Nilüfer. 1997a. “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey. The Making of Elites 
and Counter Elites” Middle East Journal 51(1) 1997.'
....................... 1997a. “Otoriter Laisizm ve Islamicy Politikalar” Yeni Türkiye
(18):252-276.
......................  1996. The Forbidden M odem . Ann Arbor; Michigan University
Press.
.......................  1997(b) “The Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere”, Public
Culture , 10(1): 61-81.
.......................  1998. “Islamism, Feminism and Post-Modernism: Women’s
Movements in Islamic Countires” New Perspectives On Turkey, (19) :53-71.
Gubrium F.Jaber and Holstein A. James. 1997. The New Laneuaee o f  
Qualitative Method. Oxford and N.Y.; Oxford University Press.
Giiner, Ahmet. 1996. Tarikatlar . Istanbul: Milliyet.
Gül bilek. Nurdan. 1992. Vitrinde Yasamak: 1980’lerin Kültürel İklim i 
IstanbuhMetis.
Hail Stuart. 1992 “Yerel ve Küresel: Küreselletme ve Etkinlik” M ürekkep  (3- 
4): 68-77.
Hall Stuart and Paul du Gay. 1996. Questions o f  Cultural Identity , London. 
Sage Pub.
Haddad, Y. Yazbeck and J.L.Esposito (eds.) 1997. Islam. Gender, and Social 
Change, Oxford; Oxford University Press.
Harding, Sandra. 1987. Feminism and Methodology. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
308
Heelas Paul, Scott Lash and Paul Morris (eds.). 1996. Detraditionalization, 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Hekman Susan. 1997. “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory 
revisited” Siens 22(21): 341-365.
Heper Metin “Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern 
Perspective’T /te Middle East Journal35(3):350-5Z.
Heper Metin and Ahmet Evin (eds.). 1994. Politics in the Third Turkish  
Republic Boulder: Westview Press.
Heper Metin. 1997. “The Impact of Secularization on Turkish Identity, 1920s- 
90s” Middle East Journal ,51(1).
Heper, Metin, and Ahmet Evin. 1988. The State, Military and Democracy. 
Berlin: De Gruyter.
Heper, Metin. 1987. “The State, the Military and Democracy in Turkey” The 
Jerusalem Journal o f  International Relations. 9(3):60-72.
Hollway. Wendy. 1998. “Recognition and Heterosexual Desire” in Diana 
R\chi\rdson(Qd.)Theorisim  iTgferQ^gxMa/t7v.Philadelphia:OpenUniversitv Press.
............................. 1995. “Feminist Discourses and Women’s heterosexual
Desire” in S. Wilkonson and C. Kitzinger. (eds.) Feminism and Discourse. 
London: Sage.
Inan-(^inar Alev. 1997. “Refah Party and The City Administration of Istanbul:
309
Liberal Islam, Localism and Hybridity”, New Perspectives On Turkey. (16): 23- 
41.
Kadioglu, Ayse. 1994. “Women’s Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the 
Villain” Middle East Journal 48:645-660.
Kandiyoti, Deniz. (ed.).1996. G enderim  The Middle East London:!.B.Tauris.
............................... (ed.) 1990. W omenJslamandTheState
London:MacMillan.
...............................  1987.“Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the
Turkish Case” Feminist Studies 13:317-338
.............................1988a “Bargaining with VdXx'mxcW'Gender and Society2:21 A-
290.
.............................. 1988b. “Slave Girls, Temptresses, and Comrades: Images of
Women in the Turkish Novel”, Feminist Issues . Spring: 35-50.
Kara Ismail. 1986. Türkiye’de İslamcılık DusuncesL Metinler, Kişiler I J I J I L
Istanbul: Risale.
......................  1994. Islamcylaryn Siyasi Göriibleri. Istanbul: 1994.
Karmi, Ghada. 1996. “Women, Islam and Patriarchalism” in Mai Yamani.(ed.) 
Feminism and Islam  ,U.K.; Ithaca Press, pp.69-87.
Kepel Gilles. 1991. The Revenee o f  God, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press.
Keyman Fuat. 1995. “On The Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism: The Crisis Of Hegemony and The Rise of (Islamic) Identity in 
Turkey” New Perspectives On Turkey (13):93-121.
.......................  1997. “Kemalizm Modernlik ve Gelenek” Toylum ve Bilim
(72):84-102.
...........................1998 “Radikal Demokrasi Kuramları; Türkiye ve Geç Modern
310
Zamanlarda Demokratik Yönetim” Defter (33): 191-223.
Keyman Fuat, Mutman Mahmut and Meyda Yegenoglu (eds.) 1997. 
Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark .İstanbul: iletişim.
Köker, Levent. 1990. Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi . İstanbul: 
iletişim.
Laçiner, Ömer. 1994. “Refah’yn Yükseli|)i ve Hayat Tarzy’nyn Siyasalla{)masy” 
Birikim  (60): 3-11.
Landes B. Joan. 1998. The Public and The Private Oxford and N.Y.: Oxford 
University Press.
Macpherson, C.b. 1989. Democratic Theory : Essays in Retrieval, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Macleod Elowe Arlene. 1991. Accommodatine Protest: Working Women, The 
New Veilin2, and Chanee in Cairo N.Y.: Columbia University Press.
Marcus E.George and Russell L.Hanson (eds.). 1993. Reconsiderins the 
Democratic Public .Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Mardin Serif. 1989. Relieion and Social Chanee in Modern Turkey, The Case
3II
o f  Said N ursi, New York: State University of New York Press.
..........................  1981. “Religion and Secularism in Turkey”, in Özbudun Ergun
and Ali Kazancigil eds.. Atatürk: Founder o f  a Modern State. Lodon: 
Duckworth and Co.
.......................  1990. Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset. Istanbul: IletiJ?im.
........................  1995. Din ve ideoloji. İstanbul: ileticim.
......................... 1994. Cultural transitions in the Middle East. Leiden: E.J.Brill.
Meehan Johanna (ed.) 1995. Feminists Read Habermas Genderine the 
Subject o f  Discourse N.Y. and London: Routledge.
Mernissi Fatima. 1975. Beyond The Veil: Male Female Dynamics in a 
Modern Muslim Society N.Y. and London: Schenkman Pub. Com.
Mernissi Fatima. \9 9 \.Women and Islam: A n  Historical and Theolo2ical 
Enquiry Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Moghadam M. Valentine (ed.). 1997. Patriarchy and Economic Development 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
.....................................................  1993. Modernizin2 Women: Gender and
Social Chanse in the Middle East Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
Moyser, George. 1991. Politics and Relieion in the Modern World. London 
and New York.
MoLiffe, Chantal. 1993. Return o f  the Political London: Verso.
...................... (ed) 1991. Dimensions o f  Radical Democracy London: Verso.
312
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 1998. “Crafting an Educated Housewife in Iran” in Lila 
Abu-Lughod.(ed) Rem akine W omen. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
pp .91-126.
Norton, Augustus, Richard. 1996. Civil Society in the Middle East. Leiden: 
E.J.Brill.
Oliver Roy. 1992. Siyasal İslam ’ın iflası Istanbul: Metis.
Öncü, Ayşe. 1981. “Turkish Women in Professions, Why So Many?” in Nermin 
Abadan-Unat (ed.) Women in Turkish Society. Leiden: E.J.Brill.
Özbudun Ergun and Ali Kazancigil (eds.). 1981. Atatürk: Founder o f  a 
Modern State, London: Duckhworthand Co.
Özdalga, Elisabeth and Sune Persson. 1998. Sivil Tonlum, Demokrasi ve Islam  
Diinyasy Istanbul: Tarih Vakfÿ Pub.
Papenek, Hanna. 1994. “The Ideal Woman and Ideal Society” in V. Moghadam 
(ed.) Identity Politics and Women. London and Oxford: Westview Press.
Parla, Taha. 1994. Anayasalar, Istanbul: Cep.
Pateman Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract Cambridge: Polity Press.
.......................... 1989. The Disorder o f  W omen, Stanford:Stanford University
Press.
313
Peterson V. Spike. 1996. “The Politics of Identification in the Context of 
Globalization” W omen’s Studies International Forum  . 19 (1-2), 1996: 5-15
Phillips Ann. 1994. Eneenderins Democracy Cambridge: Polity Press.
Piscatori P. James. 1986. Islam in a World o f  Nation States Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
...................... (ed.). 1983. Islam in the Political Process Cambridge:
Cambridge University press.
Punch,Maurice. 1986. The Politics and Ethics o f  Fieldwork London: Sage 
Pub.
Richardson, Dina. 1998. Theorisins Heterosexuality, Tellins it Straieht.
Philadelphia: Open University Press.
Rosaldo Michelle and Louise Lamphere (eds.) 1974. Woman, Culture and  
Society Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Rubin J.Herbert and Irene S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewine London: 
Sage Pub.
Rudolph Hoeber Susannnne and J. Piscatori (eds.) 1997. Transnational 
Relision and Fadine States Oxford: Westview Press.
314
Sabbah Fatna. 1984. Women in the M uslim Unconscious New York and 
Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Sakallioglu, Ümit Cizre. 1996. “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State 
Interaction in Republican Turkey” International Journal O f Middle Eastern 
Studies 28 (1996).
Saktanber, Ayse. 1995. “Becoming the ‘Other’ as a Muslim in Turkey: Turkish 
Women vs. Islamfst Women”, New Perspectives On Turkey, (11): 99-135.
.............................1997. “Formation of a Middle Class Ethos and its quotidian:
Revitalizing Islam in Modern Turkey” in Öncü, AyJje and Petra Weyland. (eds.). 
Space, Culture and Power, London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
Sarıbay Ali Yasar. 1994. Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam İstanbul: 
iletişim.
.................................  1985. Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası ,
İstanbul: Alan.
Saylan, Gencay. 1992. Türkiye’de Islam a Siyaset. Ankara: Verso.
Shaheed, Farida. 1995. “Networking for Change: The Role of Women’s Groups 
in Initiating Dialogue on Women’s Issues” in Mahnaz Afkhami. Faith and  
Freedom. New York: Syracuse University Press, pp.78-104.
Sharabi Hisham (ed.). 1990. Theory, Politics and The Arab World: Critical 
Responses London: Routledge.
Sharabi Hisham. 1988. Neo Patriarchy: A Theory o f  Distorted Change in
315
Arab Society Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shills Edward. 1981. Tradition Chicago: Chicago University press.
Shotter John. 1993. Cultural Politics o f  Everyday Life  London: Open 
University Press.
Silverman David (ed.) 1997. Qualitative Research, Theory, Method and 
Practice London: Sage Pub.
Sirman Nükhet. 1989. “Feminism in Turkey. A Short History” New  
Perspectives on Turkey 3(l):l-34.
Stowasser Barbara F. 1994. Women in the Quran, Traditions, and  
Interpretation Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stowasser F. Barbara (ed.). 1987. The Islamic Impulse London and Sydney: 
Croom Helm
Sunar İlkay and Binnaz Toprak. 1983. “Islam in Politics” Government and  
opposition, Vol.18, 1983.
Swatos, William (ed.). 1991. Relm ous Politics in Global and Comparative 
Perspective, New York: Grenwoodd Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1999. “Two Theories o f  Modernity” Public Culture 11(19):
316
153-174.
1996. “Sahicilik ilkesi ve Çokkültürcülük”, Coşito, (8): 282-
88.
Trend, David, (ed) 1996. Radical Democracy, Identity, Citizenshiv, and the 
State. New York and London: Routledge.
Tekeli, Tirin (ed.) 1990. Kadın Bakış Acısından 19801er Türkiye’sinde 
Kadınlar (Women From a Women’s Perspective in the Turkey of the 1980s), 
Istanbul: Iletitim.
Tibi,Bassam. 1998.TAg Challanee o f  Fundamentalism. Political Islam and  
the New World Disorder. Berkeley: California Press.
Tibi, Bassam. 1988. The Crisis o f Modern Islam  Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press.
Toprak, Binnaz. 1981. “Religion and Turkish Women” in Abadan Unat (ed.) 
Woman in Turkish Society Leiden: E.J. Brill.
............................ 1994. “Women and Fundamentalism in Turkey. The Case of
Turkey” in Valentine Moghadam (ed.) Identity Politics and W omen  Oxford: 
Westview Press.
.............................1981. Islam and Political Development in Turkey ,Leiden:
E.J. Brill.
Touraine, Alain. 1988. Return o f the Actor, Social Theory in Post-Industrial 
Society. Minneapolis: Minnesora Press.
317
Tucker, Judith (ed.). 1993. Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers , 
BloomingtonTndiana University Press.
Tucker, Judith. 1978. Women in 19"' Century E e \p t Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Tunaya, Zafer, Taryk. 1991 İslamcılık Akım ı Istanbul: Simavi Pub.
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları. 1998. İslam ’ın Isısında Kadın. Ankara. 
........................................................ 1997. Desisim Sürecinde İslam . Ankara.
Türköne, Mümtazer. 1991. Siyasal ideoloji Olarak Islamcılışın Dosıısıı 
İstanbul: iletişim.
Turner S. Bryan. 1996. The Body and Society London: Sage Publication.
Vergin, Nur. 1985. “Toplumsal Değişme ve Dinsellikle Artış” Toplum ve Bilim  
(29-30): 9-29.
Weber, Max. 1976. The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit O f Capitalism New 
York: MacMillan.
Weber, Max. 1992. The Sociolosy o f  Religion Boston: Beacon Press.
318
Weeks, Jeffrey. 1986. Sexuality London and N.Y.: Routledge.
Wodak, Ruth (ed.). 1997. Gender and Discourse London: Sage.
Yamani Mai. (ed.) 1996. Feminism and Islam, Legal and Literary 
Perspectives U.K: Ithaca Press.
Zuhur, Sherifa. 1992. Revealing Reveiline, Islamist Gender Ideology in 
Contemporary Egypt N.Y: State University of New York Press.
Zürcher, Erik. 1993. Turkey: A Modern History. London: LB. Tauris.
319
